State Ownership: A Residual Role?
The author reviews the state of thinking on the governance role of state ownership. He argues that a gradual transfer of operational control and financial claims over state assets remains the most desirable goal, but it needs to be paced to avoid r...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, D.C.
2013
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/09/5175906/state-ownership-residual-role http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14270 |
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okr-10986-142702021-04-23T14:03:21Z State Ownership: A Residual Role? Perotti, Enrico ABUSE OF POWER ACCOUNTABILITY ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY ASSETS AUTONOMY BANKING CRISES BANKRUPTCY BANKS BARGAINING POWER BIDDING CENTRAL BANKS CITIZENS CIVIL SOCIETY CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CORRUPTION DEBT DEMOCRATIZATION DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSITORS DEREGULATION DISCLOSURE ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMICS ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPLOYMENT ENDOWMENTS EXTERNALITIES FINANCIAL CRISES FINANCIAL SYSTEMS GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INVESTOR PROTECTION LATIN AMERICAN LAWS LEGISLATION LEGITIMACY LEVEL PLAYING FIELD LOCAL AUTHORITIES LOCAL POLITICIANS MARKET DISCIPLINE MORAL HAZARD MORTALITY NATIONALIZATION NATURAL MONOPOLIES POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL SYSTEM POLITICIANS PRIVATE BANKS PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATIZATION PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC OPINION PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC WELFARE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK RENT SEEKING REPRESENTATIVES SHAREHOLDERS STATE ASSETS STATE BANKS STATE OWNERSHIP STATE REGULATION TAXATION TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY VOLATILITY VOTING WAGES The author reviews the state of thinking on the governance role of state ownership. He argues that a gradual transfer of operational control and financial claims over state assets remains the most desirable goal, but it needs to be paced to avoid regulatory capture, and the capture of the privatization process itself. In addition, the speed of transfer should be timed on the progress in developing a strong regulatory governance system, to which certain residual rights of intervention must be vested. In many countries institutional weakness limits regulatory capacity and reliability, yet the author's conclusion is that in such environments, maintaining state control undermines the very emergence of institutional capacity, and so the balance should tip toward progressively less direct state control. After all, what are "institutions" if not governance mechanisms with some degree of autonomy from both political and private interests? The gradual creation of institutions partially autonomous from political power must become central to the development of an optimal mode of regulatory governance. The author offers some suggestions about creating maximum accountability in regulatory governance, in particular creating an internal control system based on a rotating board representative of users, producers, and civic organizations, to be elected by a process involving frequent reporting and disclosure. 2013-06-27T20:22:40Z 2013-06-27T20:22:40Z 2004-09 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/09/5175906/state-ownership-residual-role http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14270 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No.3407 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, D.C. Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ABUSE OF POWER ACCOUNTABILITY ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY ASSETS AUTONOMY BANKING CRISES BANKRUPTCY BANKS BARGAINING POWER BIDDING CENTRAL BANKS CITIZENS CIVIL SOCIETY CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CORRUPTION DEBT DEMOCRATIZATION DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSITORS DEREGULATION DISCLOSURE ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMICS ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPLOYMENT ENDOWMENTS EXTERNALITIES FINANCIAL CRISES FINANCIAL SYSTEMS GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INVESTOR PROTECTION LATIN AMERICAN LAWS LEGISLATION LEGITIMACY LEVEL PLAYING FIELD LOCAL AUTHORITIES LOCAL POLITICIANS MARKET DISCIPLINE MORAL HAZARD MORTALITY NATIONALIZATION NATURAL MONOPOLIES POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL SYSTEM POLITICIANS PRIVATE BANKS PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATIZATION PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC OPINION PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC WELFARE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK RENT SEEKING REPRESENTATIVES SHAREHOLDERS STATE ASSETS STATE BANKS STATE OWNERSHIP STATE REGULATION TAXATION TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY VOLATILITY VOTING WAGES |
| spellingShingle |
ABUSE OF POWER ACCOUNTABILITY ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY ASSETS AUTONOMY BANKING CRISES BANKRUPTCY BANKS BARGAINING POWER BIDDING CENTRAL BANKS CITIZENS CIVIL SOCIETY CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CORRUPTION DEBT DEMOCRATIZATION DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSITORS DEREGULATION DISCLOSURE ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMICS ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPLOYMENT ENDOWMENTS EXTERNALITIES FINANCIAL CRISES FINANCIAL SYSTEMS GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INVESTOR PROTECTION LATIN AMERICAN LAWS LEGISLATION LEGITIMACY LEVEL PLAYING FIELD LOCAL AUTHORITIES LOCAL POLITICIANS MARKET DISCIPLINE MORAL HAZARD MORTALITY NATIONALIZATION NATURAL MONOPOLIES POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL SYSTEM POLITICIANS PRIVATE BANKS PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATIZATION PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC OPINION PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC WELFARE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK RENT SEEKING REPRESENTATIVES SHAREHOLDERS STATE ASSETS STATE BANKS STATE OWNERSHIP STATE REGULATION TAXATION TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY VOLATILITY VOTING WAGES Perotti, Enrico State Ownership: A Residual Role? |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No.3407 |
| description |
The author reviews the state of thinking
on the governance role of state ownership. He argues that a
gradual transfer of operational control and financial claims
over state assets remains the most desirable goal, but it
needs to be paced to avoid regulatory capture, and the
capture of the privatization process itself. In addition,
the speed of transfer should be timed on the progress in
developing a strong regulatory governance system, to which
certain residual rights of intervention must be vested. In
many countries institutional weakness limits regulatory
capacity and reliability, yet the author's conclusion
is that in such environments, maintaining state control
undermines the very emergence of institutional capacity, and
so the balance should tip toward progressively less direct
state control. After all, what are "institutions"
if not governance mechanisms with some degree of autonomy
from both political and private interests? The gradual
creation of institutions partially autonomous from political
power must become central to the development of an optimal
mode of regulatory governance. The author offers some
suggestions about creating maximum accountability in
regulatory governance, in particular creating an internal
control system based on a rotating board representative of
users, producers, and civic organizations, to be elected by
a process involving frequent reporting and disclosure. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Perotti, Enrico |
| author_facet |
Perotti, Enrico |
| author_sort |
Perotti, Enrico |
| title |
State Ownership: A Residual Role? |
| title_short |
State Ownership: A Residual Role? |
| title_full |
State Ownership: A Residual Role? |
| title_fullStr |
State Ownership: A Residual Role? |
| title_full_unstemmed |
State Ownership: A Residual Role? |
| title_sort |
state ownership: a residual role? |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, D.C. |
| publishDate |
2013 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/09/5175906/state-ownership-residual-role http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14270 |
| _version_ |
1764430710960029696 |