A Model for Calculating Interconnection Costs in Telecommunications
Since the past decade, several Sub-Saharan African governments, through technical assistance provided by the World Bank and other donors, have undertaken to reform their telecommunications sectors, by implementing market liberalization policies, pr...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Publication |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
Washington, DC: World Bank and the Public–Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility
2013
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/01/3003467/model-calculating-interconnection-costs-telecommunications http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15040 |
| Summary: | Since the past decade, several
Sub-Saharan African governments, through technical
assistance provided by the World Bank and other donors, have
undertaken to reform their telecommunications sectors, by
implementing market liberalization policies, privatizing the
incumbent public operator, and creating autonomous and
independent regulatory bodies. The core objective of these
reforms is to significantly improve access, and
affordability, to telecommunications services on the basis
of the assumption that a more friendly and predictable
business environment will attract more private investment.
However, the provision of interconnection services, on fair
and efficient terms, has rapidly emerged as a main
bottleneck. In fact, new legislation and regulations enacted
in Sub-Saharan Africa recognize the interconnection rights
ascribed to all telecommunications service providers and
network operators. In addition, these regulations also
request the incumbent fixed operator to supply
interconnection services to new entrants on a fair and
competitive basis. Despite the clarity and soundness of the
legislative provisions in that respect (cost oriented,
nondiscriminatory, fair, and transparent), the number of
interconnection disputes has increased, and long-lasting
interconnection disputes have discredited the reputation and
credibility of new regulatory regimes. |
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