Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor : Understanding Political Incentives for Providing Public Services
The incentives of politicians to provide broad public goods and reduce poverty vary across countries. Even in democracies, politicians often have incentives to divert resources to political rents and private transfers that benefit a few citizens at...
Main Authors: | , |
---|---|
Format: | Journal Article |
Language: | English en_US |
Published: |
Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank
2013
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/03/17591977/democracy-public-expenditures-poor-understanding-political-incentives-providing-public-services http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16407 |
Summary: | The incentives of politicians to provide
broad public goods and reduce poverty vary across countries.
Even in democracies, politicians often have incentives to
divert resources to political rents and private transfers
that benefit a few citizens at the expense of many. These
distortions can be traced to imperfections in political
markets that are greater in some countries than in others.
This article reviews the theory and evidence on the impact
on political incentives of incomplete information for
voters, the lack of credibility of political promises, and
social polarization. The analysis has implications for
policy and for reforms to improve public goods provision and
reduce poverty. |
---|