Trade Insulation as Social Protection
In a world with volatile food prices, countries have an incentive to shelter their populations from induced real income shocks. When some agents are net food producers while others are net consumers, there is scope for insurance between the two gro...
Main Authors: | , , |
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Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
Language: | English en_US |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2013
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/05/17721206/trade-insulation-social-protection http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15588 |
Summary: | In a world with volatile food prices,
countries have an incentive to shelter their populations
from induced real income shocks. When some agents are net
food producers while others are net consumers, there is
scope for insurance between the two groups. A domestic
social protection scheme would therefore transfer resources
away from the former group to the latter in times of high
food prices, and do the reverse otherwise. This paper shows
that in the presence of consumer preference heterogeneity,
implementing the optimal social protection policy can
potentially induce higher food price volatility. Such policy
indeed generates a counter-cyclical demand shock that
amplifies the effects of the underlying food shortage. The
results call for a reassessment of food stabilization
policies. In particular, the authors urge caution against
the systematic condemnation of trade insulation practices. |
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