Admission is Free Only if Your Dad is Rich! Distributional Effects of Corruption in Schools in Developing Countries
In the standard model of corruption, the rich are more likely to pay bribes for their children's education, reflecting higher ability to pay. This prediction is, however, driven by the assumption that the probability of punishment for bribe-ta...
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/10/18425177/admission-free-only-your-dad-rich-distributional-effects-corruption-schools-developing-countries http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16886 |
| id |
okr-10986-16886 |
|---|---|
| recordtype |
oai_dc |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR AGRICULTURAL SHOCKS AGRICULTURAL WAGE AGRICULTURAL WAGES AGRICULTURE ANTI-CORRUPTION AVERAGE ANNUAL BARGAINING BARGAINING MODELS BARGAINING POWER BASIC SERVICES BENCHMARK BRIBE BRIBE PAYERS BRIBERY BRIBES CHILD LABOR CHRONIC ILLNESS CORRUPT CORRUPTION CORRUPTION ACTS CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION COUNTRY REPORTS CRIME CRIMINAL DATA SET DEPENDENT VARIABLE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS DROUGHT ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC COSTS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC REVIEW ECONOMIC SHOCKS ECONOMICS ECONOMICS LITERATURE ELASTICITY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL MODEL EMPIRICAL RESULTS EMPIRICAL WORK EMPLOYMENT EQUILIBRIUM THEORY FARM PRODUCTS FARM SECTOR FARMERS HETEROSKEDASTICITY HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION HOUSEHOLD DATA HOUSEHOLD HEAD HOUSEHOLD INCOME HOUSEHOLD SIZE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HUMAN CAPITAL INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME GROWTH INCOME INEQUALITY INCOME LEVEL INCOME SHOCK INCOMES INCREASING INCOME INEQUALITY INCREASING INEQUALITY INEQUALITY INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY JUDICIARY LABOR MARKET LABORERS LAND OWNERSHIP MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION MEAN VALUE MEASUREMENT ERROR MEASUREMENT ERRORS MEASUREMENT OF CORRUPTION MEDIA MINISTER MORTALITY NEGATIVE SHOCK NEGATIVE SHOCKS NEGATIVE SIGN 0 HYPOTHESIS OCCUPATIONS PER CAPITA INCOME PERFECT INFORMATION PERMANENT INCOME POLICE POLICY CIRCLES POLICY DISCUSSIONS POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL LEADER POOR POOR FAMILIES POOR HOUSEHOLDS POOR PARENTS POOR PAY POOR PEOPLE POOR PERSON POSITIVE CORRELATION POVERTY REDUCTION PRICE DISCRIMINATION PROSECUTION PUBLIC GOOD REGIONAL DUMMIES REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESIDUAL TERM RESOURCE ALLOCATION RISK AVERSE RISK SHARING RULE OF LAW RURAL RURAL AREAS RURAL DEVELOPMENT RURAL ECONOMY SAVINGS SOCIAL CAPITAL TRANSPARENCY UNDERESTIMATES UNSKILLED LABOR UTILITY FUNCTION WEALTH |
| spellingShingle |
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR AGRICULTURAL SHOCKS AGRICULTURAL WAGE AGRICULTURAL WAGES AGRICULTURE ANTI-CORRUPTION AVERAGE ANNUAL BARGAINING BARGAINING MODELS BARGAINING POWER BASIC SERVICES BENCHMARK BRIBE BRIBE PAYERS BRIBERY BRIBES CHILD LABOR CHRONIC ILLNESS CORRUPT CORRUPTION CORRUPTION ACTS CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION COUNTRY REPORTS CRIME CRIMINAL DATA SET DEPENDENT VARIABLE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS DROUGHT ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC COSTS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC REVIEW ECONOMIC SHOCKS ECONOMICS ECONOMICS LITERATURE ELASTICITY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL MODEL EMPIRICAL RESULTS EMPIRICAL WORK EMPLOYMENT EQUILIBRIUM THEORY FARM PRODUCTS FARM SECTOR FARMERS HETEROSKEDASTICITY HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION HOUSEHOLD DATA HOUSEHOLD HEAD HOUSEHOLD INCOME HOUSEHOLD SIZE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HUMAN CAPITAL INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME GROWTH INCOME INEQUALITY INCOME LEVEL INCOME SHOCK INCOMES INCREASING INCOME INEQUALITY INCREASING INEQUALITY INEQUALITY INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY JUDICIARY LABOR MARKET LABORERS LAND OWNERSHIP MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION MEAN VALUE MEASUREMENT ERROR MEASUREMENT ERRORS MEASUREMENT OF CORRUPTION MEDIA MINISTER MORTALITY NEGATIVE SHOCK NEGATIVE SHOCKS NEGATIVE SIGN 0 HYPOTHESIS OCCUPATIONS PER CAPITA INCOME PERFECT INFORMATION PERMANENT INCOME POLICE POLICY CIRCLES POLICY DISCUSSIONS POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL LEADER POOR POOR FAMILIES POOR HOUSEHOLDS POOR PARENTS POOR PAY POOR PEOPLE POOR PERSON POSITIVE CORRELATION POVERTY REDUCTION PRICE DISCRIMINATION PROSECUTION PUBLIC GOOD REGIONAL DUMMIES REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESIDUAL TERM RESOURCE ALLOCATION RISK AVERSE RISK SHARING RULE OF LAW RURAL RURAL AREAS RURAL DEVELOPMENT RURAL ECONOMY SAVINGS SOCIAL CAPITAL TRANSPARENCY UNDERESTIMATES UNSKILLED LABOR UTILITY FUNCTION WEALTH Emran, M. Shahe Islam, Asadul Shilpi, Forhad Admission is Free Only if Your Dad is Rich! Distributional Effects of Corruption in Schools in Developing Countries |
| geographic_facet |
South Asia Bangladesh |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6671 |
| description |
In the standard model of corruption, the
rich are more likely to pay bribes for their children's
education, reflecting higher ability to pay. This prediction
is, however, driven by the assumption that the probability
of punishment for bribe-taking is invariant across
households. In many developing countries lacking in rule of
law, this assumption is untenable, because the enforcement
of law is not impersonal or unbiased and the poor have
little bargaining power. In a more realistic model where the
probability of punishment depends on the household's
economic status, bribes are likely to be regressive, both at
the extensive and intensive margins. Using rainfall
variations as an instrument for household income in rural
Bangladesh, this paper finds strong evidence that corruption
in schools is doubly regressive: (i) the poor are more
likely to pay bribes, and (ii) among the bribe payers, the
poor pay a higher share of their income. The results
indicate that progressivity in bribes reported in the
earlier literature may be due to identification challenges.
The Ordinary Least Squares regressions show that bribes
increase with household income, but the Instrumental
Variables estimates suggest that the Ordinary Least Squares
results are spurious, driven by selection on ability and
preference. The evidence reported in this paper implies that
"free schooling" is free only for the rich and
corruption makes the playing field skewed against the poor.
This may provide a partial explanation for the observed
educational immobility in developing countries. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Emran, M. Shahe Islam, Asadul Shilpi, Forhad |
| author_facet |
Emran, M. Shahe Islam, Asadul Shilpi, Forhad |
| author_sort |
Emran, M. Shahe |
| title |
Admission is Free Only if Your Dad is Rich! Distributional Effects of Corruption in Schools in Developing Countries |
| title_short |
Admission is Free Only if Your Dad is Rich! Distributional Effects of Corruption in Schools in Developing Countries |
| title_full |
Admission is Free Only if Your Dad is Rich! Distributional Effects of Corruption in Schools in Developing Countries |
| title_fullStr |
Admission is Free Only if Your Dad is Rich! Distributional Effects of Corruption in Schools in Developing Countries |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Admission is Free Only if Your Dad is Rich! Distributional Effects of Corruption in Schools in Developing Countries |
| title_sort |
admission is free only if your dad is rich! distributional effects of corruption in schools in developing countries |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/10/18425177/admission-free-only-your-dad-rich-distributional-effects-corruption-schools-developing-countries http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16886 |
| _version_ |
1764434810398310400 |
| spelling |
okr-10986-168862021-04-23T14:03:32Z Admission is Free Only if Your Dad is Rich! Distributional Effects of Corruption in Schools in Developing Countries Emran, M. Shahe Islam, Asadul Shilpi, Forhad AGRICULTURAL SECTOR AGRICULTURAL SHOCKS AGRICULTURAL WAGE AGRICULTURAL WAGES AGRICULTURE ANTI-CORRUPTION AVERAGE ANNUAL BARGAINING BARGAINING MODELS BARGAINING POWER BASIC SERVICES BENCHMARK BRIBE BRIBE PAYERS BRIBERY BRIBES CHILD LABOR CHRONIC ILLNESS CORRUPT CORRUPTION CORRUPTION ACTS CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION COUNTRY REPORTS CRIME CRIMINAL DATA SET DEPENDENT VARIABLE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS DROUGHT ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC COSTS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC REVIEW ECONOMIC SHOCKS ECONOMICS ECONOMICS LITERATURE ELASTICITY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL MODEL EMPIRICAL RESULTS EMPIRICAL WORK EMPLOYMENT EQUILIBRIUM THEORY FARM PRODUCTS FARM SECTOR FARMERS HETEROSKEDASTICITY HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION HOUSEHOLD DATA HOUSEHOLD HEAD HOUSEHOLD INCOME HOUSEHOLD SIZE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HUMAN CAPITAL INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME GROWTH INCOME INEQUALITY INCOME LEVEL INCOME SHOCK INCOMES INCREASING INCOME INEQUALITY INCREASING INEQUALITY INEQUALITY INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY JUDICIARY LABOR MARKET LABORERS LAND OWNERSHIP MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION MEAN VALUE MEASUREMENT ERROR MEASUREMENT ERRORS MEASUREMENT OF CORRUPTION MEDIA MINISTER MORTALITY NEGATIVE SHOCK NEGATIVE SHOCKS NEGATIVE SIGN 0 HYPOTHESIS OCCUPATIONS PER CAPITA INCOME PERFECT INFORMATION PERMANENT INCOME POLICE POLICY CIRCLES POLICY DISCUSSIONS POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL LEADER POOR POOR FAMILIES POOR HOUSEHOLDS POOR PARENTS POOR PAY POOR PEOPLE POOR PERSON POSITIVE CORRELATION POVERTY REDUCTION PRICE DISCRIMINATION PROSECUTION PUBLIC GOOD REGIONAL DUMMIES REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESIDUAL TERM RESOURCE ALLOCATION RISK AVERSE RISK SHARING RULE OF LAW RURAL RURAL AREAS RURAL DEVELOPMENT RURAL ECONOMY SAVINGS SOCIAL CAPITAL TRANSPARENCY UNDERESTIMATES UNSKILLED LABOR UTILITY FUNCTION WEALTH In the standard model of corruption, the rich are more likely to pay bribes for their children's education, reflecting higher ability to pay. This prediction is, however, driven by the assumption that the probability of punishment for bribe-taking is invariant across households. In many developing countries lacking in rule of law, this assumption is untenable, because the enforcement of law is not impersonal or unbiased and the poor have little bargaining power. In a more realistic model where the probability of punishment depends on the household's economic status, bribes are likely to be regressive, both at the extensive and intensive margins. Using rainfall variations as an instrument for household income in rural Bangladesh, this paper finds strong evidence that corruption in schools is doubly regressive: (i) the poor are more likely to pay bribes, and (ii) among the bribe payers, the poor pay a higher share of their income. The results indicate that progressivity in bribes reported in the earlier literature may be due to identification challenges. The Ordinary Least Squares regressions show that bribes increase with household income, but the Instrumental Variables estimates suggest that the Ordinary Least Squares results are spurious, driven by selection on ability and preference. The evidence reported in this paper implies that "free schooling" is free only for the rich and corruption makes the playing field skewed against the poor. This may provide a partial explanation for the observed educational immobility in developing countries. 2014-02-04T20:05:21Z 2014-02-04T20:05:21Z 2013-10 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/10/18425177/admission-free-only-your-dad-rich-distributional-effects-corruption-schools-developing-countries http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16886 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6671 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research South Asia Bangladesh |