Buying Votes vs. Supplying Public Services : Political Incentives to Under-invest in Pro-poor Policies
This paper uses unique survey data to provide, for the first time in the literature, direct evidence that vote buying in poor economies is associated with lower provision of public services that disproportionately benefit the poor. Various features...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2013
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/01/17200957/buying-votes-vs-supplying-public-services-political-incentives-under-invest-pro-poor-policies http://hdl.handle.net/10986/13126 |
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okr-10986-131262021-04-23T14:03:07Z Buying Votes vs. Supplying Public Services : Political Incentives to Under-invest in Pro-poor Policies Khemani, Stuti ACCESS TO HEALTH SERVICES ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ANTENATAL CARE ASSETS BASIC HEALTH SERVICES BASIC SERVICES BLOCK GRANTS BRIBERY CHILD HEALTH CHILD HEALTH SERVICES CIVIL SOCIETY CLINICS COMMUNITIES COMMUNITY HEALTH CONFIDENCE CORRUPT CORRUPTION DECENTRALIZATION DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DESCRIPTION DISTRICTS DOCTORS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC POLICY EMPLOYMENT EQUILIBRIUM EXPENDITURES FAMILIES FEMALE FISCAL CAPACITY FOLIC ACID GOOD GOVERNANCE HEALTH CENTERS HEALTH FOR ALL HEALTH INVESTMENTS HEALTH OUTCOMES HEALTH POLICIES HEALTH POLICY HEALTH PROFESSIONALS HEALTH PROGRAMS HEALTH PROJECTS HEALTH PROVIDERS HEALTH RECORDS HEALTH SECTOR HEALTH SERVICE HEALTH SERVICE DELIVERY HEALTH SERVICES HOSPITALS HOUSEHOLDS HUMAN DEVELOPMENT HUNGER IMMUNIZATION INCOME INFANT HEALTH INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS INTERVENTIONS IRON LAW ENFORCEMENT LEASING LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MEDIA MEDICAL EQUIPMENT MEDICINES MONOPOLY MUNICIPAL MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS MUNICIPALITIES NEPOTISM NURSES NUTRITION NUTRITIONAL STATUS PATRONAGE POLITICIAN POLITICIANS PREGNANCY PRIMARY HEALTH CARE PROBABILITY PROCUREMENT PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC HEALTH PERSONNEL PUBLIC HEALTH PROGRAMS PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES PUBLIC HEALTH SPENDING PUBLIC POLICIES PUBLIC SERVICES REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT REMEDY RENTS RESOURCE ALLOCATION RULE OF LAW SCANDALS SERVICE DELIVERY SETTLEMENTS SOCIAL NETWORKS SOCIAL SERVICES STERILIZATION TAXATION THEFT TRANSPARENCY USER CHARGES VILLAGE HEALTH WORKERS VILLAGE LEVEL VILLAGES VIOLENCE WORKERS This paper uses unique survey data to provide, for the first time in the literature, direct evidence that vote buying in poor economies is associated with lower provision of public services that disproportionately benefit the poor. Various features of the data and the institutional context allow the interpretation of this correlation as the equilibrium policy consequence of clientelist politics, ruling out alternate explanations (such as, for example, poverty driving both vote buying and health outcomes). The data come from the Philippines, a country context that allows for measuring vote buying during elections and services delivered by the administrative unit controlled by winners of those elections. The data reveal a significant, robust negative correlation between vote buying and the delivery of primary health services. In places where households report more vote buying, government records show that municipalities invest less in basic health services for mothers and children; and, quite strikingly, as a summary measure of weak service delivery performance, a higher percentage of children are severely under-weight. 2013-04-10T18:26:20Z 2013-04-10T18:26:20Z 2013-01 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/01/17200957/buying-votes-vs-supplying-public-services-political-incentives-under-invest-pro-poor-policies http://hdl.handle.net/10986/13126 English en_US Policy Research working paper;no. WPS 6339 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research East Asia and Pacific |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ACCESS TO HEALTH SERVICES ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ANTENATAL CARE ASSETS BASIC HEALTH SERVICES BASIC SERVICES BLOCK GRANTS BRIBERY CHILD HEALTH CHILD HEALTH SERVICES CIVIL SOCIETY CLINICS COMMUNITIES COMMUNITY HEALTH CONFIDENCE CORRUPT CORRUPTION DECENTRALIZATION DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DESCRIPTION DISTRICTS DOCTORS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC POLICY EMPLOYMENT EQUILIBRIUM EXPENDITURES FAMILIES FEMALE FISCAL CAPACITY FOLIC ACID GOOD GOVERNANCE HEALTH CENTERS HEALTH FOR ALL HEALTH INVESTMENTS HEALTH OUTCOMES HEALTH POLICIES HEALTH POLICY HEALTH PROFESSIONALS HEALTH PROGRAMS HEALTH PROJECTS HEALTH PROVIDERS HEALTH RECORDS HEALTH SECTOR HEALTH SERVICE HEALTH SERVICE DELIVERY HEALTH SERVICES HOSPITALS HOUSEHOLDS HUMAN DEVELOPMENT HUNGER IMMUNIZATION INCOME INFANT HEALTH INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS INTERVENTIONS IRON LAW ENFORCEMENT LEASING LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MEDIA MEDICAL EQUIPMENT MEDICINES MONOPOLY MUNICIPAL MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS MUNICIPALITIES NEPOTISM NURSES NUTRITION NUTRITIONAL STATUS PATRONAGE POLITICIAN POLITICIANS PREGNANCY PRIMARY HEALTH CARE PROBABILITY PROCUREMENT PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC HEALTH PERSONNEL PUBLIC HEALTH PROGRAMS PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES PUBLIC HEALTH SPENDING PUBLIC POLICIES PUBLIC SERVICES REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT REMEDY RENTS RESOURCE ALLOCATION RULE OF LAW SCANDALS SERVICE DELIVERY SETTLEMENTS SOCIAL NETWORKS SOCIAL SERVICES STERILIZATION TAXATION THEFT TRANSPARENCY USER CHARGES VILLAGE HEALTH WORKERS VILLAGE LEVEL VILLAGES VIOLENCE WORKERS |
| spellingShingle |
ACCESS TO HEALTH SERVICES ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ANTENATAL CARE ASSETS BASIC HEALTH SERVICES BASIC SERVICES BLOCK GRANTS BRIBERY CHILD HEALTH CHILD HEALTH SERVICES CIVIL SOCIETY CLINICS COMMUNITIES COMMUNITY HEALTH CONFIDENCE CORRUPT CORRUPTION DECENTRALIZATION DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DESCRIPTION DISTRICTS DOCTORS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC POLICY EMPLOYMENT EQUILIBRIUM EXPENDITURES FAMILIES FEMALE FISCAL CAPACITY FOLIC ACID GOOD GOVERNANCE HEALTH CENTERS HEALTH FOR ALL HEALTH INVESTMENTS HEALTH OUTCOMES HEALTH POLICIES HEALTH POLICY HEALTH PROFESSIONALS HEALTH PROGRAMS HEALTH PROJECTS HEALTH PROVIDERS HEALTH RECORDS HEALTH SECTOR HEALTH SERVICE HEALTH SERVICE DELIVERY HEALTH SERVICES HOSPITALS HOUSEHOLDS HUMAN DEVELOPMENT HUNGER IMMUNIZATION INCOME INFANT HEALTH INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS INTERVENTIONS IRON LAW ENFORCEMENT LEASING LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MEDIA MEDICAL EQUIPMENT MEDICINES MONOPOLY MUNICIPAL MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS MUNICIPALITIES NEPOTISM NURSES NUTRITION NUTRITIONAL STATUS PATRONAGE POLITICIAN POLITICIANS PREGNANCY PRIMARY HEALTH CARE PROBABILITY PROCUREMENT PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC HEALTH PERSONNEL PUBLIC HEALTH PROGRAMS PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES PUBLIC HEALTH SPENDING PUBLIC POLICIES PUBLIC SERVICES REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT REMEDY RENTS RESOURCE ALLOCATION RULE OF LAW SCANDALS SERVICE DELIVERY SETTLEMENTS SOCIAL NETWORKS SOCIAL SERVICES STERILIZATION TAXATION THEFT TRANSPARENCY USER CHARGES VILLAGE HEALTH WORKERS VILLAGE LEVEL VILLAGES VIOLENCE WORKERS Khemani, Stuti Buying Votes vs. Supplying Public Services : Political Incentives to Under-invest in Pro-poor Policies |
| geographic_facet |
East Asia and Pacific |
| relation |
Policy Research working paper;no. WPS 6339 |
| description |
This paper uses unique survey data to
provide, for the first time in the literature, direct
evidence that vote buying in poor economies is associated
with lower provision of public services that
disproportionately benefit the poor. Various features of the
data and the institutional context allow the interpretation
of this correlation as the equilibrium policy consequence of
clientelist politics, ruling out alternate explanations
(such as, for example, poverty driving both vote buying and
health outcomes). The data come from the Philippines, a
country context that allows for measuring vote buying during
elections and services delivered by the administrative unit
controlled by winners of those elections. The data reveal a
significant, robust negative correlation between vote buying
and the delivery of primary health services. In places where
households report more vote buying, government records show
that municipalities invest less in basic health services for
mothers and children; and, quite strikingly, as a summary
measure of weak service delivery performance, a higher
percentage of children are severely under-weight. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Khemani, Stuti |
| author_facet |
Khemani, Stuti |
| author_sort |
Khemani, Stuti |
| title |
Buying Votes vs. Supplying Public Services : Political Incentives to Under-invest in Pro-poor Policies |
| title_short |
Buying Votes vs. Supplying Public Services : Political Incentives to Under-invest in Pro-poor Policies |
| title_full |
Buying Votes vs. Supplying Public Services : Political Incentives to Under-invest in Pro-poor Policies |
| title_fullStr |
Buying Votes vs. Supplying Public Services : Political Incentives to Under-invest in Pro-poor Policies |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Buying Votes vs. Supplying Public Services : Political Incentives to Under-invest in Pro-poor Policies |
| title_sort |
buying votes vs. supplying public services : political incentives to under-invest in pro-poor policies |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2013 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/01/17200957/buying-votes-vs-supplying-public-services-political-incentives-under-invest-pro-poor-policies http://hdl.handle.net/10986/13126 |
| _version_ |
1764422599545192448 |