Working with the Grain for Reforming the Public Service : A Live Example from Sierra Leone
Development practitioners still lack a critical mass of empirical evidence which can help identify the set of interventions that are more likely to work, and inform the design and implementation of feasible reforms. This paper contributes to fill t...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/07/16560145/working-grain-reforming-public-service-live-example-sierra-leone http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11993 |
| Summary: | Development practitioners still lack a
critical mass of empirical evidence which can help identify
the set of interventions that are more likely to work, and
inform the design and implementation of feasible reforms.
This paper contributes to fill this gap by looking at the
case of the 'Sierra Leone Pay and Performance
Project', a World Bank-supported initiative to reform
the civil service. It analyzes the functional problems
characterizing the civil service and discusses what factors
account for the observed dysfunctions. The central argument
is that the current dysfunctions might be difficult to
reverse as they define a sub-optimal equilibrium which
serves political purposes (dysfunctions by design). However,
politics is not all that matters. This equilibrium is
further reinforced by systemic dysfunctions that may not be
the consequence of any strategic design or the outcome of
elite preferences (dysfunctions by default). This is where
there is scope for change, even in the short run. The
authors conclude that the chances of successful civil
service reforms are likely to be maximized if reform
initiatives support modest and incremental changes that
work with the grain of existing incentives and are
consistent with government preferences. The Sierra Leone
Pay and Performance Project aims to do so by adopting a
limited and targeted focus on pay reform, performance
management and recruitment and staffing. In addition, the
use of the results-based lending instrument is expected to
help mitigate the current dysfunctions by aligning the
incentives of the various players and, in this way, create
the conditions for greater coordination across government
agencies. Although the suggested approach is not without
risks, recent dynamics suggest that the chances of success
are greater today than in the past. |
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