Special Issues Relating to Corporate Governance and Family Control
Control of corporate assets by wealthy families in economies lacking institutional integrity is common. It has negative implications on corporate governance and adverse macroeconomic effects when it extends across a sufficiently large part of the c...
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, D.C.
2013
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/09/5168113/special-issues-relating-corporate-governance-family-control http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14238 |
| id |
okr-10986-14238 |
|---|---|
| recordtype |
oai_dc |
| spelling |
okr-10986-142382021-04-23T14:03:21Z Special Issues Relating to Corporate Governance and Family Control Morck, Randall Yeung, Bernard ACCOUNTING AGENCY PROBLEMS ASSETS ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BANKING SYSTEMS CAPITAL GAINS CAPITAL MARKETS COMPANY COMPETITORS CONGLOMERATES CORPORATE ASSETS CORPORATE CONTROL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE OWNERSHIP CORPORATE PERFORMANCE CORPORATE STRUCTURE CORPORATIONS DECISION MAKING DISCLOSURE DIVIDENDS ECONOMIC HISTORY ECONOMIC POWER ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ENTREPRENEURSHIP EQUITY MARKETS EQUITY STAKE EXPANSION EXPENDITURES EXPROPRIATION FIRMS FIXED ASSETS FREE TRADE GDP GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT GUARANTORS HOLDING COMPANIES INHERITANCE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS INVESTOR PROTECTION LARGE SHAREHOLDERS LAWS LIQUIDITY LISTED COMPANIES LONG TERM INVESTMENT MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE MERGERS OUTSIDE SHAREHOLDERS OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE POLITICAL ECONOMY PRICE DECLINES PRODUCT MARKETS PROPERTY RIGHTS RATE OF RETURN SHAREHOLDER VALUE SHAREHOLDERS SHAREHOLDERS RIGHTS SHAREHOLDINGS SHOPS SMALL BUSINESSES SMALL FIRMS STOCK MARKETS STOCK PRICES STORES TAX SYSTEM TAXATION VALUE ADDED WEALTH Control of corporate assets by wealthy families in economies lacking institutional integrity is common. It has negative implications on corporate governance and adverse macroeconomic effects when it extends across a sufficiently large part of the country's corporate sector. The authors consider the reasons why family control and control pyramids predominate in emerging market economies and in some industrial economies. They also discuss the reasons why widely held freestanding firms predominate in the United States. The authors discuss policies that countries might adopt to discourage family control pyramids, but caution that control pyramids are but one feature of an institutionally deficient economy. A concerted effort to improve a country's institutions is needed before diffuse ownership is desirable. 2013-06-27T17:04:25Z 2013-06-27T17:04:25Z 2004-09 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/09/5168113/special-issues-relating-corporate-governance-family-control http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14238 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No.3406 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, D.C. Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ACCOUNTING AGENCY PROBLEMS ASSETS ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BANKING SYSTEMS CAPITAL GAINS CAPITAL MARKETS COMPANY COMPETITORS CONGLOMERATES CORPORATE ASSETS CORPORATE CONTROL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE OWNERSHIP CORPORATE PERFORMANCE CORPORATE STRUCTURE CORPORATIONS DECISION MAKING DISCLOSURE DIVIDENDS ECONOMIC HISTORY ECONOMIC POWER ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ENTREPRENEURSHIP EQUITY MARKETS EQUITY STAKE EXPANSION EXPENDITURES EXPROPRIATION FIRMS FIXED ASSETS FREE TRADE GDP GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT GUARANTORS HOLDING COMPANIES INHERITANCE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS INVESTOR PROTECTION LARGE SHAREHOLDERS LAWS LIQUIDITY LISTED COMPANIES LONG TERM INVESTMENT MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE MERGERS OUTSIDE SHAREHOLDERS OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE POLITICAL ECONOMY PRICE DECLINES PRODUCT MARKETS PROPERTY RIGHTS RATE OF RETURN SHAREHOLDER VALUE SHAREHOLDERS SHAREHOLDERS RIGHTS SHAREHOLDINGS SHOPS SMALL BUSINESSES SMALL FIRMS STOCK MARKETS STOCK PRICES STORES TAX SYSTEM TAXATION VALUE ADDED WEALTH |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTING AGENCY PROBLEMS ASSETS ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BANKING SYSTEMS CAPITAL GAINS CAPITAL MARKETS COMPANY COMPETITORS CONGLOMERATES CORPORATE ASSETS CORPORATE CONTROL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE OWNERSHIP CORPORATE PERFORMANCE CORPORATE STRUCTURE CORPORATIONS DECISION MAKING DISCLOSURE DIVIDENDS ECONOMIC HISTORY ECONOMIC POWER ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ENTREPRENEURSHIP EQUITY MARKETS EQUITY STAKE EXPANSION EXPENDITURES EXPROPRIATION FIRMS FIXED ASSETS FREE TRADE GDP GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT GUARANTORS HOLDING COMPANIES INHERITANCE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS INVESTOR PROTECTION LARGE SHAREHOLDERS LAWS LIQUIDITY LISTED COMPANIES LONG TERM INVESTMENT MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE MERGERS OUTSIDE SHAREHOLDERS OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE POLITICAL ECONOMY PRICE DECLINES PRODUCT MARKETS PROPERTY RIGHTS RATE OF RETURN SHAREHOLDER VALUE SHAREHOLDERS SHAREHOLDERS RIGHTS SHAREHOLDINGS SHOPS SMALL BUSINESSES SMALL FIRMS STOCK MARKETS STOCK PRICES STORES TAX SYSTEM TAXATION VALUE ADDED WEALTH Morck, Randall Yeung, Bernard Special Issues Relating to Corporate Governance and Family Control |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No.3406 |
| description |
Control of corporate assets by wealthy
families in economies lacking institutional integrity is
common. It has negative implications on corporate governance
and adverse macroeconomic effects when it extends across a
sufficiently large part of the country's corporate
sector. The authors consider the reasons why family control
and control pyramids predominate in emerging market
economies and in some industrial economies. They also
discuss the reasons why widely held freestanding firms
predominate in the United States. The authors discuss
policies that countries might adopt to discourage family
control pyramids, but caution that control pyramids are but
one feature of an institutionally deficient economy. A
concerted effort to improve a country's institutions is
needed before diffuse ownership is desirable. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Morck, Randall Yeung, Bernard |
| author_facet |
Morck, Randall Yeung, Bernard |
| author_sort |
Morck, Randall |
| title |
Special Issues Relating to Corporate Governance and Family Control |
| title_short |
Special Issues Relating to Corporate Governance and Family Control |
| title_full |
Special Issues Relating to Corporate Governance and Family Control |
| title_fullStr |
Special Issues Relating to Corporate Governance and Family Control |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Special Issues Relating to Corporate Governance and Family Control |
| title_sort |
special issues relating to corporate governance and family control |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, D.C. |
| publishDate |
2013 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/09/5168113/special-issues-relating-corporate-governance-family-control http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14238 |
| _version_ |
1764430675364020224 |