Does Sequencing Matter? Regulation and Privatization in Telecommunications Reforms
The question of the most effective order of reforming state-owned enterprises has been hotly debated over the years. In the early 1990s, many western advisers encouraged Eastern European countries, and the former Soviet Union, to privatize firms qu...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, D.C.
2013
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/04/1758948/sequencing-matter-regulation-privatization-telecommunications-reforms http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14813 |
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okr-10986-148132021-04-23T14:03:20Z Does Sequencing Matter? Regulation and Privatization in Telecommunications Reforms Wallsten, Scott ACCOUNTING BIDDING BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT COMPETITIVE MARKETS CONSUMERS DEREGULATION ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL STUDIES EMPLOYMENT EXOGENOUS VARIABLES GDP GDP PER CAPITA INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS MACROECONOMICS MONOPOLIES MONOPOLY MONOPOLY PROFITS NATURAL MONOPOLIES NATURAL MONOPOLY NETWORK EXTERNALITIES NEW ENTRANTS OPTIMIZATION PER CAPITA INCOME POSITIVE EFFECTS PRIVATE MONOPOLY PRIVATIZATION PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC POLICY REGULATOR REGULATORS REGULATORY AGENCIES REGULATORY AUTHORITY REGULATORY CAPACITY REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS REGULATORY OBJECTIVES REGULATORY REFORM REGULATORY STRUCTURE RISK PREMIUM TELECOM SECTOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEVELOPMENT TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORMS TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR TELECOMS TELEPHONE DENSITY TELEPHONE PENETRATION TELEPHONE SERVICE TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRANSPORT UNIVERSAL SERVICE VALUATION VAN WEALTH WILLINGNESS TO PAY PRIVATIZATION TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES TRANSITION ECONOMIES INSTITUTION BUILDING INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK MARKET PENETRATION COMPETITIVENESS TELECOMMUNICATION POLICY POLICY REFORM REGULATORY BODIES REGULATORY BODIES INVESTMENTS PAYMENTS ARRANGEMENTS RISK PREMIUM INVESTOR CONFIDENCE REGULATORY STRUCTURE The question of the most effective order of reforming state-owned enterprises has been hotly debated over the years. In the early 1990s, many western advisers encouraged Eastern European countries, and the former Soviet Union, to privatize firms quickly under the assumption that market institutions would develop once firms were privately owned. The thinking since then has emphasized the importance of establishing an institutional framework conducive to promoting competition before privatizing firms. To date, there has been little empirical work clarifying the debate. The author attempts to address this gap, by examining the effects of the sequence of reform in telecommunications, particularly the effects of establishing a regulatory authority, prior to privatizing incumbent telecommunications firms. Consistent with current thinking, the author finds that countries that established separate regulatory authorities, prior to privatization, saw increased telecommunications investment, fixed telephone penetration, and cellular penetration compared with countries that did not. Moreover, he finds that investors are willing to pay more for telecommunications firms, in countries that established a regulatory authority before privatization. This increased willingness to pay is consistent with the hypothesis that investors require a risk premium to invest, where regulatory rules remain unclear. 2013-08-06T15:02:42Z 2013-08-06T15:02:42Z 2002-04 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/04/1758948/sequencing-matter-regulation-privatization-telecommunications-reforms http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14813 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No.2817 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, D.C. Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ACCOUNTING BIDDING BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT COMPETITIVE MARKETS CONSUMERS DEREGULATION ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL STUDIES EMPLOYMENT EXOGENOUS VARIABLES GDP GDP PER CAPITA INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS MACROECONOMICS MONOPOLIES MONOPOLY MONOPOLY PROFITS NATURAL MONOPOLIES NATURAL MONOPOLY NETWORK EXTERNALITIES NEW ENTRANTS OPTIMIZATION PER CAPITA INCOME POSITIVE EFFECTS PRIVATE MONOPOLY PRIVATIZATION PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC POLICY REGULATOR REGULATORS REGULATORY AGENCIES REGULATORY AUTHORITY REGULATORY CAPACITY REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS REGULATORY OBJECTIVES REGULATORY REFORM REGULATORY STRUCTURE RISK PREMIUM TELECOM SECTOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEVELOPMENT TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORMS TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR TELECOMS TELEPHONE DENSITY TELEPHONE PENETRATION TELEPHONE SERVICE TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRANSPORT UNIVERSAL SERVICE VALUATION VAN WEALTH WILLINGNESS TO PAY PRIVATIZATION TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES TRANSITION ECONOMIES INSTITUTION BUILDING INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK MARKET PENETRATION COMPETITIVENESS TELECOMMUNICATION POLICY POLICY REFORM REGULATORY BODIES REGULATORY BODIES INVESTMENTS PAYMENTS ARRANGEMENTS RISK PREMIUM INVESTOR CONFIDENCE REGULATORY STRUCTURE |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTING BIDDING BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT COMPETITIVE MARKETS CONSUMERS DEREGULATION ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL STUDIES EMPLOYMENT EXOGENOUS VARIABLES GDP GDP PER CAPITA INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS MACROECONOMICS MONOPOLIES MONOPOLY MONOPOLY PROFITS NATURAL MONOPOLIES NATURAL MONOPOLY NETWORK EXTERNALITIES NEW ENTRANTS OPTIMIZATION PER CAPITA INCOME POSITIVE EFFECTS PRIVATE MONOPOLY PRIVATIZATION PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC POLICY REGULATOR REGULATORS REGULATORY AGENCIES REGULATORY AUTHORITY REGULATORY CAPACITY REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS REGULATORY OBJECTIVES REGULATORY REFORM REGULATORY STRUCTURE RISK PREMIUM TELECOM SECTOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEVELOPMENT TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORMS TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR TELECOMS TELEPHONE DENSITY TELEPHONE PENETRATION TELEPHONE SERVICE TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRANSPORT UNIVERSAL SERVICE VALUATION VAN WEALTH WILLINGNESS TO PAY PRIVATIZATION TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES TRANSITION ECONOMIES INSTITUTION BUILDING INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK MARKET PENETRATION COMPETITIVENESS TELECOMMUNICATION POLICY POLICY REFORM REGULATORY BODIES REGULATORY BODIES INVESTMENTS PAYMENTS ARRANGEMENTS RISK PREMIUM INVESTOR CONFIDENCE REGULATORY STRUCTURE Wallsten, Scott Does Sequencing Matter? Regulation and Privatization in Telecommunications Reforms |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No.2817 |
| description |
The question of the most effective order
of reforming state-owned enterprises has been hotly debated
over the years. In the early 1990s, many western advisers
encouraged Eastern European countries, and the former Soviet
Union, to privatize firms quickly under the assumption that
market institutions would develop once firms were privately
owned. The thinking since then has emphasized the importance
of establishing an institutional framework conducive to
promoting competition before privatizing firms. To date,
there has been little empirical work clarifying the debate.
The author attempts to address this gap, by examining the
effects of the sequence of reform in telecommunications,
particularly the effects of establishing a regulatory
authority, prior to privatizing incumbent telecommunications
firms. Consistent with current thinking, the author finds
that countries that established separate regulatory
authorities, prior to privatization, saw increased
telecommunications investment, fixed telephone penetration,
and cellular penetration compared with countries that did
not. Moreover, he finds that investors are willing to pay
more for telecommunications firms, in countries that
established a regulatory authority before privatization.
This increased willingness to pay is consistent with the
hypothesis that investors require a risk premium to invest,
where regulatory rules remain unclear. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Wallsten, Scott |
| author_facet |
Wallsten, Scott |
| author_sort |
Wallsten, Scott |
| title |
Does Sequencing Matter? Regulation and Privatization in Telecommunications Reforms |
| title_short |
Does Sequencing Matter? Regulation and Privatization in Telecommunications Reforms |
| title_full |
Does Sequencing Matter? Regulation and Privatization in Telecommunications Reforms |
| title_fullStr |
Does Sequencing Matter? Regulation and Privatization in Telecommunications Reforms |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Does Sequencing Matter? Regulation and Privatization in Telecommunications Reforms |
| title_sort |
does sequencing matter? regulation and privatization in telecommunications reforms |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, D.C. |
| publishDate |
2013 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/04/1758948/sequencing-matter-regulation-privatization-telecommunications-reforms http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14813 |
| _version_ |
1764429828563402752 |