Building a Clean Machine : Anti-Corruption Coalitions and Sustainable Reform
Many societies have limited corruption through the broad-based mobilization of a diverse range of interests willing and able to defend themselves by making meaningful demands for accountability of, and limits on, official power, and for an end to i...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, D.C.
2013
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/12/5576815/building-clean-machine-anti-corruption-coalitions-sustainable-reform http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14722 |
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okr-10986-147222021-04-23T14:03:21Z Building a Clean Machine : Anti-Corruption Coalitions and Sustainable Reform Johnston, Michael Kpundeh, Sahr J. ABUSES ABUSES OF POWER ACCOUNTABILITY ACTIONS ALLIANCES ANTICORRUPTION BANKS BRIBES CALCULUS CIVIL LIBERTIES CIVIL SERVICE CIVIL SOCIETY CONSTITUENCIES CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPTION CORRUPTION RISKS DECENTRALIZATION DEMOCRACY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC PROCESSES ETHICS FAMINE FREE PRESS GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IMPRISONMENT INSURANCE INTEGRITY INTERNAL CONFLICTS LEGAL ASSISTANCE LEGITIMACY MEDIA PAYOFFS PENALTIES PLEDGES POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL LEADERS POLITICAL PROGRAMS POLITICIANS PREFERENTIAL PRIORITIES PRIVATIZATION PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC PARTICIPATION REPRISALS RULE OF LAW SANCTIONS SCARCE RESOURCES TAXATION TRANSPARENCY UGANDA USAID Many societies have limited corruption through the broad-based mobilization of a diverse range of interests willing and able to defend themselves by making meaningful demands for accountability of, and limits on, official power, and for an end to illicit advantages enjoyed by others. Historically such a process has taken place gradually, as political development has proceeded and the base of participation broadens. But today's high-corruption societies cannot wait for several generations to see such developments take place. The authors argue that social action coalitions, linking public and private actors, are a way to mobilize these sorts of participation and advocacy. Such coalitions are neither a new idea nor a guarantee of successful reforms. In many instances they win out by default as an anti-corruption strategy. But they contend that if sustained by careful planning and a diverse set of incentives, they can reinforce political will and enhance the strength of civil society. Coalition-building efforts are underway in many societies. But too often they have focused only on anti-corruption tactics and pursuing their own growth, rather than looking at the coalition-building process in more general terms. In Part I, the authors employ Wilson's (1973) analysis of the incentives that motivate and reward participation in organizations. This approach helps them identify ways in which the anti-corruption goals can be augmented by other kinds of appeals, even when material incentives are scarce. The authors also identify four stages of the coalition-building process-formation, credibility, expansion, and transformation-in which differing combinations of incentives will be necessary to address the group's most important problems and opportunities. In Part II the authors examine two important coalition-building efforts in light of the discussions thus far-Ghana's Anti-Corruption Coalition, and the Bangalore Agenda Task Force in Bangalore, Karnataka State, India. In Part III the authors link those cases to a broader analysis, suggesting that while purposive incentives are common in the early phases of all coalitions, other varieties must be added to the mix. Wilson's scheme points to ways in which the imaginative use of incentives can aid the transition from one phase of coalition development to the next. The authors conclude with general strategic issues, suggesting ways in which their analysis can be applied to those questions given the important variations to be found among cases. 2013-08-01T14:57:05Z 2013-08-01T14:57:05Z 2004-12 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/12/5576815/building-clean-machine-anti-corruption-coalitions-sustainable-reform http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14722 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No.3466 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, D.C. Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Africa |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ABUSES ABUSES OF POWER ACCOUNTABILITY ACTIONS ALLIANCES ANTICORRUPTION BANKS BRIBES CALCULUS CIVIL LIBERTIES CIVIL SERVICE CIVIL SOCIETY CONSTITUENCIES CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPTION CORRUPTION RISKS DECENTRALIZATION DEMOCRACY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC PROCESSES ETHICS FAMINE FREE PRESS GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IMPRISONMENT INSURANCE INTEGRITY INTERNAL CONFLICTS LEGAL ASSISTANCE LEGITIMACY MEDIA PAYOFFS PENALTIES PLEDGES POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL LEADERS POLITICAL PROGRAMS POLITICIANS PREFERENTIAL PRIORITIES PRIVATIZATION PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC PARTICIPATION REPRISALS RULE OF LAW SANCTIONS SCARCE RESOURCES TAXATION TRANSPARENCY UGANDA USAID |
| spellingShingle |
ABUSES ABUSES OF POWER ACCOUNTABILITY ACTIONS ALLIANCES ANTICORRUPTION BANKS BRIBES CALCULUS CIVIL LIBERTIES CIVIL SERVICE CIVIL SOCIETY CONSTITUENCIES CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPTION CORRUPTION RISKS DECENTRALIZATION DEMOCRACY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC PROCESSES ETHICS FAMINE FREE PRESS GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IMPRISONMENT INSURANCE INTEGRITY INTERNAL CONFLICTS LEGAL ASSISTANCE LEGITIMACY MEDIA PAYOFFS PENALTIES PLEDGES POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL LEADERS POLITICAL PROGRAMS POLITICIANS PREFERENTIAL PRIORITIES PRIVATIZATION PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC PARTICIPATION REPRISALS RULE OF LAW SANCTIONS SCARCE RESOURCES TAXATION TRANSPARENCY UGANDA USAID Johnston, Michael Kpundeh, Sahr J. Building a Clean Machine : Anti-Corruption Coalitions and Sustainable Reform |
| geographic_facet |
Africa |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No.3466 |
| description |
Many societies have limited corruption
through the broad-based mobilization of a diverse range of
interests willing and able to defend themselves by making
meaningful demands for accountability of, and limits on,
official power, and for an end to illicit advantages enjoyed
by others. Historically such a process has taken place
gradually, as political development has proceeded and the
base of participation broadens. But today's
high-corruption societies cannot wait for several
generations to see such developments take place. The
authors argue that social action coalitions, linking public
and private actors, are a way to mobilize these sorts of
participation and advocacy. Such coalitions are neither a
new idea nor a guarantee of successful reforms. In many
instances they win out by default as an anti-corruption
strategy. But they contend that if sustained by careful
planning and a diverse set of incentives, they can reinforce
political will and enhance the strength of civil society.
Coalition-building efforts are underway in many societies.
But too often they have focused only on anti-corruption
tactics and pursuing their own growth, rather than looking
at the coalition-building process in more general terms. In
Part I, the authors employ Wilson's (1973) analysis of
the incentives that motivate and reward participation in
organizations. This approach helps them identify ways in
which the anti-corruption goals can be augmented by other
kinds of appeals, even when material incentives are scarce.
The authors also identify four stages of the
coalition-building process-formation, credibility,
expansion, and transformation-in which differing
combinations of incentives will be necessary to address the
group's most important problems and opportunities. In
Part II the authors examine two important coalition-building
efforts in light of the discussions thus far-Ghana's
Anti-Corruption Coalition, and the Bangalore Agenda Task
Force in Bangalore, Karnataka State, India. In Part III the
authors link those cases to a broader analysis, suggesting
that while purposive incentives are common in the early
phases of all coalitions, other varieties must be added to
the mix. Wilson's scheme points to ways in which the
imaginative use of incentives can aid the transition from
one phase of coalition development to the next. The authors
conclude with general strategic issues, suggesting ways in
which their analysis can be applied to those questions given
the important variations to be found among cases. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Johnston, Michael Kpundeh, Sahr J. |
| author_facet |
Johnston, Michael Kpundeh, Sahr J. |
| author_sort |
Johnston, Michael |
| title |
Building a Clean Machine : Anti-Corruption Coalitions and Sustainable Reform |
| title_short |
Building a Clean Machine : Anti-Corruption Coalitions and Sustainable Reform |
| title_full |
Building a Clean Machine : Anti-Corruption Coalitions and Sustainable Reform |
| title_fullStr |
Building a Clean Machine : Anti-Corruption Coalitions and Sustainable Reform |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Building a Clean Machine : Anti-Corruption Coalitions and Sustainable Reform |
| title_sort |
building a clean machine : anti-corruption coalitions and sustainable reform |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, D.C. |
| publishDate |
2013 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/12/5576815/building-clean-machine-anti-corruption-coalitions-sustainable-reform http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14722 |
| _version_ |
1764430936070422528 |