Universal Service Obligations in Developing Countries
This paper develops a model to analyze the impacts of asymmetric information on optimal universal, service policy in the public utilities of developing countries. Optimal universal service policy is implemented using two regulatory instruments: pri...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, D.C.
2013
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/10/5185071/universal-service-obligations-developing-countries http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14227 |
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okr-10986-142272021-04-23T14:03:21Z Universal Service Obligations in Developing Countries Estache, Antonio Laffont, Jean-Jacques Xinzhu Zhang ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BENCHMARK COLLUSION CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS COVERAGE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY ELASTICITY ICT INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES INFORMATION ECONOMICS INFORMATION GAP INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LIABILITY MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COSTS NASH EQUILIBRIUM NETWORKS OPTIMIZATION POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLICY MAKERS POLITICAL ECONOMY PRICE DISCRIMINATION PRIVATE INFORMATION PROGRAMS REGULATORY CAPTURE REGULATORY POLICY RISK NEUTRAL SAVINGS SERVICE DELIVERY SOCIAL MARGINAL COST TELECOMMUNICATIONS TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES TELEPHONE SERVICES UNIVERSAL SERVICE UTILITY FUNCTION This paper develops a model to analyze the impacts of asymmetric information on optimal universal, service policy in the public utilities of developing countries. Optimal universal service policy is implemented using two regulatory instruments: pricing and network investment. Under discriminatory pricing asymmetric information leads to a higher price, and smaller network in the rural area, than under full information. Under uniform pricing, the price is also lower but the network is even smaller. In addition, under both pricing regimes, not only the firm, but also taxpayers have incentives to collude with the regulator. 2013-06-27T13:27:41Z 2013-06-27T13:27:41Z 2004-08 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/10/5185071/universal-service-obligations-developing-countries http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14227 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No.3421 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, D.C. Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BENCHMARK COLLUSION CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS COVERAGE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY ELASTICITY ICT INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES INFORMATION ECONOMICS INFORMATION GAP INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LIABILITY MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COSTS NASH EQUILIBRIUM NETWORKS OPTIMIZATION POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLICY MAKERS POLITICAL ECONOMY PRICE DISCRIMINATION PRIVATE INFORMATION PROGRAMS REGULATORY CAPTURE REGULATORY POLICY RISK NEUTRAL SAVINGS SERVICE DELIVERY SOCIAL MARGINAL COST TELECOMMUNICATIONS TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES TELEPHONE SERVICES UNIVERSAL SERVICE UTILITY FUNCTION |
| spellingShingle |
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BENCHMARK COLLUSION CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS COVERAGE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY ELASTICITY ICT INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES INFORMATION ECONOMICS INFORMATION GAP INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LIABILITY MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COSTS NASH EQUILIBRIUM NETWORKS OPTIMIZATION POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLICY MAKERS POLITICAL ECONOMY PRICE DISCRIMINATION PRIVATE INFORMATION PROGRAMS REGULATORY CAPTURE REGULATORY POLICY RISK NEUTRAL SAVINGS SERVICE DELIVERY SOCIAL MARGINAL COST TELECOMMUNICATIONS TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES TELEPHONE SERVICES UNIVERSAL SERVICE UTILITY FUNCTION Estache, Antonio Laffont, Jean-Jacques Xinzhu Zhang Universal Service Obligations in Developing Countries |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No.3421 |
| description |
This paper develops a model to analyze
the impacts of asymmetric information on optimal universal,
service policy in the public utilities of developing
countries. Optimal universal service policy is implemented
using two regulatory instruments: pricing and network
investment. Under discriminatory pricing asymmetric
information leads to a higher price, and smaller network in
the rural area, than under full information. Under uniform
pricing, the price is also lower but the network is even
smaller. In addition, under both pricing regimes, not only
the firm, but also taxpayers have incentives to collude with
the regulator. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Estache, Antonio Laffont, Jean-Jacques Xinzhu Zhang |
| author_facet |
Estache, Antonio Laffont, Jean-Jacques Xinzhu Zhang |
| author_sort |
Estache, Antonio |
| title |
Universal Service Obligations in Developing Countries |
| title_short |
Universal Service Obligations in Developing Countries |
| title_full |
Universal Service Obligations in Developing Countries |
| title_fullStr |
Universal Service Obligations in Developing Countries |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Universal Service Obligations in Developing Countries |
| title_sort |
universal service obligations in developing countries |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, D.C. |
| publishDate |
2013 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/10/5185071/universal-service-obligations-developing-countries http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14227 |
| _version_ |
1764430787876225024 |