How Does Deposit Insurance Affect Bank Risk? Evidence from the Recent Crisis

Deposit insurance is widely offered in a number of countries as part of a financial system safety net to promote stability. An unintended consequence of deposit insurance is the reduction in the incentive of depositors to monitor banks, which leads...

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Main Authors: Anginer, Deniz, Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, Zhu, Min
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2013
Subjects:
CDS
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/12/17061254/deposit-insurance-affect-bank-risk-evidence-recent-crisis
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/12186
id okr-10986-12186
recordtype oai_dc
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
en_US
topic ACCOUNTING
ADOPTION OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE
ASSET VALUE
ASSET VALUES
ASSETS RATIO
AUSTRIAN NATIONAL BANK
BALANCE SHEET
BANK ASSETS
BANK COMPETITION
BANK DEFAULT
BANK DEPOSITORS
BANK DIRECTORS
BANK EQUITY
BANK FRAGILITY
BANK INTERMEDIATION
BANK LENDING
BANK PERFORMANCE
BANK POLICY
BANK REGULATION
BANK RESTRUCTURING
BANK RISK
BANK RISK TAKING
BANK RISK-TAKING
BANK STABILITY
BANK SUPERVISION
BANK SYSTEM
BANKING ASSETS
BANKING CRISES
BANKING CRISIS
BANKING LAW
BANKING SECTOR
BANKING SECTOR STABILITY
BANKING SECTORS
BANKING SYSTEM
BANKING SYSTEM STABILITY
BANKRUPTCY
BANKS
BEHAVIOR OF BANKS
BENEFITS OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CALL OPTION
CAPITALIZATION
CDS
COMMERCIAL BANKS
CONSEQUENCES OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CONTAGIOUS BANK
CONTAGIOUS BANK RUNS
CORPORATE DEBT
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
COSTS OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE
COUNTRIES WITH DEPOSIT INSURANCE
COUNTRIES WITHOUT DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CREDIT RISK
CREDIT UNION
CREDIT UNIONS
DEBT
DEFAULT PROBABILITIES
DEFAULT PROBABILITY
DEFAULT RISK
DEFAULTS
DEPOSIT
DEPOSIT INSURANCE
DEPOSIT INSURANCE AFFECT
DEPOSIT INSURANCE AFFECTS
DEPOSIT INSURANCE COVERAGE
DEPOSIT INSURANCE DUMMY
DEPOSIT INSURANCE INCREASE
DEPOSIT INSURANCE INCREASES
DEPOSIT INSURANCE PREMIUMS
DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEME
DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES
DEPOSIT INSURANCE VARIABLE
DEPOSIT MONEY BANKS
DEPOSIT-INSURANCE
DEPOSIT-INSURANCE DESIGN
DEPOSITOR
DEPOSITOR CONFIDENCE
DEPOSITORS
DEPOSITS
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
DIVIDEND
DIVIDEND RATE
DIVIDENDS
DUMMY VARIABLE
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC DOWNTURNS
ECONOMIC STABILITY
EFFECT OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE
EFFECTIVENESS OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE
EFFECTS OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE
EFFECTS ON BANK
EQUITY PREMIUM
EQUITY RETURNS
EQUITY VALUE
EQUITY VOLATILITY
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK
EXCESSIVE RISK
EXCESSIVE RISK TAKING
EXPLICIT DEPOSIT
EXPLICIT DEPOSIT INSURANCE
EXTERNAL AUDITORS
FACE VALUE
FEATURES OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE
FINANCIAL CRISIS
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT
FINANCIAL INSTABILITY
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
FINANCIAL SAFETY NETS
FINANCIAL STABILITY
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
FINANCIAL STUDIES
FINANCIAL SYSTEM
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
FRAUD
FULL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
FULL INSURANCE COVERAGE
GLOBAL STOCK MARKET
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS
GROWTH RATE
IMPACT OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE
IMPLICIT GUARANTEE
IMPLIED VOLATILITY
INCENTIVE OF DEPOSITORS
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS
INSURANCE DEPOSIT
INSURANCE DESIGN
INTEREST INCOME
INTEREST RATES
INTERNATIONAL BANK
INTERNATIONAL BANKS
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
INTERPOLATION
INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES
INVESTOR CONFIDENCE
LACK OF MARKET DISCIPLINE
LEVEL OF RISK
LEVERAGE
LEVERAGE RATIO
LEVERAGE RATIOS
LIQUIDITY
LOAN
LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS
MARKET CAP
MARKET DISCIPLINE
MARKET EQUITY
MARKET INFORMATION
MARKET PRICES
MARKET VALUE
MONETARY FUND
MORAL HAZARD
MORAL HAZARD EFFECT
MORAL HAZARD EFFECTS
MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM
MORAL HAZARD PROBLEMS
NEGATIVE SHOCK
OPTIMAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
OWNERSHIP RIGHTS
PARTICULAR COUNTRY
PORTFOLIO
PORTFOLIO OF BANKS
PRESENCE OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE
PRIVATE BANKS
PRIVATE CREDIT
PRIVATE CREDITS
PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT
PROBABILITY OF DEFAULT
PROBLEM BANK
PROFITABILITY
PUBLIC POLICY
RECAPITALIZATIONS
REORGANIZATION
RESERVE
RETURN ON ASSETS
RISK ASSESSMENT
RISK SHIFTING
RISK TAKING
SAFETY NET
SHAREHOLDER
SHAREHOLDERS
STOCK MARKET
STOCK MARKET CAPITALIZATION
STOCK PRICE
STOCK RETURN
STOCK RETURNS
SUPERVISORY AGENCY
SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES
SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY
SYSTEMIC CRISIS
SYSTEMIC RISK
T-BILL
T-BILL RATE
TREASURY
TREASURY YIELD
TRUST COMPANIES
UNSOPHISTICATED DEPOSITORS
VALUE OF ASSETS
VALUE OF BANK ASSETS
WEAK BANK
spellingShingle ACCOUNTING
ADOPTION OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE
ASSET VALUE
ASSET VALUES
ASSETS RATIO
AUSTRIAN NATIONAL BANK
BALANCE SHEET
BANK ASSETS
BANK COMPETITION
BANK DEFAULT
BANK DEPOSITORS
BANK DIRECTORS
BANK EQUITY
BANK FRAGILITY
BANK INTERMEDIATION
BANK LENDING
BANK PERFORMANCE
BANK POLICY
BANK REGULATION
BANK RESTRUCTURING
BANK RISK
BANK RISK TAKING
BANK RISK-TAKING
BANK STABILITY
BANK SUPERVISION
BANK SYSTEM
BANKING ASSETS
BANKING CRISES
BANKING CRISIS
BANKING LAW
BANKING SECTOR
BANKING SECTOR STABILITY
BANKING SECTORS
BANKING SYSTEM
BANKING SYSTEM STABILITY
BANKRUPTCY
BANKS
BEHAVIOR OF BANKS
BENEFITS OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CALL OPTION
CAPITALIZATION
CDS
COMMERCIAL BANKS
CONSEQUENCES OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CONTAGIOUS BANK
CONTAGIOUS BANK RUNS
CORPORATE DEBT
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
COSTS OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE
COUNTRIES WITH DEPOSIT INSURANCE
COUNTRIES WITHOUT DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CREDIT RISK
CREDIT UNION
CREDIT UNIONS
DEBT
DEFAULT PROBABILITIES
DEFAULT PROBABILITY
DEFAULT RISK
DEFAULTS
DEPOSIT
DEPOSIT INSURANCE
DEPOSIT INSURANCE AFFECT
DEPOSIT INSURANCE AFFECTS
DEPOSIT INSURANCE COVERAGE
DEPOSIT INSURANCE DUMMY
DEPOSIT INSURANCE INCREASE
DEPOSIT INSURANCE INCREASES
DEPOSIT INSURANCE PREMIUMS
DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEME
DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES
DEPOSIT INSURANCE VARIABLE
DEPOSIT MONEY BANKS
DEPOSIT-INSURANCE
DEPOSIT-INSURANCE DESIGN
DEPOSITOR
DEPOSITOR CONFIDENCE
DEPOSITORS
DEPOSITS
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
DIVIDEND
DIVIDEND RATE
DIVIDENDS
DUMMY VARIABLE
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC DOWNTURNS
ECONOMIC STABILITY
EFFECT OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE
EFFECTIVENESS OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE
EFFECTS OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE
EFFECTS ON BANK
EQUITY PREMIUM
EQUITY RETURNS
EQUITY VALUE
EQUITY VOLATILITY
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK
EXCESSIVE RISK
EXCESSIVE RISK TAKING
EXPLICIT DEPOSIT
EXPLICIT DEPOSIT INSURANCE
EXTERNAL AUDITORS
FACE VALUE
FEATURES OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE
FINANCIAL CRISIS
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT
FINANCIAL INSTABILITY
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
FINANCIAL SAFETY NETS
FINANCIAL STABILITY
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
FINANCIAL STUDIES
FINANCIAL SYSTEM
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
FRAUD
FULL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
FULL INSURANCE COVERAGE
GLOBAL STOCK MARKET
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS
GROWTH RATE
IMPACT OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE
IMPLICIT GUARANTEE
IMPLIED VOLATILITY
INCENTIVE OF DEPOSITORS
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS
INSURANCE DEPOSIT
INSURANCE DESIGN
INTEREST INCOME
INTEREST RATES
INTERNATIONAL BANK
INTERNATIONAL BANKS
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
INTERPOLATION
INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES
INVESTOR CONFIDENCE
LACK OF MARKET DISCIPLINE
LEVEL OF RISK
LEVERAGE
LEVERAGE RATIO
LEVERAGE RATIOS
LIQUIDITY
LOAN
LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS
MARKET CAP
MARKET DISCIPLINE
MARKET EQUITY
MARKET INFORMATION
MARKET PRICES
MARKET VALUE
MONETARY FUND
MORAL HAZARD
MORAL HAZARD EFFECT
MORAL HAZARD EFFECTS
MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM
MORAL HAZARD PROBLEMS
NEGATIVE SHOCK
OPTIMAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
OWNERSHIP RIGHTS
PARTICULAR COUNTRY
PORTFOLIO
PORTFOLIO OF BANKS
PRESENCE OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE
PRIVATE BANKS
PRIVATE CREDIT
PRIVATE CREDITS
PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT
PROBABILITY OF DEFAULT
PROBLEM BANK
PROFITABILITY
PUBLIC POLICY
RECAPITALIZATIONS
REORGANIZATION
RESERVE
RETURN ON ASSETS
RISK ASSESSMENT
RISK SHIFTING
RISK TAKING
SAFETY NET
SHAREHOLDER
SHAREHOLDERS
STOCK MARKET
STOCK MARKET CAPITALIZATION
STOCK PRICE
STOCK RETURN
STOCK RETURNS
SUPERVISORY AGENCY
SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES
SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY
SYSTEMIC CRISIS
SYSTEMIC RISK
T-BILL
T-BILL RATE
TREASURY
TREASURY YIELD
TRUST COMPANIES
UNSOPHISTICATED DEPOSITORS
VALUE OF ASSETS
VALUE OF BANK ASSETS
WEAK BANK
Anginer, Deniz
Demirguc-Kunt, Asli
Zhu, Min
How Does Deposit Insurance Affect Bank Risk? Evidence from the Recent Crisis
relation Policy Research Working Paper; No. 6289
description Deposit insurance is widely offered in a number of countries as part of a financial system safety net to promote stability. An unintended consequence of deposit insurance is the reduction in the incentive of depositors to monitor banks, which leads to excessive risk-taking. This paper examines the relation between deposit insurance and bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading to and during the recent financial crisis. It finds that generous financial safety nets increase bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to the global financial crisis. However, during the crisis, bank risk is lower and systemic stability is greater in countries with deposit insurance coverage. The findings suggest that the "moral hazard effect" of deposit insurance dominates in good times while the "stabilization effect" of deposit insurance dominates in turbulent times. Nevertheless, the overall effect of deposit insurance over the full sample remains negative since the destabilizing effect during normal times is greater in magnitude compared with the stabilizing effect during global turbulence. In addition, the analysis finds that good bank supervision can alleviate the unintended consequences of deposit insurance on bank systemic risk during good times, suggesting that fostering the appropriate incentive framework is very important for ensuring systemic stability.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author Anginer, Deniz
Demirguc-Kunt, Asli
Zhu, Min
author_facet Anginer, Deniz
Demirguc-Kunt, Asli
Zhu, Min
author_sort Anginer, Deniz
title How Does Deposit Insurance Affect Bank Risk? Evidence from the Recent Crisis
title_short How Does Deposit Insurance Affect Bank Risk? Evidence from the Recent Crisis
title_full How Does Deposit Insurance Affect Bank Risk? Evidence from the Recent Crisis
title_fullStr How Does Deposit Insurance Affect Bank Risk? Evidence from the Recent Crisis
title_full_unstemmed How Does Deposit Insurance Affect Bank Risk? Evidence from the Recent Crisis
title_sort how does deposit insurance affect bank risk? evidence from the recent crisis
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2013
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/12/17061254/deposit-insurance-affect-bank-risk-evidence-recent-crisis
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/12186
_version_ 1764422098884755456
spelling okr-10986-121862021-04-23T14:03:05Z How Does Deposit Insurance Affect Bank Risk? Evidence from the Recent Crisis Anginer, Deniz Demirguc-Kunt, Asli Zhu, Min ACCOUNTING ADOPTION OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE ASSET VALUE ASSET VALUES ASSETS RATIO AUSTRIAN NATIONAL BANK BALANCE SHEET BANK ASSETS BANK COMPETITION BANK DEFAULT BANK DEPOSITORS BANK DIRECTORS BANK EQUITY BANK FRAGILITY BANK INTERMEDIATION BANK LENDING BANK PERFORMANCE BANK POLICY BANK REGULATION BANK RESTRUCTURING BANK RISK BANK RISK TAKING BANK RISK-TAKING BANK STABILITY BANK SUPERVISION BANK SYSTEM BANKING ASSETS BANKING CRISES BANKING CRISIS BANKING LAW BANKING SECTOR BANKING SECTOR STABILITY BANKING SECTORS BANKING SYSTEM BANKING SYSTEM STABILITY BANKRUPTCY BANKS BEHAVIOR OF BANKS BENEFITS OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE CALL OPTION CAPITALIZATION CDS COMMERCIAL BANKS CONSEQUENCES OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE CONTAGIOUS BANK CONTAGIOUS BANK RUNS CORPORATE DEBT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS COSTS OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE COUNTRIES WITH DEPOSIT INSURANCE COUNTRIES WITHOUT DEPOSIT INSURANCE CREDIT RISK CREDIT UNION CREDIT UNIONS DEBT DEFAULT PROBABILITIES DEFAULT PROBABILITY DEFAULT RISK DEFAULTS DEPOSIT DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE AFFECT DEPOSIT INSURANCE AFFECTS DEPOSIT INSURANCE COVERAGE DEPOSIT INSURANCE DUMMY DEPOSIT INSURANCE INCREASE DEPOSIT INSURANCE INCREASES DEPOSIT INSURANCE PREMIUMS DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEME DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES DEPOSIT INSURANCE VARIABLE DEPOSIT MONEY BANKS DEPOSIT-INSURANCE DEPOSIT-INSURANCE DESIGN DEPOSITOR DEPOSITOR CONFIDENCE DEPOSITORS DEPOSITS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DIVIDEND DIVIDEND RATE DIVIDENDS DUMMY VARIABLE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC DOWNTURNS ECONOMIC STABILITY EFFECT OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE EFFECTIVENESS OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE EFFECTS OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE EFFECTS ON BANK EQUITY PREMIUM EQUITY RETURNS EQUITY VALUE EQUITY VOLATILITY EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK EXCESSIVE RISK EXCESSIVE RISK TAKING EXPLICIT DEPOSIT EXPLICIT DEPOSIT INSURANCE EXTERNAL AUDITORS FACE VALUE FEATURES OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL INSTABILITY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION FINANCIAL SAFETY NETS FINANCIAL STABILITY FINANCIAL STRUCTURE FINANCIAL STUDIES FINANCIAL SYSTEM FINANCIAL SYSTEMS FRAUD FULL DEPOSIT INSURANCE FULL INSURANCE COVERAGE GLOBAL STOCK MARKET GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS GROWTH RATE IMPACT OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE IMPLICIT GUARANTEE IMPLIED VOLATILITY INCENTIVE OF DEPOSITORS INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS INSURANCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE DESIGN INTEREST INCOME INTEREST RATES INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL BANKS INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM INTERNATIONAL TRADE INTERPOLATION INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES INVESTOR CONFIDENCE LACK OF MARKET DISCIPLINE LEVEL OF RISK LEVERAGE LEVERAGE RATIO LEVERAGE RATIOS LIQUIDITY LOAN LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS MARKET CAP MARKET DISCIPLINE MARKET EQUITY MARKET INFORMATION MARKET PRICES MARKET VALUE MONETARY FUND MORAL HAZARD MORAL HAZARD EFFECT MORAL HAZARD EFFECTS MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM MORAL HAZARD PROBLEMS NEGATIVE SHOCK OPTIMAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE OWNERSHIP RIGHTS PARTICULAR COUNTRY PORTFOLIO PORTFOLIO OF BANKS PRESENCE OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE PRIVATE BANKS PRIVATE CREDIT PRIVATE CREDITS PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROBABILITY OF DEFAULT PROBLEM BANK PROFITABILITY PUBLIC POLICY RECAPITALIZATIONS REORGANIZATION RESERVE RETURN ON ASSETS RISK ASSESSMENT RISK SHIFTING RISK TAKING SAFETY NET SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDERS STOCK MARKET STOCK MARKET CAPITALIZATION STOCK PRICE STOCK RETURN STOCK RETURNS SUPERVISORY AGENCY SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY SYSTEMIC CRISIS SYSTEMIC RISK T-BILL T-BILL RATE TREASURY TREASURY YIELD TRUST COMPANIES UNSOPHISTICATED DEPOSITORS VALUE OF ASSETS VALUE OF BANK ASSETS WEAK BANK Deposit insurance is widely offered in a number of countries as part of a financial system safety net to promote stability. An unintended consequence of deposit insurance is the reduction in the incentive of depositors to monitor banks, which leads to excessive risk-taking. This paper examines the relation between deposit insurance and bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading to and during the recent financial crisis. It finds that generous financial safety nets increase bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to the global financial crisis. However, during the crisis, bank risk is lower and systemic stability is greater in countries with deposit insurance coverage. The findings suggest that the "moral hazard effect" of deposit insurance dominates in good times while the "stabilization effect" of deposit insurance dominates in turbulent times. Nevertheless, the overall effect of deposit insurance over the full sample remains negative since the destabilizing effect during normal times is greater in magnitude compared with the stabilizing effect during global turbulence. In addition, the analysis finds that good bank supervision can alleviate the unintended consequences of deposit insurance on bank systemic risk during good times, suggesting that fostering the appropriate incentive framework is very important for ensuring systemic stability. 2013-01-28T23:02:12Z 2013-01-28T23:02:12Z 2012-12 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/12/17061254/deposit-insurance-affect-bank-risk-evidence-recent-crisis http://hdl.handle.net/10986/12186 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper; No. 6289 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research