Towards a Fiscal Pact : The Political Economy of Decentralization in Bolivia
The decentralization game in Bolivia has been altered quite significantly with the presence of new bargainers at the departmental level. Two, opposing groups have emerged and which follow intricate strategies to enforce their claims. The highland d...
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| Format: | Economic Updates and Modeling |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2013
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2010/05/16445913/towards-fiscal-pact-political-economy-decentralization-bolivia http://hdl.handle.net/10986/12737 |
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okr-10986-127372021-04-23T14:03:04Z Towards a Fiscal Pact : The Political Economy of Decentralization in Bolivia Frank, Jonas ACCOUNTABILITY ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS ASSIGNMENT OF EXPENDITURES BALANCE SHEETS BANKS BORROWING BROKER BUDGET CONSTRAINT BUDGET POLICY BUDGETING CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIES CIVIL SERVICE COLLECTIVE ACTION COMMODITY PRICES COMPENSATION FUND CORPORATE INCOME TAX DEBT RULES DEBT SERVICE DEBT STOCK DECENTRALIZATION DECENTRALIZATION PROCESS DEVELOPMENT BANK DISTRICTS DOMESTIC FINANCIAL MARKET ECONOMIC REFORM ELECTRICITY EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURE ASSIGNMENTS EXPENDITURE DECENTRALIZATION EXPENDITURE NEEDS EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES EXPENDITURES EXTERNALITIES FEDERAL COUNTRIES FINANCES FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL SUPPORT FISCAL ADJUSTMENT FISCAL COORDINATION FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL INFORMATION FISCAL MANAGEMENT FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY FISCAL SURPLUSES FLOATING DEBT GOVERNOR GOVERNORS HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS HEALTH SERVICES HOUSING HUMAN RESOURCE INCENTIVE CONSTRAINTS INCOME TAX INDEBTEDNESS INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS LABOR UNIONS LAND REFORM LAWS LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL FISCAL CAPACITY MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT MAYORS MINISTRY OF ECONOMY MINISTRY OF FINANCE MUNICIPAL MUNICIPAL DEBT MUNICIPALITIES NATIONAL BUDGET NATIONAL TAXES NATURAL RESOURCES NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES ODIOUS DEBT OIL PRICES OUTSTANDING DEBT PERSONAL INCOME POLITICAL AUTHORITY POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL POWER POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES PREFECTURES PRIVATE BANKS PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION PROPERTY OWNERSHIP PROPERTY RIGHTS PROVINCES PROVINCIAL LEVEL PROVISIONS PUBLIC PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR EXPENDITURES PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY PUBLIC SERVICES REDISTRIBUTION REFERENDA REFERENDUM RENEGOTIATION RENEGOTIATIONS RETURN REVENUE LOSS REVENUE SHARING REVENUE STREAMS REVENUE YIELD ROADS SECTOR MINISTRIES SEWAGE SOCIAL SERVICES SUB-NATIONAL SUBNATIONAL SUBNATIONAL DEBT SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS SUBNATIONAL UNITS TAX TAX AUTHORITY TAX AUTONOMY TAX BASES TAX DECENTRALIZATION TAX RATES TAX REFORM TAX REVENUE TAX REVENUES TAXATION TAXES ON PROPERTY TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURES TRANSPARENCY URBAN SERVICES WAGES The decentralization game in Bolivia has been altered quite significantly with the presence of new bargainers at the departmental level. Two, opposing groups have emerged and which follow intricate strategies to enforce their claims. The highland departments are strongly aligned to the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) party and the charismatic leadership of the country's first indigenous leader Evo Morales. The Media Luna departments in the lowlands demand autonomy and seek a greater share of the national pool of hydrocarbon revenue. The paper discusses how a fiscal pact can be forged to bring agreement around the most pressing issues. It considers several bargaining packages which could be crafted and analyzes the extent to which decentralization principles need to be sacrificed in order to achieve agreement among competing actors. It is likely that these agreements may eliminate some inefficiency, but also create others. An important insight is that the fiscal pact should be renegotiated at certain pre-defined times, in order to provide flexibility and adjust to the constraints of actors to engage in inter-temporal commitments. Explicit exit options would enhance the possibilities for agreement. 2013-03-14T19:18:05Z 2013-03-14T19:18:05Z 2010-05 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2010/05/16445913/towards-fiscal-pact-political-economy-decentralization-bolivia http://hdl.handle.net/10986/12737 English en_US CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Economic & Sector Work :: Economic Updates and Modeling Economic & Sector Work Latin America & Caribbean Bolivia |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS ASSIGNMENT OF EXPENDITURES BALANCE SHEETS BANKS BORROWING BROKER BUDGET CONSTRAINT BUDGET POLICY BUDGETING CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIES CIVIL SERVICE COLLECTIVE ACTION COMMODITY PRICES COMPENSATION FUND CORPORATE INCOME TAX DEBT RULES DEBT SERVICE DEBT STOCK DECENTRALIZATION DECENTRALIZATION PROCESS DEVELOPMENT BANK DISTRICTS DOMESTIC FINANCIAL MARKET ECONOMIC REFORM ELECTRICITY EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURE ASSIGNMENTS EXPENDITURE DECENTRALIZATION EXPENDITURE NEEDS EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES EXPENDITURES EXTERNALITIES FEDERAL COUNTRIES FINANCES FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL SUPPORT FISCAL ADJUSTMENT FISCAL COORDINATION FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL INFORMATION FISCAL MANAGEMENT FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY FISCAL SURPLUSES FLOATING DEBT GOVERNOR GOVERNORS HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS HEALTH SERVICES HOUSING HUMAN RESOURCE INCENTIVE CONSTRAINTS INCOME TAX INDEBTEDNESS INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS LABOR UNIONS LAND REFORM LAWS LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL FISCAL CAPACITY MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT MAYORS MINISTRY OF ECONOMY MINISTRY OF FINANCE MUNICIPAL MUNICIPAL DEBT MUNICIPALITIES NATIONAL BUDGET NATIONAL TAXES NATURAL RESOURCES NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES ODIOUS DEBT OIL PRICES OUTSTANDING DEBT PERSONAL INCOME POLITICAL AUTHORITY POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL POWER POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES PREFECTURES PRIVATE BANKS PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION PROPERTY OWNERSHIP PROPERTY RIGHTS PROVINCES PROVINCIAL LEVEL PROVISIONS PUBLIC PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR EXPENDITURES PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY PUBLIC SERVICES REDISTRIBUTION REFERENDA REFERENDUM RENEGOTIATION RENEGOTIATIONS RETURN REVENUE LOSS REVENUE SHARING REVENUE STREAMS REVENUE YIELD ROADS SECTOR MINISTRIES SEWAGE SOCIAL SERVICES SUB-NATIONAL SUBNATIONAL SUBNATIONAL DEBT SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS SUBNATIONAL UNITS TAX TAX AUTHORITY TAX AUTONOMY TAX BASES TAX DECENTRALIZATION TAX RATES TAX REFORM TAX REVENUE TAX REVENUES TAXATION TAXES ON PROPERTY TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURES TRANSPARENCY URBAN SERVICES WAGES |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS ASSIGNMENT OF EXPENDITURES BALANCE SHEETS BANKS BORROWING BROKER BUDGET CONSTRAINT BUDGET POLICY BUDGETING CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIES CIVIL SERVICE COLLECTIVE ACTION COMMODITY PRICES COMPENSATION FUND CORPORATE INCOME TAX DEBT RULES DEBT SERVICE DEBT STOCK DECENTRALIZATION DECENTRALIZATION PROCESS DEVELOPMENT BANK DISTRICTS DOMESTIC FINANCIAL MARKET ECONOMIC REFORM ELECTRICITY EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURE ASSIGNMENTS EXPENDITURE DECENTRALIZATION EXPENDITURE NEEDS EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES EXPENDITURES EXTERNALITIES FEDERAL COUNTRIES FINANCES FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL SUPPORT FISCAL ADJUSTMENT FISCAL COORDINATION FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL INFORMATION FISCAL MANAGEMENT FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY FISCAL SURPLUSES FLOATING DEBT GOVERNOR GOVERNORS HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS HEALTH SERVICES HOUSING HUMAN RESOURCE INCENTIVE CONSTRAINTS INCOME TAX INDEBTEDNESS INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS LABOR UNIONS LAND REFORM LAWS LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL FISCAL CAPACITY MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT MAYORS MINISTRY OF ECONOMY MINISTRY OF FINANCE MUNICIPAL MUNICIPAL DEBT MUNICIPALITIES NATIONAL BUDGET NATIONAL TAXES NATURAL RESOURCES NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES ODIOUS DEBT OIL PRICES OUTSTANDING DEBT PERSONAL INCOME POLITICAL AUTHORITY POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL POWER POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES PREFECTURES PRIVATE BANKS PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION PROPERTY OWNERSHIP PROPERTY RIGHTS PROVINCES PROVINCIAL LEVEL PROVISIONS PUBLIC PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR EXPENDITURES PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY PUBLIC SERVICES REDISTRIBUTION REFERENDA REFERENDUM RENEGOTIATION RENEGOTIATIONS RETURN REVENUE LOSS REVENUE SHARING REVENUE STREAMS REVENUE YIELD ROADS SECTOR MINISTRIES SEWAGE SOCIAL SERVICES SUB-NATIONAL SUBNATIONAL SUBNATIONAL DEBT SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS SUBNATIONAL UNITS TAX TAX AUTHORITY TAX AUTONOMY TAX BASES TAX DECENTRALIZATION TAX RATES TAX REFORM TAX REVENUE TAX REVENUES TAXATION TAXES ON PROPERTY TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURES TRANSPARENCY URBAN SERVICES WAGES Frank, Jonas Towards a Fiscal Pact : The Political Economy of Decentralization in Bolivia |
| geographic_facet |
Latin America & Caribbean Bolivia |
| description |
The decentralization game in Bolivia has
been altered quite significantly with the presence of new
bargainers at the departmental level. Two, opposing groups
have emerged and which follow intricate strategies to
enforce their claims. The highland departments are strongly
aligned to the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) party and the
charismatic leadership of the country's first
indigenous leader Evo Morales. The Media Luna departments in
the lowlands demand autonomy and seek a greater share of the
national pool of hydrocarbon revenue. The paper discusses
how a fiscal pact can be forged to bring agreement around
the most pressing issues. It considers several bargaining
packages which could be crafted and analyzes the extent to
which decentralization principles need to be sacrificed in
order to achieve agreement among competing actors. It is
likely that these agreements may eliminate some
inefficiency, but also create others. An important insight
is that the fiscal pact should be renegotiated at certain
pre-defined times, in order to provide flexibility and
adjust to the constraints of actors to engage in
inter-temporal commitments. Explicit exit options would
enhance the possibilities for agreement. |
| format |
Economic & Sector Work :: Economic Updates and Modeling |
| author |
Frank, Jonas |
| author_facet |
Frank, Jonas |
| author_sort |
Frank, Jonas |
| title |
Towards a Fiscal Pact : The Political Economy of Decentralization in Bolivia |
| title_short |
Towards a Fiscal Pact : The Political Economy of Decentralization in Bolivia |
| title_full |
Towards a Fiscal Pact : The Political Economy of Decentralization in Bolivia |
| title_fullStr |
Towards a Fiscal Pact : The Political Economy of Decentralization in Bolivia |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Towards a Fiscal Pact : The Political Economy of Decentralization in Bolivia |
| title_sort |
towards a fiscal pact : the political economy of decentralization in bolivia |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2013 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2010/05/16445913/towards-fiscal-pact-political-economy-decentralization-bolivia http://hdl.handle.net/10986/12737 |
| _version_ |
1764421448422653952 |