Contract Teachers in India
In this paper, we use non‐experimental data from government schools in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, two of the largest Indian states, to present average school outcomes by contract status of teachers. We find that contract teachers are associated with higher effort than civil service teachers w...
Main Authors: | , |
---|---|
Format: | Journal Article |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
Taylor and Francis
2013
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10986/13272 |
id |
okr-10986-13272 |
---|---|
recordtype |
oai_dc |
spelling |
okr-10986-132722021-04-23T14:03:07Z Contract Teachers in India Goyal, Sangeeta Pandey, Priyanka developing countries primary education teacher incentives teacher contracts teacher absenteeism In this paper, we use non‐experimental data from government schools in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, two of the largest Indian states, to present average school outcomes by contract status of teachers. We find that contract teachers are associated with higher effort than civil service teachers with permanent tenures, before as well as after controlling for school fixed effects. And higher teacher effort is associated with better student performance after controlling for other school inputs and student characteristics. Given that salaries earned by contract teachers are one‐fourth or less of civil service teachers, contract teachers may be a more cost‐effective resource. However, contracts ‘as they are’ appear weak. Not only do contract teachers have fairly low average effort in absolute terms, but those who have been on the job for at least one full tenure have lower effort than others who are in the first contract period. 2013-04-25T19:34:40Z 2013-04-25T19:34:40Z 2011-06-24 Journal Article Education Economics 0964-5292 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/13272 en_US Education Economics; http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/ World Bank Taylor and Francis Publications & Research :: Journal Article India |
repository_type |
Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
en_US |
topic |
developing countries primary education teacher incentives teacher contracts teacher absenteeism |
spellingShingle |
developing countries primary education teacher incentives teacher contracts teacher absenteeism Goyal, Sangeeta Pandey, Priyanka Contract Teachers in India |
geographic_facet |
India |
relation |
Education Economics; |
description |
In this paper, we use non‐experimental data from government schools in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, two of the largest Indian states, to present average school outcomes by contract status of teachers. We find that contract teachers are associated with higher effort than civil service teachers with permanent tenures, before as well as after controlling for school fixed effects. And higher teacher effort is associated with better student performance after controlling for other school inputs and student characteristics. Given that salaries earned by contract teachers are one‐fourth or less of civil service teachers, contract teachers may be a more cost‐effective resource. However, contracts ‘as they are’ appear weak. Not only do contract teachers have fairly low average effort in absolute terms, but those who have been on the job for at least one full tenure have lower effort than others who are in the first contract period. |
format |
Journal Article |
author |
Goyal, Sangeeta Pandey, Priyanka |
author_facet |
Goyal, Sangeeta Pandey, Priyanka |
author_sort |
Goyal, Sangeeta |
title |
Contract Teachers in India |
title_short |
Contract Teachers in India |
title_full |
Contract Teachers in India |
title_fullStr |
Contract Teachers in India |
title_full_unstemmed |
Contract Teachers in India |
title_sort |
contract teachers in india |
publisher |
Taylor and Francis |
publishDate |
2013 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/13272 |
_version_ |
1764423060140589056 |