Political Economy Aspects of Fuel Subsidies : A Conceptual Framework
While notoriously inefficient, fuel subsidies are widespread, and in many cases politically stable. This paper discusses and models various political economy aspects of fuel subsidies, focusing on gasoline and kerosene. Both economic and political...
Main Author: | |
---|---|
Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
Language: | English en_US |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2013
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/03/17492714/political-economy-aspects-fuel-subsidies-conceptual-framework-political-economy-aspects-fuel-subsidies-conceptual-framework http://hdl.handle.net/10986/13190 |
id |
okr-10986-13190 |
---|---|
recordtype |
oai_dc |
spelling |
okr-10986-131902021-04-23T14:03:07Z Political Economy Aspects of Fuel Subsidies : A Conceptual Framework Strand, Jon APPROACH AUTOMOBILE BALANCE BUYING POWER CAR CAR OWNERS CAR OWNERSHIP CAR-OWNING HOUSEHOLDS CARS COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS CONCENTRATIONS CONGESTION CONGESTION PROBLEMS DEBT DECISION MAKING DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY DIESEL DRIVERS DRIVING ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC GROWTH RATES ECONOMIC POLICIES ELASTICITY ELECTRIC POWER ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES ENERGY STRATEGY ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION EXPECTED UTILITY EXTERNALITIES EXTERNALITY FORECASTS FOSSIL FOSSIL FUEL FUEL FUEL CONSUMPTION FUEL DEMAND FUEL PRICE FUEL PRICES FUEL SUBSIDIES FUEL TAX RATES FUEL TAXATION FUEL TAXES FUEL TYPES FUELS FUTURE RESEARCH GAS GAS PRICE GAS PRICES GASOLINE GASOLINE CONSUMPTION GASOLINE DEMAND GASOLINE PRICE GASOLINE PRICES GASOLINE TAX HIGHWAYS INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME GROUPS INCOME LEVELS INEFFICIENCY INTERNATIONAL FUEL TAX KEROSENE KEROSENE SUBSIDIES MACROECONOMICS MOBILITY MOTOR FUEL MOTOR FUEL TAX MOTOR FUELS MOTOR VEHICLE MOTOR VEHICLE OWNERS MOTOR VEHICLE OWNERSHIP MOTOR VEHICLE USE MOTOR VEHICLES NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES OIL OIL PRICES PASSENGER CARS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL POWER POLLUTION PRICE OF FUELS PRICE OF GASOLINE PRIVATE GOODS PUBLIC PUBLIC ECONOMICS PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC TRANSPORT PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION PURCHASES PURCHASING POWER ROAD ROAD USE TAX TAX ASSESSMENT TAX REVENUE TOTALITARIAN REGIMES TOTALITARIANISM TRANSPORT ECONOMICS TRANSPORT RESEARCH TRANSPORTATION COST TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM TRAVEL DEMAND TRAVEL DEMAND PREDICTIONS TRUE URBAN AREAS UTILITY FUNCTION UTILITY FUNCTIONS VEHICLE OWNERS VOTER PREFERENCES VOTERS While notoriously inefficient, fuel subsidies are widespread, and in many cases politically stable. This paper discusses and models various political economy aspects of fuel subsidies, focusing on gasoline and kerosene. Both economic and political are considered to explain differences in subsidies, with particular focus on democratic and autocratic governments. A political process is modeled whereby a promise of low fuel prices is used in democracies to attract voters, and in autocracies to mobilize support among key groups. Subsidies to fuels are viewed as either easier to observe, easier to commit to, easier to deliver, or better targeted at core groups, than other public goods or favors offered by rulers. Easier commitment and delivery than for regular public goods can explain the high prevalence of such policies in autocracies, and also in young democracies where the capacity to commit to or deliver complex public goods is not yet fully developed. The analysis provides a framework for empirical testing and verification. 2013-04-12T17:32:44Z 2013-04-12T17:32:44Z 2013-03 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/03/17492714/political-economy-aspects-fuel-subsidies-conceptual-framework-political-economy-aspects-fuel-subsidies-conceptual-framework http://hdl.handle.net/10986/13190 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6392 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
repository_type |
Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
English en_US |
topic |
APPROACH AUTOMOBILE BALANCE BUYING POWER CAR CAR OWNERS CAR OWNERSHIP CAR-OWNING HOUSEHOLDS CARS COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS CONCENTRATIONS CONGESTION CONGESTION PROBLEMS DEBT DECISION MAKING DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY DIESEL DRIVERS DRIVING ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC GROWTH RATES ECONOMIC POLICIES ELASTICITY ELECTRIC POWER ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES ENERGY STRATEGY ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION EXPECTED UTILITY EXTERNALITIES EXTERNALITY FORECASTS FOSSIL FOSSIL FUEL FUEL FUEL CONSUMPTION FUEL DEMAND FUEL PRICE FUEL PRICES FUEL SUBSIDIES FUEL TAX RATES FUEL TAXATION FUEL TAXES FUEL TYPES FUELS FUTURE RESEARCH GAS GAS PRICE GAS PRICES GASOLINE GASOLINE CONSUMPTION GASOLINE DEMAND GASOLINE PRICE GASOLINE PRICES GASOLINE TAX HIGHWAYS INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME GROUPS INCOME LEVELS INEFFICIENCY INTERNATIONAL FUEL TAX KEROSENE KEROSENE SUBSIDIES MACROECONOMICS MOBILITY MOTOR FUEL MOTOR FUEL TAX MOTOR FUELS MOTOR VEHICLE MOTOR VEHICLE OWNERS MOTOR VEHICLE OWNERSHIP MOTOR VEHICLE USE MOTOR VEHICLES NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES OIL OIL PRICES PASSENGER CARS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL POWER POLLUTION PRICE OF FUELS PRICE OF GASOLINE PRIVATE GOODS PUBLIC PUBLIC ECONOMICS PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC TRANSPORT PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION PURCHASES PURCHASING POWER ROAD ROAD USE TAX TAX ASSESSMENT TAX REVENUE TOTALITARIAN REGIMES TOTALITARIANISM TRANSPORT ECONOMICS TRANSPORT RESEARCH TRANSPORTATION COST TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM TRAVEL DEMAND TRAVEL DEMAND PREDICTIONS TRUE URBAN AREAS UTILITY FUNCTION UTILITY FUNCTIONS VEHICLE OWNERS VOTER PREFERENCES VOTERS |
spellingShingle |
APPROACH AUTOMOBILE BALANCE BUYING POWER CAR CAR OWNERS CAR OWNERSHIP CAR-OWNING HOUSEHOLDS CARS COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS CONCENTRATIONS CONGESTION CONGESTION PROBLEMS DEBT DECISION MAKING DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY DIESEL DRIVERS DRIVING ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC GROWTH RATES ECONOMIC POLICIES ELASTICITY ELECTRIC POWER ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES ENERGY STRATEGY ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION EXPECTED UTILITY EXTERNALITIES EXTERNALITY FORECASTS FOSSIL FOSSIL FUEL FUEL FUEL CONSUMPTION FUEL DEMAND FUEL PRICE FUEL PRICES FUEL SUBSIDIES FUEL TAX RATES FUEL TAXATION FUEL TAXES FUEL TYPES FUELS FUTURE RESEARCH GAS GAS PRICE GAS PRICES GASOLINE GASOLINE CONSUMPTION GASOLINE DEMAND GASOLINE PRICE GASOLINE PRICES GASOLINE TAX HIGHWAYS INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME GROUPS INCOME LEVELS INEFFICIENCY INTERNATIONAL FUEL TAX KEROSENE KEROSENE SUBSIDIES MACROECONOMICS MOBILITY MOTOR FUEL MOTOR FUEL TAX MOTOR FUELS MOTOR VEHICLE MOTOR VEHICLE OWNERS MOTOR VEHICLE OWNERSHIP MOTOR VEHICLE USE MOTOR VEHICLES NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES OIL OIL PRICES PASSENGER CARS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL POWER POLLUTION PRICE OF FUELS PRICE OF GASOLINE PRIVATE GOODS PUBLIC PUBLIC ECONOMICS PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC TRANSPORT PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION PURCHASES PURCHASING POWER ROAD ROAD USE TAX TAX ASSESSMENT TAX REVENUE TOTALITARIAN REGIMES TOTALITARIANISM TRANSPORT ECONOMICS TRANSPORT RESEARCH TRANSPORTATION COST TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM TRAVEL DEMAND TRAVEL DEMAND PREDICTIONS TRUE URBAN AREAS UTILITY FUNCTION UTILITY FUNCTIONS VEHICLE OWNERS VOTER PREFERENCES VOTERS Strand, Jon Political Economy Aspects of Fuel Subsidies : A Conceptual Framework |
relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6392 |
description |
While notoriously inefficient, fuel
subsidies are widespread, and in many cases politically
stable. This paper discusses and models various political
economy aspects of fuel subsidies, focusing on gasoline and
kerosene. Both economic and political are considered to
explain differences in subsidies, with particular focus on
democratic and autocratic governments. A political process
is modeled whereby a promise of low fuel prices is used in
democracies to attract voters, and in autocracies to
mobilize support among key groups. Subsidies to fuels are
viewed as either easier to observe, easier to commit to,
easier to deliver, or better targeted at core groups, than
other public goods or favors offered by rulers. Easier
commitment and delivery than for regular public goods can
explain the high prevalence of such policies in autocracies,
and also in young democracies where the capacity to commit
to or deliver complex public goods is not yet fully
developed. The analysis provides a framework for empirical
testing and verification. |
format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
author |
Strand, Jon |
author_facet |
Strand, Jon |
author_sort |
Strand, Jon |
title |
Political Economy Aspects of Fuel Subsidies : A Conceptual Framework |
title_short |
Political Economy Aspects of Fuel Subsidies : A Conceptual Framework |
title_full |
Political Economy Aspects of Fuel Subsidies : A Conceptual Framework |
title_fullStr |
Political Economy Aspects of Fuel Subsidies : A Conceptual Framework |
title_full_unstemmed |
Political Economy Aspects of Fuel Subsidies : A Conceptual Framework |
title_sort |
political economy aspects of fuel subsidies : a conceptual framework |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2013 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/03/17492714/political-economy-aspects-fuel-subsidies-conceptual-framework-political-economy-aspects-fuel-subsidies-conceptual-framework http://hdl.handle.net/10986/13190 |
_version_ |
1764422940134211584 |