Building a Clean Machine : Anti-Corruption Coalitions and Sustainable Reform
Many societies have limited corruption through the broad-based mobilization of a diverse range of interests willing and able to defend themselves by making meaningful demands for accountability of, and limits on, official power, and for an end to i...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, D.C.
2013
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/12/5576815/building-clean-machine-anti-corruption-coalitions-sustainable-reform http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14722 |
| Summary: | Many societies have limited corruption
through the broad-based mobilization of a diverse range of
interests willing and able to defend themselves by making
meaningful demands for accountability of, and limits on,
official power, and for an end to illicit advantages enjoyed
by others. Historically such a process has taken place
gradually, as political development has proceeded and the
base of participation broadens. But today's
high-corruption societies cannot wait for several
generations to see such developments take place. The
authors argue that social action coalitions, linking public
and private actors, are a way to mobilize these sorts of
participation and advocacy. Such coalitions are neither a
new idea nor a guarantee of successful reforms. In many
instances they win out by default as an anti-corruption
strategy. But they contend that if sustained by careful
planning and a diverse set of incentives, they can reinforce
political will and enhance the strength of civil society.
Coalition-building efforts are underway in many societies.
But too often they have focused only on anti-corruption
tactics and pursuing their own growth, rather than looking
at the coalition-building process in more general terms. In
Part I, the authors employ Wilson's (1973) analysis of
the incentives that motivate and reward participation in
organizations. This approach helps them identify ways in
which the anti-corruption goals can be augmented by other
kinds of appeals, even when material incentives are scarce.
The authors also identify four stages of the
coalition-building process-formation, credibility,
expansion, and transformation-in which differing
combinations of incentives will be necessary to address the
group's most important problems and opportunities. In
Part II the authors examine two important coalition-building
efforts in light of the discussions thus far-Ghana's
Anti-Corruption Coalition, and the Bangalore Agenda Task
Force in Bangalore, Karnataka State, India. In Part III the
authors link those cases to a broader analysis, suggesting
that while purposive incentives are common in the early
phases of all coalitions, other varieties must be added to
the mix. Wilson's scheme points to ways in which the
imaginative use of incentives can aid the transition from
one phase of coalition development to the next. The authors
conclude with general strategic issues, suggesting ways in
which their analysis can be applied to those questions given
the important variations to be found among cases. |
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