Political Budget Cycles and the Organization of Political Parties
This paper introduces a new explanation for political budget cycles: politicians have stronger incentives to increase spending around elections in the presence of younger political parties. Previous research has shown that political budget cycles a...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/10/18400406/political-budget-cycles-organization-political-parties http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16869 |
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okr-10986-168692021-04-23T14:03:32Z Political Budget Cycles and the Organization of Political Parties Hanusch, Marek Keefer, Philip BUDGET CYCLE FISCAL POLICY POLITICAL PARTY COLLECTIVE ACTION ELECTION AMDINISTRATION BUSINESS CYCLE BUSINESS CYCLE FLUCTUATIONS BUSINESS CYCLES BUSINESS CYCLESGOVERNMENT SPENDING CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES CAMPAIGN FINANCING CITIZEN ACTION COLLECTIVE ACTION CONSUMPTION DATA CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES CONSUMPTION MEASURE CONSUMPTION MEASURE DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY DEMOCRATIZATION DEMOCRATIZATION ECONOMIC GROWTH ELECTION ELECTION RESULT ELECTION TIME ELECTIONEERING ELECTIONS EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURE DATA ATA EXPENDITURES FINAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE FISCAL POLICY GDP PER CAPITA GENERAL GOVERNMENT FINAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE GOVERNMENT FINAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT SPENDING LEGISLATIVE SEATS NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS NATIONAL INCOME NEW DEMOCRACIES PARTY LEADERS PARTY POSITIONS POLITICAL ACTORS POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE POLITICAL CANDIDATES POLITICAL CONTROL NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS PUBLIC SPENDING REAL ECONOMIC GROWTH REAL GDP SUBNATIONAL SPENDING TOTAL EXPENDITURES TOTAL EXPENDITURES BUSINESS CYCLE BUSINESS CYCLE FLUCTUATIONS BUSINESS CYCLES GOVERNMENT SPENDING CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES CAMPAIGN FINANCING CITIZEN ACTION CITIZEN ACTION COLLECTIVE ACTION COLLECTIVE ACTION CONSUMPTION DATA CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES CONSUMPTION MEASURE DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY DEMOCRATIZATION ECONOMIC GROWTH ELECTION ELECTION ELECTION RESULT ELECTION RESULT ELECTION TIME ELECTION TIME ELECTIONEERING ELECTIONEERING ELECTIONS ELECTIONS EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURE DATA EXPENDITURE DATA EXPENDITURES FINAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE FISCAL POLICY GDP PER CAPITA GENERAL GOVERNMENT FINAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE FISCAL POLICY GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT SPENDING LEGISLATIVE SEATS LEGISLATIVE SEATS NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS NATIONAL INCOME NATIONAL INCOME NEW DEMOCRACIES NEW DEMOCRACIES PARTY LEADERS PARTY POSITIONS PARTY POSITIONS POLITICAL ACTORS POLITICAL ACTORS POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE PARTY LEADERS POLITICAL CANDIDATES POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICAL VARIABLES PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION PUBLIC OPINION NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS PUBLIC SPENDING NATIONAL SPENDING SUBNATIONAL SPENDING TOTAL EXPENDITURES VOTER VOTERS This paper introduces a new explanation for political budget cycles: politicians have stronger incentives to increase spending around elections in the presence of younger political parties. Previous research has shown that political budget cycles are larger when voters are uninformed about politician characteristics and when politicians are less credible. The effects of party age can be traced to organizational differences between younger and older parties that also affect voter information and politician credibility. Parties organized around particular individuals, rather than around policy labels or a party machine, are less likely to survive the departure of party leaders, to adopt organizational attributes that promote voter information and political credibility, and to limit political budget cycles. Previous research has also shown larger political budget cycles in younger democracies. Evidence presented here indicates that party age accounts for this effect. 2014-02-04T17:55:49Z 2014-02-04T17:55:49Z 2013-10 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/10/18400406/political-budget-cycles-organization-political-parties http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16869 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6654 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
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Digital Repository |
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Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
BUDGET CYCLE FISCAL POLICY POLITICAL PARTY COLLECTIVE ACTION ELECTION AMDINISTRATION BUSINESS CYCLE BUSINESS CYCLE FLUCTUATIONS BUSINESS CYCLES BUSINESS CYCLESGOVERNMENT SPENDING CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES CAMPAIGN FINANCING CITIZEN ACTION COLLECTIVE ACTION CONSUMPTION DATA CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES CONSUMPTION MEASURE CONSUMPTION MEASURE DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY DEMOCRATIZATION DEMOCRATIZATION ECONOMIC GROWTH ELECTION ELECTION RESULT ELECTION TIME ELECTIONEERING ELECTIONS EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURE DATA ATA EXPENDITURES FINAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE FISCAL POLICY GDP PER CAPITA GENERAL GOVERNMENT FINAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE GOVERNMENT FINAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT SPENDING LEGISLATIVE SEATS NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS NATIONAL INCOME NEW DEMOCRACIES PARTY LEADERS PARTY POSITIONS POLITICAL ACTORS POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE POLITICAL CANDIDATES POLITICAL CONTROL NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS PUBLIC SPENDING REAL ECONOMIC GROWTH REAL GDP SUBNATIONAL SPENDING TOTAL EXPENDITURES TOTAL EXPENDITURES BUSINESS CYCLE BUSINESS CYCLE FLUCTUATIONS BUSINESS CYCLES GOVERNMENT SPENDING CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES CAMPAIGN FINANCING CITIZEN ACTION CITIZEN ACTION COLLECTIVE ACTION COLLECTIVE ACTION CONSUMPTION DATA CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES CONSUMPTION MEASURE DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY DEMOCRATIZATION ECONOMIC GROWTH ELECTION ELECTION ELECTION RESULT ELECTION RESULT ELECTION TIME ELECTION TIME ELECTIONEERING ELECTIONEERING ELECTIONS ELECTIONS EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURE DATA EXPENDITURE DATA EXPENDITURES FINAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE FISCAL POLICY GDP PER CAPITA GENERAL GOVERNMENT FINAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE FISCAL POLICY GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT SPENDING LEGISLATIVE SEATS LEGISLATIVE SEATS NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS NATIONAL INCOME NATIONAL INCOME NEW DEMOCRACIES NEW DEMOCRACIES PARTY LEADERS PARTY POSITIONS PARTY POSITIONS POLITICAL ACTORS POLITICAL ACTORS POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE PARTY LEADERS POLITICAL CANDIDATES POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICAL VARIABLES PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION PUBLIC OPINION NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS PUBLIC SPENDING NATIONAL SPENDING SUBNATIONAL SPENDING TOTAL EXPENDITURES VOTER VOTERS |
| spellingShingle |
BUDGET CYCLE FISCAL POLICY POLITICAL PARTY COLLECTIVE ACTION ELECTION AMDINISTRATION BUSINESS CYCLE BUSINESS CYCLE FLUCTUATIONS BUSINESS CYCLES BUSINESS CYCLESGOVERNMENT SPENDING CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES CAMPAIGN FINANCING CITIZEN ACTION COLLECTIVE ACTION CONSUMPTION DATA CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES CONSUMPTION MEASURE CONSUMPTION MEASURE DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY DEMOCRATIZATION DEMOCRATIZATION ECONOMIC GROWTH ELECTION ELECTION RESULT ELECTION TIME ELECTIONEERING ELECTIONS EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURE DATA ATA EXPENDITURES FINAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE FISCAL POLICY GDP PER CAPITA GENERAL GOVERNMENT FINAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE GOVERNMENT FINAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT SPENDING LEGISLATIVE SEATS NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS NATIONAL INCOME NEW DEMOCRACIES PARTY LEADERS PARTY POSITIONS POLITICAL ACTORS POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE POLITICAL CANDIDATES POLITICAL CONTROL NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS PUBLIC SPENDING REAL ECONOMIC GROWTH REAL GDP SUBNATIONAL SPENDING TOTAL EXPENDITURES TOTAL EXPENDITURES BUSINESS CYCLE BUSINESS CYCLE FLUCTUATIONS BUSINESS CYCLES GOVERNMENT SPENDING CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES CAMPAIGN FINANCING CITIZEN ACTION CITIZEN ACTION COLLECTIVE ACTION COLLECTIVE ACTION CONSUMPTION DATA CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES CONSUMPTION MEASURE DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY DEMOCRATIZATION ECONOMIC GROWTH ELECTION ELECTION ELECTION RESULT ELECTION RESULT ELECTION TIME ELECTION TIME ELECTIONEERING ELECTIONEERING ELECTIONS ELECTIONS EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURE DATA EXPENDITURE DATA EXPENDITURES FINAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE FISCAL POLICY GDP PER CAPITA GENERAL GOVERNMENT FINAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE FISCAL POLICY GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT SPENDING LEGISLATIVE SEATS LEGISLATIVE SEATS NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS NATIONAL INCOME NATIONAL INCOME NEW DEMOCRACIES NEW DEMOCRACIES PARTY LEADERS PARTY POSITIONS PARTY POSITIONS POLITICAL ACTORS POLITICAL ACTORS POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE PARTY LEADERS POLITICAL CANDIDATES POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICAL VARIABLES PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION PUBLIC OPINION NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS PUBLIC SPENDING NATIONAL SPENDING SUBNATIONAL SPENDING TOTAL EXPENDITURES VOTER VOTERS Hanusch, Marek Keefer, Philip Political Budget Cycles and the Organization of Political Parties |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6654 |
| description |
This paper introduces a new explanation
for political budget cycles: politicians have stronger
incentives to increase spending around elections in the
presence of younger political parties. Previous research has
shown that political budget cycles are larger when voters
are uninformed about politician characteristics and when
politicians are less credible. The effects of party age can
be traced to organizational differences between younger and
older parties that also affect voter information and
politician credibility. Parties organized around particular
individuals, rather than around policy labels or a party
machine, are less likely to survive the departure of party
leaders, to adopt organizational attributes that promote
voter information and political credibility, and to limit
political budget cycles. Previous research has also shown
larger political budget cycles in younger democracies.
Evidence presented here indicates that party age accounts
for this effect. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Hanusch, Marek Keefer, Philip |
| author_facet |
Hanusch, Marek Keefer, Philip |
| author_sort |
Hanusch, Marek |
| title |
Political Budget Cycles and the Organization of Political Parties |
| title_short |
Political Budget Cycles and the Organization of Political Parties |
| title_full |
Political Budget Cycles and the Organization of Political Parties |
| title_fullStr |
Political Budget Cycles and the Organization of Political Parties |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Political Budget Cycles and the Organization of Political Parties |
| title_sort |
political budget cycles and the organization of political parties |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/10/18400406/political-budget-cycles-organization-political-parties http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16869 |
| _version_ |
1764434751874138112 |