Public Money for Private Infrastructure : Deciding When to Offer Guarantees, Output-based Subsidies, and Other Fiscal Support
When governments seek private investment in infrastructure projects, they usually find themselves asked to provide grants, guarantees, or other forms of fiscal support. Often they prefer to provide support in ways that limit immediate cash expendit...
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Washington, DC: World Bank
2013
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/08/2492949/public-money-private-infrastructure-deciding-offer-guarantees-output-based-subsidies-other-fiscal-support http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15117 |
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okr-10986-151172021-04-23T14:03:12Z Public Money for Private Infrastructure : Deciding When to Offer Guarantees, Output-based Subsidies, and Other Fiscal Support Irwin, Timothy GUARANTEES SUBSIDIES FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY FINANCING PROGRAMS POLITICAL RISKS POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS GRANTS CASH MANAGEMENT TAX BREAKS INFORMATION DISSEMINATION FOREIGN EXCHANGE STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES TARIFFS PRIVATE OWNERSHIP REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES ACCRUAL ACCOUNTING ADVERSE SELECTION AIRPORTS BALANCE SHEET BANKS BARRIERS TO ENTRY BENEFIT ANALYSIS CASH FLOWS COMPETITIVE MARKETS COST OF CAPITAL COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES DEBT DISCLOSURE DISCOUNT RATE ELECTRICITY EXPECTED RETURNS EXPENDITURES EXTERNALITIES EXTERNALITY FINANCIAL MARKETS FISCAL PROBLEMS FISCAL TRANSPARENCY GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES INSURANCE INTEREST RATE INTEREST RATES LICENSES LIVING STANDARDS MARKET PRICES MARKET VALUE MATURITIES MORAL HAZARD NET ASSETS NET LOSS OPPORTUNITY COST POLICY ENVIRONMENT POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES PRESENT VALUE PRICE INCREASES PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATIZATION PROFITABILITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC RESOURCES REVENUE GUARANTEES ROADS TAX TAX RATES TAX REVENUE TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRADEOFFS UTILITIES When governments seek private investment in infrastructure projects, they usually find themselves asked to provide grants, guarantees, or other forms of fiscal support. Often they prefer to provide support in ways that limit immediate cash expenditure but sometimes generate large costs later. Seeking to provide support without any immediate spending of cash, for example, governments often agree to shoulder project risks and sometimes encounter fiscal problems later. For example, in the 1970s and 1980s in Spain, the government was obliged to pay $2.7 billion when the exchange-rate guarantees it had given private toll roads were called (Gomez-Ibanez 1993). More recently, the Indonesian government agreed to pay $260 million as a result of its agreements, through the electricity company it owns, to bear demand and foreign-exchange risks in private power projects. Yet even when governments have chosen to provide cash subsidies they have not always achieved their apparent goals: for example, over 80 percent of the Honduran government's "lifeline" electricity subsidies go to customers who aren't poor (Wodon et al. 2003). In still other cases, governments' decisions not to provide support may have caused problems. 2013-08-16T15:46:22Z 2013-08-16T15:46:22Z 2003-08 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/08/2492949/public-money-private-infrastructure-deciding-offer-guarantees-output-based-subsidies-other-fiscal-support 0-8213-5556-2 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15117 English en_US World Bank Working Paper;No. 10 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank Washington, DC: World Bank Publications & Research :: Publication Publications & Research :: Publication |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
GUARANTEES SUBSIDIES FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY FINANCING PROGRAMS POLITICAL RISKS POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS GRANTS CASH MANAGEMENT TAX BREAKS INFORMATION DISSEMINATION FOREIGN EXCHANGE STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES TARIFFS PRIVATE OWNERSHIP REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES ACCRUAL ACCOUNTING ADVERSE SELECTION AIRPORTS BALANCE SHEET BANKS BARRIERS TO ENTRY BENEFIT ANALYSIS CASH FLOWS COMPETITIVE MARKETS COST OF CAPITAL COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES DEBT DISCLOSURE DISCOUNT RATE ELECTRICITY EXPECTED RETURNS EXPENDITURES EXTERNALITIES EXTERNALITY FINANCIAL MARKETS FISCAL PROBLEMS FISCAL TRANSPARENCY GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES INSURANCE INTEREST RATE INTEREST RATES LICENSES LIVING STANDARDS MARKET PRICES MARKET VALUE MATURITIES MORAL HAZARD NET ASSETS NET LOSS OPPORTUNITY COST POLICY ENVIRONMENT POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES PRESENT VALUE PRICE INCREASES PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATIZATION PROFITABILITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC RESOURCES REVENUE GUARANTEES ROADS TAX TAX RATES TAX REVENUE TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRADEOFFS UTILITIES |
| spellingShingle |
GUARANTEES SUBSIDIES FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY FINANCING PROGRAMS POLITICAL RISKS POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS GRANTS CASH MANAGEMENT TAX BREAKS INFORMATION DISSEMINATION FOREIGN EXCHANGE STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES TARIFFS PRIVATE OWNERSHIP REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES ACCRUAL ACCOUNTING ADVERSE SELECTION AIRPORTS BALANCE SHEET BANKS BARRIERS TO ENTRY BENEFIT ANALYSIS CASH FLOWS COMPETITIVE MARKETS COST OF CAPITAL COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES DEBT DISCLOSURE DISCOUNT RATE ELECTRICITY EXPECTED RETURNS EXPENDITURES EXTERNALITIES EXTERNALITY FINANCIAL MARKETS FISCAL PROBLEMS FISCAL TRANSPARENCY GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES INSURANCE INTEREST RATE INTEREST RATES LICENSES LIVING STANDARDS MARKET PRICES MARKET VALUE MATURITIES MORAL HAZARD NET ASSETS NET LOSS OPPORTUNITY COST POLICY ENVIRONMENT POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES PRESENT VALUE PRICE INCREASES PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATIZATION PROFITABILITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC RESOURCES REVENUE GUARANTEES ROADS TAX TAX RATES TAX REVENUE TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRADEOFFS UTILITIES Irwin, Timothy Public Money for Private Infrastructure : Deciding When to Offer Guarantees, Output-based Subsidies, and Other Fiscal Support |
| relation |
World Bank Working Paper;No. 10 |
| description |
When governments seek private investment
in infrastructure projects, they usually find themselves
asked to provide grants, guarantees, or other forms of
fiscal support. Often they prefer to provide support in ways
that limit immediate cash expenditure but sometimes generate
large costs later. Seeking to provide support without any
immediate spending of cash, for example, governments often
agree to shoulder project risks and sometimes encounter
fiscal problems later. For example, in the 1970s and 1980s
in Spain, the government was obliged to pay $2.7 billion
when the exchange-rate guarantees it had given private toll
roads were called (Gomez-Ibanez 1993). More recently, the
Indonesian government agreed to pay $260 million as a result
of its agreements, through the electricity company it owns,
to bear demand and foreign-exchange risks in private power
projects. Yet even when governments have chosen to provide
cash subsidies they have not always achieved their apparent
goals: for example, over 80 percent of the Honduran
government's "lifeline" electricity subsidies
go to customers who aren't poor (Wodon et al. 2003). In
still other cases, governments' decisions not to
provide support may have caused problems. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Publication |
| author |
Irwin, Timothy |
| author_facet |
Irwin, Timothy |
| author_sort |
Irwin, Timothy |
| title |
Public Money for Private Infrastructure : Deciding When to Offer Guarantees, Output-based Subsidies, and Other Fiscal Support |
| title_short |
Public Money for Private Infrastructure : Deciding When to Offer Guarantees, Output-based Subsidies, and Other Fiscal Support |
| title_full |
Public Money for Private Infrastructure : Deciding When to Offer Guarantees, Output-based Subsidies, and Other Fiscal Support |
| title_fullStr |
Public Money for Private Infrastructure : Deciding When to Offer Guarantees, Output-based Subsidies, and Other Fiscal Support |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Public Money for Private Infrastructure : Deciding When to Offer Guarantees, Output-based Subsidies, and Other Fiscal Support |
| title_sort |
public money for private infrastructure : deciding when to offer guarantees, output-based subsidies, and other fiscal support |
| publisher |
Washington, DC: World Bank |
| publishDate |
2013 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/08/2492949/public-money-private-infrastructure-deciding-offer-guarantees-output-based-subsidies-other-fiscal-support http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15117 |
| _version_ |
1764425593808486400 |