Regional Integration as Diplomacy

Regional integration agreements are examples of second-best policies and have an ambiguous impact on welfare. This article builds a model in which regional integration agreements unambiguously raise welfare by correcting for externalities. It assum...

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Main Authors: Schiff, Maurice, Winters, L. Alan
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank 2013
Subjects:
TAX
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/05/17718660/regional-integration-diplomacy
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16435
id okr-10986-16435
recordtype oai_dc
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
en_US
topic ABSOLUTE VALUE
AGRICULTURAL TRADE
ANDEAN PACT
AVERAGE TARIFFS
BENEFITS OF TRADE
BORDER MEASURES
CAPITAL GOODS
CIVIL WAR
COMMON MARKET
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
CONCESSIONS
CONSUMER PRICES
CONSUMERS
CURRENCY
CUSTOMS
CUSTOMS UNION
CUSTOMS UNIONS
DEMAND CURVE
DEMAND CURVES
DEMOCRACIES
DEMOCRACY
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
DEVELOPING COUNTRY
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
DIVIDEND
DOMESTIC TAXES
ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS
ECONOMIC COOPERATION
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES
ECONOMIC POLICIES
ECONOMIC POLICY
ECONOMIC POWER
ECONOMIC REFORM
ECONOMIC RELATIONS
ECONOMIC RESEARCH
ECONOMIC THEORY
ECONOMIC WELFARE
ECONOMICS RESEARCH
ECONOMIES OF SCALE
ELASTICITY
ELASTICITY OF DEMAND
EMBARGO
EQUATIONS
EQUILIBRIUM
EUROPEAN UNION
EXPORT SUBSIDIES
EXPORTS
EXTERNAL BARRIERS
EXTERNAL TARIFF
EXTERNAL TARIFFS
EXTERNAL TRADE
EXTERNAL TRADE BARRIERS
EXTERNAL TRADE POLICY
EXTERNALITIES
EXTERNALITY
FACE VALUE
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
FOREIGN SOURCES
FORMAL ANALYSIS
FREE TRADE
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
FUNCTIONAL FORMS
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
GLOBAL TRADING
GRANGER CAUSALITY
HARMONIZATION
HOME COUNTRY
IMPACT OF TRADE
INCOME
INCOMES
INSURANCE
INTERNAL MARKET
INTERNATIONAL BANK
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
INTERNATIONAL TRADING
MARGINAL PRODUCTS
MARGINAL UTILITY
MARGINAL VALUE
MARKET ACCESS
MARKET SEGMENTATION
MARKET SHARE
MUTUAL INVESTMENT
MUTUAL RECOGNITION
MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF STANDARDS
NASH EQUILIBRIUM
NATIONAL INCOME
OPEN MARKETS
OPTIMIZATION
OUTPUT
PER CAPITA INCOME
POLICY RESEARCH
POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES
POSITIVE EXTERNALITY
POTENTIAL CONFLICTS
PREFERENTIAL TRADE
PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
PREFERENTIAL TRADING ARRANGEMENTS
PRESENT VALUE
PRICE OF IMPORTS
PRODUCTION FUNCTION
PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS
PUBLIC GOOD
REGIONAL GROUPS
REGIONAL INTEGRATION
REGIONAL INTEGRATION AGREEMENT
REGIONAL INTEGRATION AGREEMENTS
REGIONAL POWERS
REGIONAL TRADE
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
REGIONALISM
RULES OF ORIGIN
SECURITY CONCERN
SECURITY CONCERNS
SINGLE MARKET
SMALL COUNTRIES
SOCIAL CAPITAL
SOCIAL COST
SOCIAL DEMAND
SOCIAL VALUE
SOCIAL VALUES
SOCIAL WELFARE
TARIFF RATE
TAX
TAX RATE
TAXATION
TERMS OF TRADE
TRADE BARRIERS
TRADE BLOCKS
TRADE CREATION
TRADE DIVERSION
TRADE FLOWS
TRADE FRICTIONS
TRADE LIBERALIZATION
TRADE MODEL
TRADE MORE
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
TRADE POLICIES
TRADE POLICY
TRADE PREFERENCES
TRADE RELATIONS
TRADE SURPLUS
TRADE TAXES
TRADING BLOCS
TRADING SYSTEM
UNILATERAL LIBERALIZATION
URUGUAY ROUND
UTILITY FUNCTION
UTILITY MAXIMIZATION
VALUE OF IMPORTS
WEALTH
WELFARE FUNCTION
WELFARE GAINS
WELFARE LOSS
WORLD ECONOMY
WORLD MARKET
WORLD PRICES
spellingShingle ABSOLUTE VALUE
AGRICULTURAL TRADE
ANDEAN PACT
AVERAGE TARIFFS
BENEFITS OF TRADE
BORDER MEASURES
CAPITAL GOODS
CIVIL WAR
COMMON MARKET
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
CONCESSIONS
CONSUMER PRICES
CONSUMERS
CURRENCY
CUSTOMS
CUSTOMS UNION
CUSTOMS UNIONS
DEMAND CURVE
DEMAND CURVES
DEMOCRACIES
DEMOCRACY
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
DEVELOPING COUNTRY
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
DIVIDEND
DOMESTIC TAXES
ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS
ECONOMIC COOPERATION
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES
ECONOMIC POLICIES
ECONOMIC POLICY
ECONOMIC POWER
ECONOMIC REFORM
ECONOMIC RELATIONS
ECONOMIC RESEARCH
ECONOMIC THEORY
ECONOMIC WELFARE
ECONOMICS RESEARCH
ECONOMIES OF SCALE
ELASTICITY
ELASTICITY OF DEMAND
EMBARGO
EQUATIONS
EQUILIBRIUM
EUROPEAN UNION
EXPORT SUBSIDIES
EXPORTS
EXTERNAL BARRIERS
EXTERNAL TARIFF
EXTERNAL TARIFFS
EXTERNAL TRADE
EXTERNAL TRADE BARRIERS
EXTERNAL TRADE POLICY
EXTERNALITIES
EXTERNALITY
FACE VALUE
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
FOREIGN SOURCES
FORMAL ANALYSIS
FREE TRADE
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
FUNCTIONAL FORMS
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
GLOBAL TRADING
GRANGER CAUSALITY
HARMONIZATION
HOME COUNTRY
IMPACT OF TRADE
INCOME
INCOMES
INSURANCE
INTERNAL MARKET
INTERNATIONAL BANK
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
INTERNATIONAL TRADING
MARGINAL PRODUCTS
MARGINAL UTILITY
MARGINAL VALUE
MARKET ACCESS
MARKET SEGMENTATION
MARKET SHARE
MUTUAL INVESTMENT
MUTUAL RECOGNITION
MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF STANDARDS
NASH EQUILIBRIUM
NATIONAL INCOME
OPEN MARKETS
OPTIMIZATION
OUTPUT
PER CAPITA INCOME
POLICY RESEARCH
POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES
POSITIVE EXTERNALITY
POTENTIAL CONFLICTS
PREFERENTIAL TRADE
PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
PREFERENTIAL TRADING ARRANGEMENTS
PRESENT VALUE
PRICE OF IMPORTS
PRODUCTION FUNCTION
PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS
PUBLIC GOOD
REGIONAL GROUPS
REGIONAL INTEGRATION
REGIONAL INTEGRATION AGREEMENT
REGIONAL INTEGRATION AGREEMENTS
REGIONAL POWERS
REGIONAL TRADE
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
REGIONALISM
RULES OF ORIGIN
SECURITY CONCERN
SECURITY CONCERNS
SINGLE MARKET
SMALL COUNTRIES
SOCIAL CAPITAL
SOCIAL COST
SOCIAL DEMAND
SOCIAL VALUE
SOCIAL VALUES
SOCIAL WELFARE
TARIFF RATE
TAX
TAX RATE
TAXATION
TERMS OF TRADE
TRADE BARRIERS
TRADE BLOCKS
TRADE CREATION
TRADE DIVERSION
TRADE FLOWS
TRADE FRICTIONS
TRADE LIBERALIZATION
TRADE MODEL
TRADE MORE
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
TRADE POLICIES
TRADE POLICY
TRADE PREFERENCES
TRADE RELATIONS
TRADE SURPLUS
TRADE TAXES
TRADING BLOCS
TRADING SYSTEM
UNILATERAL LIBERALIZATION
URUGUAY ROUND
UTILITY FUNCTION
UTILITY MAXIMIZATION
VALUE OF IMPORTS
WEALTH
WELFARE FUNCTION
WELFARE GAINS
WELFARE LOSS
WORLD ECONOMY
WORLD MARKET
WORLD PRICES
Schiff, Maurice
Winters, L. Alan
Regional Integration as Diplomacy
description Regional integration agreements are examples of second-best policies and have an ambiguous impact on welfare. This article builds a model in which regional integration agreements unambiguously raise welfare by correcting for externalities. It assumes that trade between neighboring countries raises trust between them and reduces the likelihood of conflict. The optimum intervention in that case is a subsidy on imports from the neighbor. The article shows that an equivalent solution is for the neighboring countries to tax imports from the rest of the world that is, to form a regional integration agreement together with some domestic taxes. The article shows that (1) the optimum tariffs on imports from the rest of the world are likely to decline over time; (2) deep integration implies lower optimum external tariffs if it is exogenous; (3) optimum external tariffs are higher before deep integration and lower thereafter if deep integration is endogenous; and (4) enlargement of bloc size (in terms of symmetric countries) has an ambiguous impact on external tariffs but raises welfare, and some form of domino effect exists.
format Publications & Research :: Journal Article
author Schiff, Maurice
Winters, L. Alan
author_facet Schiff, Maurice
Winters, L. Alan
author_sort Schiff, Maurice
title Regional Integration as Diplomacy
title_short Regional Integration as Diplomacy
title_full Regional Integration as Diplomacy
title_fullStr Regional Integration as Diplomacy
title_full_unstemmed Regional Integration as Diplomacy
title_sort regional integration as diplomacy
publisher World Bank
publishDate 2013
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/05/17718660/regional-integration-diplomacy
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16435
_version_ 1764433068033048576
spelling okr-10986-164352021-04-23T14:03:29Z Regional Integration as Diplomacy Schiff, Maurice Winters, L. Alan ABSOLUTE VALUE AGRICULTURAL TRADE ANDEAN PACT AVERAGE TARIFFS BENEFITS OF TRADE BORDER MEASURES CAPITAL GOODS CIVIL WAR COMMON MARKET COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE CONCESSIONS CONSUMER PRICES CONSUMERS CURRENCY CUSTOMS CUSTOMS UNION CUSTOMS UNIONS DEMAND CURVE DEMAND CURVES DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DIVIDEND DOMESTIC TAXES ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS ECONOMIC COOPERATION ECONOMIC INTEGRATION ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES ECONOMIC POLICIES ECONOMIC POLICY ECONOMIC POWER ECONOMIC REFORM ECONOMIC RELATIONS ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMIC WELFARE ECONOMICS RESEARCH ECONOMIES OF SCALE ELASTICITY ELASTICITY OF DEMAND EMBARGO EQUATIONS EQUILIBRIUM EUROPEAN UNION EXPORT SUBSIDIES EXPORTS EXTERNAL BARRIERS EXTERNAL TARIFF EXTERNAL TARIFFS EXTERNAL TRADE EXTERNAL TRADE BARRIERS EXTERNAL TRADE POLICY EXTERNALITIES EXTERNALITY FACE VALUE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOREIGN SOURCES FORMAL ANALYSIS FREE TRADE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS FUNCTIONAL FORMS GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL GLOBAL TRADING GRANGER CAUSALITY HARMONIZATION HOME COUNTRY IMPACT OF TRADE INCOME INCOMES INSURANCE INTERNAL MARKET INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS INTERNATIONAL POLITICS INTERNATIONAL TRADE INTERNATIONAL TRADING MARGINAL PRODUCTS MARGINAL UTILITY MARGINAL VALUE MARKET ACCESS MARKET SEGMENTATION MARKET SHARE MUTUAL INVESTMENT MUTUAL RECOGNITION MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF STANDARDS NASH EQUILIBRIUM NATIONAL INCOME OPEN MARKETS OPTIMIZATION OUTPUT PER CAPITA INCOME POLICY RESEARCH POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES POSITIVE EXTERNALITY POTENTIAL CONFLICTS PREFERENTIAL TRADE PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS PREFERENTIAL TRADING ARRANGEMENTS PRESENT VALUE PRICE OF IMPORTS PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS PUBLIC GOOD REGIONAL GROUPS REGIONAL INTEGRATION REGIONAL INTEGRATION AGREEMENT REGIONAL INTEGRATION AGREEMENTS REGIONAL POWERS REGIONAL TRADE REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS REGIONALISM RULES OF ORIGIN SECURITY CONCERN SECURITY CONCERNS SINGLE MARKET SMALL COUNTRIES SOCIAL CAPITAL SOCIAL COST SOCIAL DEMAND SOCIAL VALUE SOCIAL VALUES SOCIAL WELFARE TARIFF RATE TAX TAX RATE TAXATION TERMS OF TRADE TRADE BARRIERS TRADE BLOCKS TRADE CREATION TRADE DIVERSION TRADE FLOWS TRADE FRICTIONS TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE MODEL TRADE MORE TRADE NEGOTIATIONS TRADE POLICIES TRADE POLICY TRADE PREFERENCES TRADE RELATIONS TRADE SURPLUS TRADE TAXES TRADING BLOCS TRADING SYSTEM UNILATERAL LIBERALIZATION URUGUAY ROUND UTILITY FUNCTION UTILITY MAXIMIZATION VALUE OF IMPORTS WEALTH WELFARE FUNCTION WELFARE GAINS WELFARE LOSS WORLD ECONOMY WORLD MARKET WORLD PRICES Regional integration agreements are examples of second-best policies and have an ambiguous impact on welfare. This article builds a model in which regional integration agreements unambiguously raise welfare by correcting for externalities. It assumes that trade between neighboring countries raises trust between them and reduces the likelihood of conflict. The optimum intervention in that case is a subsidy on imports from the neighbor. The article shows that an equivalent solution is for the neighboring countries to tax imports from the rest of the world that is, to form a regional integration agreement together with some domestic taxes. The article shows that (1) the optimum tariffs on imports from the rest of the world are likely to decline over time; (2) deep integration implies lower optimum external tariffs if it is exogenous; (3) optimum external tariffs are higher before deep integration and lower thereafter if deep integration is endogenous; and (4) enlargement of bloc size (in terms of symmetric countries) has an ambiguous impact on external tariffs but raises welfare, and some form of domino effect exists. 2013-12-20T20:29:13Z 2013-12-20T20:29:13Z 1998-05-01 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/05/17718660/regional-integration-diplomacy World Bank Economic Review http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16435 English en_US CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank Publications & Research :: Journal Article Publications & Research :: Journal Article