Quality Contingent Contracts : Evidence from Tanzania's Coffee Market
The literature on product quality in markets where product attributes are not readily observable indicates that information asymmetries and incentive problems may lead to the under-provision of quality. This paper contributes to this literature by...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/08/16603775/quality-contingent-contracts-evidence-tanzanias-coffee-market http://hdl.handle.net/10986/12018 |
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okr-10986-120182021-04-23T14:02:58Z Quality Contingent Contracts : Evidence from Tanzania's Coffee Market Mahdi, Shireen ACCESS TO MARKETS AGRICULTURAL MARKETS ANTITRUST ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AUCTION BASIL BUYER CASH PAYMENT COFFEE COFFEE BEANS COFFEE BOARD COFFEE BUYERS COFFEE CROP COFFEE GROWERS COFFEE MARKET COFFEE PRODUCER COFFEE PRODUCERS COFFEE PRODUCTION COFFEE SECTOR COMMODITY COMPETITIVE MARKET CONTRACT FARMING CONTRACT FARMING ARRANGEMENTS CONTRACT PERFORMANCE COOPERATIVE MARKETING COOPERATIVES CROP CROPS DATA ANALYSIS DATA PROCESSING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DUMMY VARIABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS EQUIPMENT FAIR FARM FARMER FARMERS FERTILIZER FOOD SECURITY FREE PRESS FREE RIDER PROBLEM HOUSEHOLD INCOME HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IFPRI INCENTIVE PROBLEMS INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES INSPECTION INSTRUMENT INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE INTERNATIONAL MARKET LOCAL GOVERNMENT MARKET ECONOMY MARKET FAILURE MARKET REFORMS MARKET SHARE MARKETING OPEN ACCESS OPPORTUNITY COSTS ORGANIC COFFEE ORGANIC PRODUCTION OUTPUTS PESTICIDE POLITICAL ECONOMY PREMIUM PAYMENT PRICE INCENTIVES PRICE PREMIUM PRODUCE PRODUCER PRICE PRODUCER PRICES PRODUCT QUALITY PRODUCTION PROCESSES PRODUCTIVITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PURCHASING QUALITY COFFEE RENTS RESULT RESULTS SALE SALES SMALL FARMERS SPOT MARKET SPOT MARKET TRANSACTIONS SUPERMARKET TOMATOES TRANSACTION TRANSACTION COST TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSMISSION USES VALUE CHAIN VALUE CHAINS WEB The literature on product quality in markets where product attributes are not readily observable indicates that information asymmetries and incentive problems may lead to the under-provision of quality. This paper contributes to this literature by estimating the effects of village-level contractual arrangements on producer incomes and on quality enhancing production practices. Three contract types are studied: spot contracts, contingent contracts with product grading and contingent contracts without product grading. To do this, the study uses original data from a survey of 450 coffee producers in Tanzania's coffee market that take advantage of contractual variation in the Kilimanjaro region. The results indicate that coffee contracts that include village-based product grading have a large positive effect on producer incomes, and that the grading effect is associated with production practices that enhance quality. The results also indicate that cooperative membership has no significant effect on producer incomes. 2012-12-21T20:43:57Z 2012-12-21T20:43:57Z 2012-08 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/08/16603775/quality-contingent-contracts-evidence-tanzanias-coffee-market http://hdl.handle.net/10986/12018 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;6171 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Africa Tanzania |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ACCESS TO MARKETS AGRICULTURAL MARKETS ANTITRUST ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AUCTION BASIL BUYER CASH PAYMENT COFFEE COFFEE BEANS COFFEE BOARD COFFEE BUYERS COFFEE CROP COFFEE GROWERS COFFEE MARKET COFFEE PRODUCER COFFEE PRODUCERS COFFEE PRODUCTION COFFEE SECTOR COMMODITY COMPETITIVE MARKET CONTRACT FARMING CONTRACT FARMING ARRANGEMENTS CONTRACT PERFORMANCE COOPERATIVE MARKETING COOPERATIVES CROP CROPS DATA ANALYSIS DATA PROCESSING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DUMMY VARIABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS EQUIPMENT FAIR FARM FARMER FARMERS FERTILIZER FOOD SECURITY FREE PRESS FREE RIDER PROBLEM HOUSEHOLD INCOME HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IFPRI INCENTIVE PROBLEMS INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES INSPECTION INSTRUMENT INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE INTERNATIONAL MARKET LOCAL GOVERNMENT MARKET ECONOMY MARKET FAILURE MARKET REFORMS MARKET SHARE MARKETING OPEN ACCESS OPPORTUNITY COSTS ORGANIC COFFEE ORGANIC PRODUCTION OUTPUTS PESTICIDE POLITICAL ECONOMY PREMIUM PAYMENT PRICE INCENTIVES PRICE PREMIUM PRODUCE PRODUCER PRICE PRODUCER PRICES PRODUCT QUALITY PRODUCTION PROCESSES PRODUCTIVITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PURCHASING QUALITY COFFEE RENTS RESULT RESULTS SALE SALES SMALL FARMERS SPOT MARKET SPOT MARKET TRANSACTIONS SUPERMARKET TOMATOES TRANSACTION TRANSACTION COST TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSMISSION USES VALUE CHAIN VALUE CHAINS WEB |
| spellingShingle |
ACCESS TO MARKETS AGRICULTURAL MARKETS ANTITRUST ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AUCTION BASIL BUYER CASH PAYMENT COFFEE COFFEE BEANS COFFEE BOARD COFFEE BUYERS COFFEE CROP COFFEE GROWERS COFFEE MARKET COFFEE PRODUCER COFFEE PRODUCERS COFFEE PRODUCTION COFFEE SECTOR COMMODITY COMPETITIVE MARKET CONTRACT FARMING CONTRACT FARMING ARRANGEMENTS CONTRACT PERFORMANCE COOPERATIVE MARKETING COOPERATIVES CROP CROPS DATA ANALYSIS DATA PROCESSING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DUMMY VARIABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS EQUIPMENT FAIR FARM FARMER FARMERS FERTILIZER FOOD SECURITY FREE PRESS FREE RIDER PROBLEM HOUSEHOLD INCOME HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IFPRI INCENTIVE PROBLEMS INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES INSPECTION INSTRUMENT INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE INTERNATIONAL MARKET LOCAL GOVERNMENT MARKET ECONOMY MARKET FAILURE MARKET REFORMS MARKET SHARE MARKETING OPEN ACCESS OPPORTUNITY COSTS ORGANIC COFFEE ORGANIC PRODUCTION OUTPUTS PESTICIDE POLITICAL ECONOMY PREMIUM PAYMENT PRICE INCENTIVES PRICE PREMIUM PRODUCE PRODUCER PRICE PRODUCER PRICES PRODUCT QUALITY PRODUCTION PROCESSES PRODUCTIVITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PURCHASING QUALITY COFFEE RENTS RESULT RESULTS SALE SALES SMALL FARMERS SPOT MARKET SPOT MARKET TRANSACTIONS SUPERMARKET TOMATOES TRANSACTION TRANSACTION COST TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSMISSION USES VALUE CHAIN VALUE CHAINS WEB Mahdi, Shireen Quality Contingent Contracts : Evidence from Tanzania's Coffee Market |
| geographic_facet |
Africa Tanzania |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;6171 |
| description |
The literature on product quality in
markets where product attributes are not readily observable
indicates that information asymmetries and incentive
problems may lead to the under-provision of quality. This
paper contributes to this literature by estimating the
effects of village-level contractual arrangements on
producer incomes and on quality enhancing production
practices. Three contract types are studied: spot contracts,
contingent contracts with product grading and contingent
contracts without product grading. To do this, the study
uses original data from a survey of 450 coffee producers in
Tanzania's coffee market that take advantage of
contractual variation in the Kilimanjaro region. The results
indicate that coffee contracts that include village-based
product grading have a large positive effect on producer
incomes, and that the grading effect is associated with
production practices that enhance quality. The results also
indicate that cooperative membership has no significant
effect on producer incomes. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Mahdi, Shireen |
| author_facet |
Mahdi, Shireen |
| author_sort |
Mahdi, Shireen |
| title |
Quality Contingent Contracts : Evidence from Tanzania's Coffee Market |
| title_short |
Quality Contingent Contracts : Evidence from Tanzania's Coffee Market |
| title_full |
Quality Contingent Contracts : Evidence from Tanzania's Coffee Market |
| title_fullStr |
Quality Contingent Contracts : Evidence from Tanzania's Coffee Market |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Quality Contingent Contracts : Evidence from Tanzania's Coffee Market |
| title_sort |
quality contingent contracts : evidence from tanzania's coffee market |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/08/16603775/quality-contingent-contracts-evidence-tanzanias-coffee-market http://hdl.handle.net/10986/12018 |
| _version_ |
1764418724107911168 |