Political Budget Cycles and the Organization of Political Parties
This paper introduces a new explanation for political budget cycles: politicians have stronger incentives to increase spending around elections in the presence of younger political parties. Previous research has shown that political budget cycles a...
Main Authors: | , |
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Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
Language: | English en_US |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/10/18400406/political-budget-cycles-organization-political-parties http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16869 |
Summary: | This paper introduces a new explanation
for political budget cycles: politicians have stronger
incentives to increase spending around elections in the
presence of younger political parties. Previous research has
shown that political budget cycles are larger when voters
are uninformed about politician characteristics and when
politicians are less credible. The effects of party age can
be traced to organizational differences between younger and
older parties that also affect voter information and
politician credibility. Parties organized around particular
individuals, rather than around policy labels or a party
machine, are less likely to survive the departure of party
leaders, to adopt organizational attributes that promote
voter information and political credibility, and to limit
political budget cycles. Previous research has also shown
larger political budget cycles in younger democracies.
Evidence presented here indicates that party age accounts
for this effect. |
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