Bank Competition, Concentration, and Credit Reporting
This paper explores the empirical relationship between bank competition, bank concentration, and the emergence of credit reporting institutions. The authors find that countries with lower entry barriers into the banking market (that is, a greater t...
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2013
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/05/17705268/bank-competition-concentration-credit-reporting http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15583 |
| id |
okr-10986-15583 |
|---|---|
| recordtype |
oai_dc |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ACCESS TO FINANCE ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS ADVERSE SELECTION AMOUNT OF CAPITAL ASSETS ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AUTOMATIC STAY AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT BANK COMPETITION BANK ENTRY BANKING MARKET BANKING SECTOR BANKING SYSTEMS BANKRUPT BANKRUPT FIRM BANKS BARRIERS TO ENTRY BORROWER BORROWER BEHAVIOR BORROWING BRITISH LEGAL ORIGIN BUSINESS CREDIT CAPITAL REQUIREMENT CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS CENTRAL BANK COLLATERAL CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CREDIT BUREAU CREDIT BUREAUS CREDIT HISTORY CREDIT INFORMATION CREDIT MARKET CREDIT MARKETS CREDIT RATIONING CREDIT REGISTRIES CREDIT REGISTRY CREDIT REPORTING CREDIT REPORTING SYSTEMS CREDIT RISK CREDIT RISKS CREDIT SCORES CREDITOR CREDITOR CONSENT CREDITOR RIGHTS CREDITORS CREDITWORTHINESS DEBTOR DEBTORS DEFAULT INFORMATION DEFAULT RISK DEFAULTS DEPENDENT DEPOSIT DEPOSIT MONEY BANKS DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY DIVIDENDS DUMMY VARIABLE DUMMY VARIABLES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS RESEARCH ENTRY BARRIERS EXISTING CREDIT FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION FINANCIAL REGULATORS FINANCIAL SECTOR FINANCIAL STABILITY FINANCIAL STRUCTURE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FINANCIAL SYSTEMS FINANCING CONSTRAINTS FIRST CREDIT FOREIGN BANK FOREIGN BANKS FOREIGN OWNERSHIP GDP GDP PER CAPITA GOVERNMENT BANKS GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES GROUPS OF LENDERS GUARANTEED ACCESS IMPLICIT GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES INCOME INCOME GROUPS INCREASING RETURNS INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE INFORMATION ON BORROWERS INFORMATION SHARING INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INTEREST RATES INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS LARGE BANKS LAWS LEGAL ORIGIN LEGAL ORIGINS LEGAL RIGHTS LEGAL RIGHTS OF CREDITORS LENDER LENDERS LENDING INSTITUTIONS LEVELS OF CREDIT LOAN LOAN REPAYMENT LOAN VOLUME LOAN VOLUMES LOCAL CURRENCY LOCAL MARKET MARKET CONDITIONS MARKET EFFICIENCY MARKET ENTRY MARKET FOR CREDIT MARKET INFORMATION MARKET SHARE MARKET COMPETITION MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES MINIMUM CAPITAL REQUIREMENT MINIMUM CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS MONOPOLY MONOPOLY RENTS MORAL HAZARD NATIONAL BANKS NEW ENTRANTS NEW MARKET OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE POSITIVE COEFFICIENT POTENTIAL BORROWERS PRIVATE CREDIT PRIVATE CREDIT BUREAU PROPRIETARY INFORMATION PRUDENTIAL REGULATION PUBLIC CREDIT REGRESSION ANALYSIS REORGANIZATION REPAYMENT REPAYMENT BEHAVIOR REPAYMENT HISTORY REPAYMENT RATES RETURNS SHARE OF ASSETS STRONG CREDITOR RIGHTS SYSTEMIC STABILITY TRANSACTIONS COSTS TRANSITION COUNTRIES TRANSPARENCY TRANSPARENCY OF INFORMATION |
| spellingShingle |
ACCESS TO FINANCE ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS ADVERSE SELECTION AMOUNT OF CAPITAL ASSETS ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AUTOMATIC STAY AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT BANK COMPETITION BANK ENTRY BANKING MARKET BANKING SECTOR BANKING SYSTEMS BANKRUPT BANKRUPT FIRM BANKS BARRIERS TO ENTRY BORROWER BORROWER BEHAVIOR BORROWING BRITISH LEGAL ORIGIN BUSINESS CREDIT CAPITAL REQUIREMENT CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS CENTRAL BANK COLLATERAL CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CREDIT BUREAU CREDIT BUREAUS CREDIT HISTORY CREDIT INFORMATION CREDIT MARKET CREDIT MARKETS CREDIT RATIONING CREDIT REGISTRIES CREDIT REGISTRY CREDIT REPORTING CREDIT REPORTING SYSTEMS CREDIT RISK CREDIT RISKS CREDIT SCORES CREDITOR CREDITOR CONSENT CREDITOR RIGHTS CREDITORS CREDITWORTHINESS DEBTOR DEBTORS DEFAULT INFORMATION DEFAULT RISK DEFAULTS DEPENDENT DEPOSIT DEPOSIT MONEY BANKS DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY DIVIDENDS DUMMY VARIABLE DUMMY VARIABLES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS RESEARCH ENTRY BARRIERS EXISTING CREDIT FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION FINANCIAL REGULATORS FINANCIAL SECTOR FINANCIAL STABILITY FINANCIAL STRUCTURE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FINANCIAL SYSTEMS FINANCING CONSTRAINTS FIRST CREDIT FOREIGN BANK FOREIGN BANKS FOREIGN OWNERSHIP GDP GDP PER CAPITA GOVERNMENT BANKS GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES GROUPS OF LENDERS GUARANTEED ACCESS IMPLICIT GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES INCOME INCOME GROUPS INCREASING RETURNS INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE INFORMATION ON BORROWERS INFORMATION SHARING INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INTEREST RATES INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS LARGE BANKS LAWS LEGAL ORIGIN LEGAL ORIGINS LEGAL RIGHTS LEGAL RIGHTS OF CREDITORS LENDER LENDERS LENDING INSTITUTIONS LEVELS OF CREDIT LOAN LOAN REPAYMENT LOAN VOLUME LOAN VOLUMES LOCAL CURRENCY LOCAL MARKET MARKET CONDITIONS MARKET EFFICIENCY MARKET ENTRY MARKET FOR CREDIT MARKET INFORMATION MARKET SHARE MARKET COMPETITION MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES MINIMUM CAPITAL REQUIREMENT MINIMUM CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS MONOPOLY MONOPOLY RENTS MORAL HAZARD NATIONAL BANKS NEW ENTRANTS NEW MARKET OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE POSITIVE COEFFICIENT POTENTIAL BORROWERS PRIVATE CREDIT PRIVATE CREDIT BUREAU PROPRIETARY INFORMATION PRUDENTIAL REGULATION PUBLIC CREDIT REGRESSION ANALYSIS REORGANIZATION REPAYMENT REPAYMENT BEHAVIOR REPAYMENT HISTORY REPAYMENT RATES RETURNS SHARE OF ASSETS STRONG CREDITOR RIGHTS SYSTEMIC STABILITY TRANSACTIONS COSTS TRANSITION COUNTRIES TRANSPARENCY TRANSPARENCY OF INFORMATION Bruhn, Miriam Farazi, Subika Kanz, Martin Bank Competition, Concentration, and Credit Reporting |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6442 |
| description |
This paper explores the empirical
relationship between bank competition, bank concentration,
and the emergence of credit reporting institutions. The
authors find that countries with lower entry barriers into
the banking market (that is, a greater threat of
competition) are less likely to have a credit bureau,
presumably because banks are less willing to share
proprietary information when the threat of market entry is
high. In addition, a credit bureau is significantly less
likely to emerge in economies characterized by a high degree
of bank concentration. The authors argue that the reason for
this finding is that large banks stand to lose more monopoly
rents from sharing their extensive information with smaller
players. In contrast, the data show no significant
relationship between bank competition or concentration and
the emergence of a public credit registry, where banks'
participation is mandatory. The results highlight that
policies designed to promote the voluntary creation of a
credit bureau need to take into account banks'
incentives to extract monopoly rents from proprietary credit information. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Bruhn, Miriam Farazi, Subika Kanz, Martin |
| author_facet |
Bruhn, Miriam Farazi, Subika Kanz, Martin |
| author_sort |
Bruhn, Miriam |
| title |
Bank Competition, Concentration, and Credit Reporting |
| title_short |
Bank Competition, Concentration, and Credit Reporting |
| title_full |
Bank Competition, Concentration, and Credit Reporting |
| title_fullStr |
Bank Competition, Concentration, and Credit Reporting |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Bank Competition, Concentration, and Credit Reporting |
| title_sort |
bank competition, concentration, and credit reporting |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2013 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/05/17705268/bank-competition-concentration-credit-reporting http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15583 |
| _version_ |
1764429477052416000 |
| spelling |
okr-10986-155832021-04-23T14:03:19Z Bank Competition, Concentration, and Credit Reporting Bruhn, Miriam Farazi, Subika Kanz, Martin ACCESS TO FINANCE ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS ADVERSE SELECTION AMOUNT OF CAPITAL ASSETS ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AUTOMATIC STAY AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT BANK COMPETITION BANK ENTRY BANKING MARKET BANKING SECTOR BANKING SYSTEMS BANKRUPT BANKRUPT FIRM BANKS BARRIERS TO ENTRY BORROWER BORROWER BEHAVIOR BORROWING BRITISH LEGAL ORIGIN BUSINESS CREDIT CAPITAL REQUIREMENT CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS CENTRAL BANK COLLATERAL CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CREDIT BUREAU CREDIT BUREAUS CREDIT HISTORY CREDIT INFORMATION CREDIT MARKET CREDIT MARKETS CREDIT RATIONING CREDIT REGISTRIES CREDIT REGISTRY CREDIT REPORTING CREDIT REPORTING SYSTEMS CREDIT RISK CREDIT RISKS CREDIT SCORES CREDITOR CREDITOR CONSENT CREDITOR RIGHTS CREDITORS CREDITWORTHINESS DEBTOR DEBTORS DEFAULT INFORMATION DEFAULT RISK DEFAULTS DEPENDENT DEPOSIT DEPOSIT MONEY BANKS DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY DIVIDENDS DUMMY VARIABLE DUMMY VARIABLES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS RESEARCH ENTRY BARRIERS EXISTING CREDIT FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION FINANCIAL REGULATORS FINANCIAL SECTOR FINANCIAL STABILITY FINANCIAL STRUCTURE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FINANCIAL SYSTEMS FINANCING CONSTRAINTS FIRST CREDIT FOREIGN BANK FOREIGN BANKS FOREIGN OWNERSHIP GDP GDP PER CAPITA GOVERNMENT BANKS GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES GROUPS OF LENDERS GUARANTEED ACCESS IMPLICIT GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES INCOME INCOME GROUPS INCREASING RETURNS INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE INFORMATION ON BORROWERS INFORMATION SHARING INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INTEREST RATES INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS LARGE BANKS LAWS LEGAL ORIGIN LEGAL ORIGINS LEGAL RIGHTS LEGAL RIGHTS OF CREDITORS LENDER LENDERS LENDING INSTITUTIONS LEVELS OF CREDIT LOAN LOAN REPAYMENT LOAN VOLUME LOAN VOLUMES LOCAL CURRENCY LOCAL MARKET MARKET CONDITIONS MARKET EFFICIENCY MARKET ENTRY MARKET FOR CREDIT MARKET INFORMATION MARKET SHARE MARKET COMPETITION MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES MINIMUM CAPITAL REQUIREMENT MINIMUM CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS MONOPOLY MONOPOLY RENTS MORAL HAZARD NATIONAL BANKS NEW ENTRANTS NEW MARKET OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE POSITIVE COEFFICIENT POTENTIAL BORROWERS PRIVATE CREDIT PRIVATE CREDIT BUREAU PROPRIETARY INFORMATION PRUDENTIAL REGULATION PUBLIC CREDIT REGRESSION ANALYSIS REORGANIZATION REPAYMENT REPAYMENT BEHAVIOR REPAYMENT HISTORY REPAYMENT RATES RETURNS SHARE OF ASSETS STRONG CREDITOR RIGHTS SYSTEMIC STABILITY TRANSACTIONS COSTS TRANSITION COUNTRIES TRANSPARENCY TRANSPARENCY OF INFORMATION This paper explores the empirical relationship between bank competition, bank concentration, and the emergence of credit reporting institutions. The authors find that countries with lower entry barriers into the banking market (that is, a greater threat of competition) are less likely to have a credit bureau, presumably because banks are less willing to share proprietary information when the threat of market entry is high. In addition, a credit bureau is significantly less likely to emerge in economies characterized by a high degree of bank concentration. The authors argue that the reason for this finding is that large banks stand to lose more monopoly rents from sharing their extensive information with smaller players. In contrast, the data show no significant relationship between bank competition or concentration and the emergence of a public credit registry, where banks' participation is mandatory. The results highlight that policies designed to promote the voluntary creation of a credit bureau need to take into account banks' incentives to extract monopoly rents from proprietary credit information. 2013-09-04T17:02:26Z 2013-09-04T17:02:26Z 2013-05 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/05/17705268/bank-competition-concentration-credit-reporting http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15583 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6442 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |