Political Economy Aspects of Fuel Subsidies : A Conceptual Framework

While notoriously inefficient, fuel subsidies are widespread, and in many cases politically stable. This paper discusses and models various political economy aspects of fuel subsidies, focusing on gasoline and kerosene. Both economic and political...

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Main Author: Strand, Jon
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2013
Subjects:
CAR
GAS
OIL
TAX
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/03/17492714/political-economy-aspects-fuel-subsidies-conceptual-framework-political-economy-aspects-fuel-subsidies-conceptual-framework
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/13190
id okr-10986-13190
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-131902021-04-23T14:03:07Z Political Economy Aspects of Fuel Subsidies : A Conceptual Framework Strand, Jon APPROACH AUTOMOBILE BALANCE BUYING POWER CAR CAR OWNERS CAR OWNERSHIP CAR-OWNING HOUSEHOLDS CARS COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS CONCENTRATIONS CONGESTION CONGESTION PROBLEMS DEBT DECISION MAKING DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY DIESEL DRIVERS DRIVING ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC GROWTH RATES ECONOMIC POLICIES ELASTICITY ELECTRIC POWER ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES ENERGY STRATEGY ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION EXPECTED UTILITY EXTERNALITIES EXTERNALITY FORECASTS FOSSIL FOSSIL FUEL FUEL FUEL CONSUMPTION FUEL DEMAND FUEL PRICE FUEL PRICES FUEL SUBSIDIES FUEL TAX RATES FUEL TAXATION FUEL TAXES FUEL TYPES FUELS FUTURE RESEARCH GAS GAS PRICE GAS PRICES GASOLINE GASOLINE CONSUMPTION GASOLINE DEMAND GASOLINE PRICE GASOLINE PRICES GASOLINE TAX HIGHWAYS INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME GROUPS INCOME LEVELS INEFFICIENCY INTERNATIONAL FUEL TAX KEROSENE KEROSENE SUBSIDIES MACROECONOMICS MOBILITY MOTOR FUEL MOTOR FUEL TAX MOTOR FUELS MOTOR VEHICLE MOTOR VEHICLE OWNERS MOTOR VEHICLE OWNERSHIP MOTOR VEHICLE USE MOTOR VEHICLES NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES OIL OIL PRICES PASSENGER CARS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL POWER POLLUTION PRICE OF FUELS PRICE OF GASOLINE PRIVATE GOODS PUBLIC PUBLIC ECONOMICS PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC TRANSPORT PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION PURCHASES PURCHASING POWER ROAD ROAD USE TAX TAX ASSESSMENT TAX REVENUE TOTALITARIAN REGIMES TOTALITARIANISM TRANSPORT ECONOMICS TRANSPORT RESEARCH TRANSPORTATION COST TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM TRAVEL DEMAND TRAVEL DEMAND PREDICTIONS TRUE URBAN AREAS UTILITY FUNCTION UTILITY FUNCTIONS VEHICLE OWNERS VOTER PREFERENCES VOTERS While notoriously inefficient, fuel subsidies are widespread, and in many cases politically stable. This paper discusses and models various political economy aspects of fuel subsidies, focusing on gasoline and kerosene. Both economic and political are considered to explain differences in subsidies, with particular focus on democratic and autocratic governments. A political process is modeled whereby a promise of low fuel prices is used in democracies to attract voters, and in autocracies to mobilize support among key groups. Subsidies to fuels are viewed as either easier to observe, easier to commit to, easier to deliver, or better targeted at core groups, than other public goods or favors offered by rulers. Easier commitment and delivery than for regular public goods can explain the high prevalence of such policies in autocracies, and also in young democracies where the capacity to commit to or deliver complex public goods is not yet fully developed. The analysis provides a framework for empirical testing and verification. 2013-04-12T17:32:44Z 2013-04-12T17:32:44Z 2013-03 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/03/17492714/political-economy-aspects-fuel-subsidies-conceptual-framework-political-economy-aspects-fuel-subsidies-conceptual-framework http://hdl.handle.net/10986/13190 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6392 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
en_US
topic APPROACH
AUTOMOBILE
BALANCE
BUYING POWER
CAR
CAR OWNERS
CAR OWNERSHIP
CAR-OWNING HOUSEHOLDS
CARS
COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS
CONCENTRATIONS
CONGESTION
CONGESTION PROBLEMS
DEBT
DECISION MAKING
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
DEVELOPMENT POLICY
DIESEL
DRIVERS
DRIVING
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ECONOMIC GROWTH RATES
ECONOMIC POLICIES
ELASTICITY
ELECTRIC POWER
ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES
ENERGY STRATEGY
ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION
EXPECTED UTILITY
EXTERNALITIES
EXTERNALITY
FORECASTS
FOSSIL
FOSSIL FUEL
FUEL
FUEL CONSUMPTION
FUEL DEMAND
FUEL PRICE
FUEL PRICES
FUEL SUBSIDIES
FUEL TAX RATES
FUEL TAXATION
FUEL TAXES
FUEL TYPES
FUELS
FUTURE RESEARCH
GAS
GAS PRICE
GAS PRICES
GASOLINE
GASOLINE CONSUMPTION
GASOLINE DEMAND
GASOLINE PRICE
GASOLINE PRICES
GASOLINE TAX
HIGHWAYS
INCOME
INCOME DISTRIBUTION
INCOME GROUPS
INCOME LEVELS
INEFFICIENCY
INTERNATIONAL FUEL TAX
KEROSENE
KEROSENE SUBSIDIES
MACROECONOMICS
MOBILITY
MOTOR FUEL
MOTOR FUEL TAX
MOTOR FUELS
MOTOR VEHICLE
MOTOR VEHICLE OWNERS
MOTOR VEHICLE OWNERSHIP
MOTOR VEHICLE USE
MOTOR VEHICLES
NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES
OIL
OIL PRICES
PASSENGER CARS
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POLITICAL POWER
POLLUTION
PRICE OF FUELS
PRICE OF GASOLINE
PRIVATE GOODS
PUBLIC
PUBLIC ECONOMICS
PUBLIC FINANCE
PUBLIC GOOD
PUBLIC GOODS
PUBLIC TRANSPORT
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
PURCHASES
PURCHASING POWER
ROAD
ROAD USE
TAX
TAX ASSESSMENT
TAX REVENUE
TOTALITARIAN REGIMES
TOTALITARIANISM
TRANSPORT ECONOMICS
TRANSPORT RESEARCH
TRANSPORTATION COST
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
TRAVEL DEMAND
TRAVEL DEMAND PREDICTIONS
TRUE
URBAN AREAS
UTILITY FUNCTION
UTILITY FUNCTIONS
VEHICLE OWNERS
VOTER PREFERENCES
VOTERS
spellingShingle APPROACH
AUTOMOBILE
BALANCE
BUYING POWER
CAR
CAR OWNERS
CAR OWNERSHIP
CAR-OWNING HOUSEHOLDS
CARS
COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS
CONCENTRATIONS
CONGESTION
CONGESTION PROBLEMS
DEBT
DECISION MAKING
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
DEVELOPMENT POLICY
DIESEL
DRIVERS
DRIVING
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ECONOMIC GROWTH RATES
ECONOMIC POLICIES
ELASTICITY
ELECTRIC POWER
ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES
ENERGY STRATEGY
ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION
EXPECTED UTILITY
EXTERNALITIES
EXTERNALITY
FORECASTS
FOSSIL
FOSSIL FUEL
FUEL
FUEL CONSUMPTION
FUEL DEMAND
FUEL PRICE
FUEL PRICES
FUEL SUBSIDIES
FUEL TAX RATES
FUEL TAXATION
FUEL TAXES
FUEL TYPES
FUELS
FUTURE RESEARCH
GAS
GAS PRICE
GAS PRICES
GASOLINE
GASOLINE CONSUMPTION
GASOLINE DEMAND
GASOLINE PRICE
GASOLINE PRICES
GASOLINE TAX
HIGHWAYS
INCOME
INCOME DISTRIBUTION
INCOME GROUPS
INCOME LEVELS
INEFFICIENCY
INTERNATIONAL FUEL TAX
KEROSENE
KEROSENE SUBSIDIES
MACROECONOMICS
MOBILITY
MOTOR FUEL
MOTOR FUEL TAX
MOTOR FUELS
MOTOR VEHICLE
MOTOR VEHICLE OWNERS
MOTOR VEHICLE OWNERSHIP
MOTOR VEHICLE USE
MOTOR VEHICLES
NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES
OIL
OIL PRICES
PASSENGER CARS
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POLITICAL POWER
POLLUTION
PRICE OF FUELS
PRICE OF GASOLINE
PRIVATE GOODS
PUBLIC
PUBLIC ECONOMICS
PUBLIC FINANCE
PUBLIC GOOD
PUBLIC GOODS
PUBLIC TRANSPORT
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
PURCHASES
PURCHASING POWER
ROAD
ROAD USE
TAX
TAX ASSESSMENT
TAX REVENUE
TOTALITARIAN REGIMES
TOTALITARIANISM
TRANSPORT ECONOMICS
TRANSPORT RESEARCH
TRANSPORTATION COST
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
TRAVEL DEMAND
TRAVEL DEMAND PREDICTIONS
TRUE
URBAN AREAS
UTILITY FUNCTION
UTILITY FUNCTIONS
VEHICLE OWNERS
VOTER PREFERENCES
VOTERS
Strand, Jon
Political Economy Aspects of Fuel Subsidies : A Conceptual Framework
relation Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6392
description While notoriously inefficient, fuel subsidies are widespread, and in many cases politically stable. This paper discusses and models various political economy aspects of fuel subsidies, focusing on gasoline and kerosene. Both economic and political are considered to explain differences in subsidies, with particular focus on democratic and autocratic governments. A political process is modeled whereby a promise of low fuel prices is used in democracies to attract voters, and in autocracies to mobilize support among key groups. Subsidies to fuels are viewed as either easier to observe, easier to commit to, easier to deliver, or better targeted at core groups, than other public goods or favors offered by rulers. Easier commitment and delivery than for regular public goods can explain the high prevalence of such policies in autocracies, and also in young democracies where the capacity to commit to or deliver complex public goods is not yet fully developed. The analysis provides a framework for empirical testing and verification.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author Strand, Jon
author_facet Strand, Jon
author_sort Strand, Jon
title Political Economy Aspects of Fuel Subsidies : A Conceptual Framework
title_short Political Economy Aspects of Fuel Subsidies : A Conceptual Framework
title_full Political Economy Aspects of Fuel Subsidies : A Conceptual Framework
title_fullStr Political Economy Aspects of Fuel Subsidies : A Conceptual Framework
title_full_unstemmed Political Economy Aspects of Fuel Subsidies : A Conceptual Framework
title_sort political economy aspects of fuel subsidies : a conceptual framework
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2013
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/03/17492714/political-economy-aspects-fuel-subsidies-conceptual-framework-political-economy-aspects-fuel-subsidies-conceptual-framework
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/13190
_version_ 1764422940134211584