Financing Pharmaceutical Innovation : How Much Should Poor Countries Contribute?
A public economics framework is used to consider how pharmaceuticals should be priced when at least some of the research and development incentive comes from sales revenues. Familiar techniques of public finance are used to relax some of the restri...
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Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank
2014
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/01/17747581/financing-pharmaceutical-innovation-much-poor-countries-contribute http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16481 |
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okr-10986-164812021-04-23T14:03:29Z Financing Pharmaceutical Innovation : How Much Should Poor Countries Contribute? Jack, William Lanjouw, Jean O. ADVERTISING ARBITRAGE BENCHMARK CONSUMER DEMAND CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS COST INCREASES COST OF CAPITAL COUNTRY MARKETS CUSTOMS DAMAGES DEMAND ELASTICITY DEVELOPING ECONOMIES DEVELOPING ECONOMY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE DIFFERENTIAL PRICING E-MAIL E-MAIL ADDRESS ECONOMIC COOPERATION ECONOMIC LAW ECONOMIC RENTS ELASTICITY ELASTICITY OF DEMAND FAIR FIXED COSTS FORMAL ANALYSES FREE MARKET INCENTIVE EFFECTS INCOME INCOME LEVELS INCOME TAX INCOMES INCREASING RETURNS INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE INNOVATION INNOVATION POLICY INNOVATIONS INSTITUTION INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INVENTION LEGAL ISSUES LICENSE LICENSES MACROECONOMICS MANUFACTURING MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COST OF PRODUCTION MARGINAL COST PRICING MARGINAL COSTS MARGINAL REVENUE MARGINAL UTILITY MARKETING MONOPOLY MONOPOLY PRICE MONOPOLY PRICES NEW PRODUCTS PATENTS POSTAL SERVICE POSTAL SERVICES PRICE CEILINGS PRICE CONTROL PRICE CONTROLS PRICE DISCRIMINATION PRICE INCREASE PRICE LEVELS PRICE REGULATION PRICE STRUCTURE PRICE STRUCTURES PRICING MODEL PRICING POLICIES PROCUREMENT PRODUCTIVITY PROFIT MARGIN PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC POLICY R&D RAMSEY PRICE RAMSEY PRICES REGULATORS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK RESEARCH INVESTMENT RESULT RESULTS RETURNS TO SCALE SALE SALES SALES ARRANGEMENTS SAVINGS SENIOR CITIZEN SOCIAL COST SOCIAL COSTS SOCIAL VALUE SUPPLIERS TARGETS TAX TAX CREDITS TAX RATES TAX STRUCTURE TAX SYSTEM TAXATION USES UTILITY FUNCTION VOTERS WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO A public economics framework is used to consider how pharmaceuticals should be priced when at least some of the research and development incentive comes from sales revenues. Familiar techniques of public finance are used to relax some of the restrictions implied in the standard use of Ramsey pricing. Under the more general model, poor countries should not necessarily cover even their own marginal costs, and the pricing structure is not related to that which will be chosen by a monopolist in a simple way. This framework is then used to examine ongoing debates regarding the international patent system as embodied in the world trade organization's agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights. 2014-01-03T20:55:55Z 2014-01-03T20:55:55Z 2005-01 Journal Article http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/01/17747581/financing-pharmaceutical-innovation-much-poor-countries-contribute World Bank Economic Review doi:10.1093/wber/lhi005 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16481 English en_US CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank Publications & Research :: Journal Article Publications & Research :: Journal Article |
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World Bank |
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English en_US |
topic |
ADVERTISING ARBITRAGE BENCHMARK CONSUMER DEMAND CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS COST INCREASES COST OF CAPITAL COUNTRY MARKETS CUSTOMS DAMAGES DEMAND ELASTICITY DEVELOPING ECONOMIES DEVELOPING ECONOMY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE DIFFERENTIAL PRICING E-MAIL ADDRESS ECONOMIC COOPERATION ECONOMIC LAW ECONOMIC RENTS ELASTICITY ELASTICITY OF DEMAND FAIR FIXED COSTS FORMAL ANALYSES FREE MARKET INCENTIVE EFFECTS INCOME INCOME LEVELS INCOME TAX INCOMES INCREASING RETURNS INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE INNOVATION INNOVATION POLICY INNOVATIONS INSTITUTION INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INVENTION LEGAL ISSUES LICENSE LICENSES MACROECONOMICS MANUFACTURING MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COST OF PRODUCTION MARGINAL COST PRICING MARGINAL COSTS MARGINAL REVENUE MARGINAL UTILITY MARKETING MONOPOLY MONOPOLY PRICE MONOPOLY PRICES NEW PRODUCTS PATENTS POSTAL SERVICE POSTAL SERVICES PRICE CEILINGS PRICE CONTROL PRICE CONTROLS PRICE DISCRIMINATION PRICE INCREASE PRICE LEVELS PRICE REGULATION PRICE STRUCTURE PRICE STRUCTURES PRICING MODEL PRICING POLICIES PROCUREMENT PRODUCTIVITY PROFIT MARGIN PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC POLICY R&D RAMSEY PRICE RAMSEY PRICES REGULATORS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK RESEARCH INVESTMENT RESULT RESULTS RETURNS TO SCALE SALE SALES SALES ARRANGEMENTS SAVINGS SENIOR CITIZEN SOCIAL COST SOCIAL COSTS SOCIAL VALUE SUPPLIERS TARGETS TAX TAX CREDITS TAX RATES TAX STRUCTURE TAX SYSTEM TAXATION USES UTILITY FUNCTION VOTERS WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO |
spellingShingle |
ADVERTISING ARBITRAGE BENCHMARK CONSUMER DEMAND CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS COST INCREASES COST OF CAPITAL COUNTRY MARKETS CUSTOMS DAMAGES DEMAND ELASTICITY DEVELOPING ECONOMIES DEVELOPING ECONOMY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE DIFFERENTIAL PRICING E-MAIL ADDRESS ECONOMIC COOPERATION ECONOMIC LAW ECONOMIC RENTS ELASTICITY ELASTICITY OF DEMAND FAIR FIXED COSTS FORMAL ANALYSES FREE MARKET INCENTIVE EFFECTS INCOME INCOME LEVELS INCOME TAX INCOMES INCREASING RETURNS INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE INNOVATION INNOVATION POLICY INNOVATIONS INSTITUTION INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INVENTION LEGAL ISSUES LICENSE LICENSES MACROECONOMICS MANUFACTURING MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COST OF PRODUCTION MARGINAL COST PRICING MARGINAL COSTS MARGINAL REVENUE MARGINAL UTILITY MARKETING MONOPOLY MONOPOLY PRICE MONOPOLY PRICES NEW PRODUCTS PATENTS POSTAL SERVICE POSTAL SERVICES PRICE CEILINGS PRICE CONTROL PRICE CONTROLS PRICE DISCRIMINATION PRICE INCREASE PRICE LEVELS PRICE REGULATION PRICE STRUCTURE PRICE STRUCTURES PRICING MODEL PRICING POLICIES PROCUREMENT PRODUCTIVITY PROFIT MARGIN PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC POLICY R&D RAMSEY PRICE RAMSEY PRICES REGULATORS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK RESEARCH INVESTMENT RESULT RESULTS RETURNS TO SCALE SALE SALES SALES ARRANGEMENTS SAVINGS SENIOR CITIZEN SOCIAL COST SOCIAL COSTS SOCIAL VALUE SUPPLIERS TARGETS TAX TAX CREDITS TAX RATES TAX STRUCTURE TAX SYSTEM TAXATION USES UTILITY FUNCTION VOTERS WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO Jack, William Lanjouw, Jean O. Financing Pharmaceutical Innovation : How Much Should Poor Countries Contribute? |
description |
A public economics framework is used to
consider how pharmaceuticals should be priced when at least
some of the research and development incentive comes from
sales revenues. Familiar techniques of public finance are
used to relax some of the restrictions implied in the
standard use of Ramsey pricing. Under the more general
model, poor countries should not necessarily cover even
their own marginal costs, and the pricing structure is not
related to that which will be chosen by a monopolist in a
simple way. This framework is then used to examine ongoing
debates regarding the international patent system as
embodied in the world trade organization's agreement on
trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights. |
format |
Journal Article |
author |
Jack, William Lanjouw, Jean O. |
author_facet |
Jack, William Lanjouw, Jean O. |
author_sort |
Jack, William |
title |
Financing Pharmaceutical Innovation : How Much Should Poor Countries Contribute? |
title_short |
Financing Pharmaceutical Innovation : How Much Should Poor Countries Contribute? |
title_full |
Financing Pharmaceutical Innovation : How Much Should Poor Countries Contribute? |
title_fullStr |
Financing Pharmaceutical Innovation : How Much Should Poor Countries Contribute? |
title_full_unstemmed |
Financing Pharmaceutical Innovation : How Much Should Poor Countries Contribute? |
title_sort |
financing pharmaceutical innovation : how much should poor countries contribute? |
publisher |
Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank |
publishDate |
2014 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/01/17747581/financing-pharmaceutical-innovation-much-poor-countries-contribute http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16481 |
_version_ |
1764433346706800640 |