Investor Protection, Ownership, and the Cost of Capital

Investor Protection, Ownership, and the Cost of Capital

The authors combine the agency theory of the firm with risk diversification incentives for insiders. Principal-agent problems between insiders and outsiders force insiders to retain a larger share in their firm than they would under a perfect risk...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Himmelberg, Charles P., Hubbard, R. Glenn, Love, Inessa
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, D.C. 2013
Subjects:
INVESTOR PROTECTION
OWNERSHIP
COST OF CAPITAL
AGENCY CONCEPT
RISK DIVERSIFICATION
INCENTIVES ACCOUNTING
AGENCY PROBLEMS
BALANCE SHEET
BENCHMARK
BOOK VALUE
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES
CAPITAL MARKETS
CAPITAL PROJECTS
CD
CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT
CONTROL TRANSACTIONS
CORPORATE FINANCE
COUNTRY COMPARISONS
DEBT
DEMAND CURVE
DIVESTITURES
DIVIDENDS
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ECONOMIC REFORMS
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
EQUILIBRIUM
EXCISE TAXES
EXPECTED UTILITY
EXPENDITURES
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK
FINANCIAL DATA
FINANCIAL MARKETS
FIXED CAPITAL
FOREIGN FIRMS
FOREIGN INVESTORS
INCOME
LAWS
LEGAL PROTECTION
LEGAL REGIMES
LIQUIDITY
MARGINAL COST
MARGINAL COSTS
MARGINAL PRODUCT
MARGINAL UTILITY
MARGINAL VALUE
MERGERS
MONETARY POLICY
MORAL HAZARD
OPPORTUNITY COST
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
PAYOUT
PENALTIES
PORTFOLIO
PREDICTIONS
PRICE ELASTICITY
PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND
PRODUCTION FUNCTION
PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY
PROFITABILITY
PROPRIETORSHIP
PURCHASE PRICE
RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS
REORGANIZATION
RESEARCH AGENDA
RISK AVERSION
RISK PREMIUM
SHAREHOLDERS
TAKEOVER
TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY
VALUE ADDED
WEALTH
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/04/1783726/investor-protection-ownership-cost-capital
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14288

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/04/1783726/investor-protection-ownership-cost-capital
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14288

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