The Quality of Foreign Aid: Country Selectivity or Donors Incentives?
The author investigates the determinants of foreign aid quality. He shows that design effects are a crucial component of quality. He thus establishes that donors have an impact on the quality of the foreign assistance they provide. The author also...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, D.C.
2013
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/06/4983704/quality-foreign-aid-country-selectivity-or-donors-incentives http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14001 |
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okr-10986-140012021-04-23T14:03:21Z The Quality of Foreign Aid: Country Selectivity or Donors Incentives? Wane, Waly ACCOUNTABILITY AID AID AGENCIES AID ALLOCATION CORRUPTION DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS DEVELOPMENT IMPACT DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS DEVELOPMENT ISSUES DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH FATIGUE INCOME INTEREST RATES INTERMEDIARIES INTERNATIONAL AID MANAGERS MORAL HAZARD POLICY RESEARCH POVERTY REDUCTION PROGRAMS QUALITY OF LIFE SCREENING STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT SUSTAINABILITY FOREIGN AID FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROJECT DESIGN PROJECT QUALITY PROJECT QUALITY CONTROL The author investigates the determinants of foreign aid quality. He shows that design effects are a crucial component of quality. He thus establishes that donors have an impact on the quality of the foreign assistance they provide. The author also shows both theoretically and empirically that the quality of aid is endogenous to the relationship between the donor agency and the recipient government. Highly capable and accountable governments accept only well-designed projects, whereas governments with low accountability may accept poor quality projects either because they are unable to assess the worth of the projects or they will benefit personally. 2013-06-19T14:09:10Z 2013-06-19T14:09:10Z 2004-06 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/06/4983704/quality-foreign-aid-country-selectivity-or-donors-incentives http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14001 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No.3325 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, D.C. Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research World |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY AID AID AGENCIES AID ALLOCATION CORRUPTION DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS DEVELOPMENT IMPACT DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS DEVELOPMENT ISSUES DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH FATIGUE INCOME INTEREST RATES INTERMEDIARIES INTERNATIONAL AID MANAGERS MORAL HAZARD POLICY RESEARCH POVERTY REDUCTION PROGRAMS QUALITY OF LIFE SCREENING STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT SUSTAINABILITY FOREIGN AID FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROJECT DESIGN PROJECT QUALITY PROJECT QUALITY CONTROL |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY AID AID AGENCIES AID ALLOCATION CORRUPTION DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS DEVELOPMENT IMPACT DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS DEVELOPMENT ISSUES DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH FATIGUE INCOME INTEREST RATES INTERMEDIARIES INTERNATIONAL AID MANAGERS MORAL HAZARD POLICY RESEARCH POVERTY REDUCTION PROGRAMS QUALITY OF LIFE SCREENING STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT SUSTAINABILITY FOREIGN AID FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROJECT DESIGN PROJECT QUALITY PROJECT QUALITY CONTROL Wane, Waly The Quality of Foreign Aid: Country Selectivity or Donors Incentives? |
| geographic_facet |
World |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No.3325 |
| description |
The author investigates the determinants
of foreign aid quality. He shows that design effects are a
crucial component of quality. He thus establishes that
donors have an impact on the quality of the foreign
assistance they provide. The author also shows both
theoretically and empirically that the quality of aid is
endogenous to the relationship between the donor agency and
the recipient government. Highly capable and accountable
governments accept only well-designed projects, whereas
governments with low accountability may accept poor quality
projects either because they are unable to assess the worth
of the projects or they will benefit personally. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Wane, Waly |
| author_facet |
Wane, Waly |
| author_sort |
Wane, Waly |
| title |
The Quality of Foreign Aid: Country Selectivity or Donors Incentives? |
| title_short |
The Quality of Foreign Aid: Country Selectivity or Donors Incentives? |
| title_full |
The Quality of Foreign Aid: Country Selectivity or Donors Incentives? |
| title_fullStr |
The Quality of Foreign Aid: Country Selectivity or Donors Incentives? |
| title_full_unstemmed |
The Quality of Foreign Aid: Country Selectivity or Donors Incentives? |
| title_sort |
quality of foreign aid: country selectivity or donors incentives? |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, D.C. |
| publishDate |
2013 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/06/4983704/quality-foreign-aid-country-selectivity-or-donors-incentives http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14001 |
| _version_ |
1764430343473987584 |