Trademark Protection or Protectionism?
This paper explores the extent to which discrimination against foreign applicants in the trademark registration process can be used as a "behind-the-border" barrier to imports. Prima-facie evidence shows that in some developing countries...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, D.C.
2013
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/02/3909851/trademark-protection-or-protectionism http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14312 |
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okr-10986-143122021-04-23T14:03:20Z Trademark Protection or Protectionism? Baroncelli, Eugenia Krivonos, Ekaterina Olarreaga, Marcelo TRADEMARKS TRADE REGULATION EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS FOREIGN EXCHANGE IMPORTS TRADE BARRIERS AGRICULTURE BRANDS CD CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS DISCRIMINATION DOMESTIC MARKET DOMESTIC PRODUCTS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EXPORTS FISH FUTURE RESEARCH HOME MARKET IMPERFECT COMPETITION IMPORTS INCOME INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAWS LEGISLATION MARKET MECHANISM MARKET SEGMENTATION MARKET SHARE MERCHANDISE METALS PERFECT INFORMATION PRODUCERS PRODUCT QUALITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTIONISM QUALITY STANDARDS QUOTAS SALES SURPLUSES TRADE BARRIERS TRADEMARKS TRANSACTION COSTS WILLINGNESS TO PAY WTO WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION This paper explores the extent to which discrimination against foreign applicants in the trademark registration process can be used as a "behind-the-border" barrier to imports. Prima-facie evidence shows that in some developing countries the ratio of trademark registration to applications is much higher for national than for foreign applicants, which is consistent with the notion of discrimination against foreign firms. The authors develop a simple model that suggests that incentives to discriminate are stronger when foreign firms produce products that are close in quality to the product produced by domestic firms. This hypothesis is then tested and empirically confirmed in three of the four countries in their sample, suggesting that discretion and discrimination in the trademark registration process can sometimes be used as a protectionist tool. 2013-07-01T18:19:54Z 2013-07-01T18:19:54Z 2004-02 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/02/3909851/trademark-protection-or-protectionism http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14312 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No.3214 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, D.C. Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
TRADEMARKS TRADE REGULATION EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS FOREIGN EXCHANGE IMPORTS TRADE BARRIERS AGRICULTURE BRANDS CD CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS DISCRIMINATION DOMESTIC MARKET DOMESTIC PRODUCTS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EXPORTS FISH FUTURE RESEARCH HOME MARKET IMPERFECT COMPETITION IMPORTS INCOME INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAWS LEGISLATION MARKET MECHANISM MARKET SEGMENTATION MARKET SHARE MERCHANDISE METALS PERFECT INFORMATION PRODUCERS PRODUCT QUALITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTIONISM QUALITY STANDARDS QUOTAS SALES SURPLUSES TRADE BARRIERS TRADEMARKS TRANSACTION COSTS WILLINGNESS TO PAY WTO WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION |
| spellingShingle |
TRADEMARKS TRADE REGULATION EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS FOREIGN EXCHANGE IMPORTS TRADE BARRIERS AGRICULTURE BRANDS CD CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS DISCRIMINATION DOMESTIC MARKET DOMESTIC PRODUCTS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EXPORTS FISH FUTURE RESEARCH HOME MARKET IMPERFECT COMPETITION IMPORTS INCOME INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAWS LEGISLATION MARKET MECHANISM MARKET SEGMENTATION MARKET SHARE MERCHANDISE METALS PERFECT INFORMATION PRODUCERS PRODUCT QUALITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTIONISM QUALITY STANDARDS QUOTAS SALES SURPLUSES TRADE BARRIERS TRADEMARKS TRANSACTION COSTS WILLINGNESS TO PAY WTO WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION Baroncelli, Eugenia Krivonos, Ekaterina Olarreaga, Marcelo Trademark Protection or Protectionism? |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No.3214 |
| description |
This paper explores the extent to which
discrimination against foreign applicants in the trademark
registration process can be used as a
"behind-the-border" barrier to imports.
Prima-facie evidence shows that in some developing countries
the ratio of trademark registration to applications is much
higher for national than for foreign applicants, which is
consistent with the notion of discrimination against foreign
firms. The authors develop a simple model that suggests that
incentives to discriminate are stronger when foreign firms
produce products that are close in quality to the product
produced by domestic firms. This hypothesis is then tested
and empirically confirmed in three of the four countries in
their sample, suggesting that discretion and discrimination
in the trademark registration process can sometimes be used
as a protectionist tool. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Baroncelli, Eugenia Krivonos, Ekaterina Olarreaga, Marcelo |
| author_facet |
Baroncelli, Eugenia Krivonos, Ekaterina Olarreaga, Marcelo |
| author_sort |
Baroncelli, Eugenia |
| title |
Trademark Protection or Protectionism? |
| title_short |
Trademark Protection or Protectionism? |
| title_full |
Trademark Protection or Protectionism? |
| title_fullStr |
Trademark Protection or Protectionism? |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Trademark Protection or Protectionism? |
| title_sort |
trademark protection or protectionism? |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, D.C. |
| publishDate |
2013 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/02/3909851/trademark-protection-or-protectionism http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14312 |
| _version_ |
1764430282902994944 |