Direct Democracy and Resource Allocation : Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan
Direct democracy is designed to better align public resource allocation decisions with citizen preferences. Using a randomized field experiment in 250 villages across Afghanistan, this paper compares outcomes of secret-ballot referenda with those o...
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Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/07/16506743/direct-democracy-resource-allocation-experimental-evidence-afghanistan http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11946 |
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okr-10986-119462021-04-23T14:02:58Z Direct Democracy and Resource Allocation : Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan Beath, Andrew Christia, Fotini Enikolopov, Ruben ACCOUNTABILITY BENEFICIARY ASSESSMENTS BRIDGE PROJECT CENTRAL GOVERNMENT COMMUNITIES COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY MEMBERS CONSENSUS CONSULTATION CONSULTATIONS COUNTRYSIDE DATA COLLECTION DECISION MAKING DECISION-MAKING PROCESS DECISIONMAKING DEMOCRACY DIRECT DEMOCRACY DISTRICT LEVEL DISTRICTS DRINKING WATER ELECTION ELECTIONS ELIGIBLE VOTERS EQUALITY FEMALE FEMALES FIELD EXPERIMENT FOCUS GROUP GENDER HOUSEHOLDS INTEREST GROUPS INTERVENTION INTERVENTIONS INTERVIEWS LINE MINISTRIES LIVESTOCK LOCAL DEVELOPMENT LOCAL PARTICIPATION MEDICAL SERVICES POLICY STUDIES POLITICAL PARTICIPATION POLITICAL PROCESSES POWER-HOLDERS PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION PUBLIC POLICY RECONSTRUCTION RURAL AREAS RURAL COMMUNITIES RURAL DEVELOPMENT RURAL POPULATION SHEEP SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL PROTECTION SUFFRAGE VILLAGE VILLAGE LEVEL VILLAGE MEETINGS VILLAGER VILLAGERS VILLAGES YOUTH Direct democracy is designed to better align public resource allocation decisions with citizen preferences. Using a randomized field experiment in 250 villages across Afghanistan, this paper compares outcomes of secret-ballot referenda with those of consultation meetings, which adhere to customary decision-making practices. Elites are found to exert influence over meeting outcomes, but not over referenda outcomes, which are driven primarily by citizen preferences. Referenda are also found to improve public satisfaction, whereas elite domination of allocation processes has a negative effect. The results indicate that the use of direct democracy in public resource allocation results in more legitimate outcomes than those produced by customary processes. 2012-12-07T23:10:43Z 2012-12-07T23:10:43Z 2012-07 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/07/16506743/direct-democracy-resource-allocation-experimental-evidence-afghanistan http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11946 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper; No. 6133 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research South Asia Afghanistan |
repository_type |
Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
English en_US |
topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY BENEFICIARY ASSESSMENTS BRIDGE PROJECT CENTRAL GOVERNMENT COMMUNITIES COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY MEMBERS CONSENSUS CONSULTATION CONSULTATIONS COUNTRYSIDE DATA COLLECTION DECISION MAKING DECISION-MAKING PROCESS DECISIONMAKING DEMOCRACY DIRECT DEMOCRACY DISTRICT LEVEL DISTRICTS DRINKING WATER ELECTION ELECTIONS ELIGIBLE VOTERS EQUALITY FEMALE FEMALES FIELD EXPERIMENT FOCUS GROUP GENDER HOUSEHOLDS INTEREST GROUPS INTERVENTION INTERVENTIONS INTERVIEWS LINE MINISTRIES LIVESTOCK LOCAL DEVELOPMENT LOCAL PARTICIPATION MEDICAL SERVICES POLICY STUDIES POLITICAL PARTICIPATION POLITICAL PROCESSES POWER-HOLDERS PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION PUBLIC POLICY RECONSTRUCTION RURAL AREAS RURAL COMMUNITIES RURAL DEVELOPMENT RURAL POPULATION SHEEP SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL PROTECTION SUFFRAGE VILLAGE VILLAGE LEVEL VILLAGE MEETINGS VILLAGER VILLAGERS VILLAGES YOUTH |
spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY BENEFICIARY ASSESSMENTS BRIDGE PROJECT CENTRAL GOVERNMENT COMMUNITIES COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY MEMBERS CONSENSUS CONSULTATION CONSULTATIONS COUNTRYSIDE DATA COLLECTION DECISION MAKING DECISION-MAKING PROCESS DECISIONMAKING DEMOCRACY DIRECT DEMOCRACY DISTRICT LEVEL DISTRICTS DRINKING WATER ELECTION ELECTIONS ELIGIBLE VOTERS EQUALITY FEMALE FEMALES FIELD EXPERIMENT FOCUS GROUP GENDER HOUSEHOLDS INTEREST GROUPS INTERVENTION INTERVENTIONS INTERVIEWS LINE MINISTRIES LIVESTOCK LOCAL DEVELOPMENT LOCAL PARTICIPATION MEDICAL SERVICES POLICY STUDIES POLITICAL PARTICIPATION POLITICAL PROCESSES POWER-HOLDERS PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION PUBLIC POLICY RECONSTRUCTION RURAL AREAS RURAL COMMUNITIES RURAL DEVELOPMENT RURAL POPULATION SHEEP SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL PROTECTION SUFFRAGE VILLAGE VILLAGE LEVEL VILLAGE MEETINGS VILLAGER VILLAGERS VILLAGES YOUTH Beath, Andrew Christia, Fotini Enikolopov, Ruben Direct Democracy and Resource Allocation : Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan |
geographic_facet |
South Asia Afghanistan |
relation |
Policy Research Working Paper; No. 6133 |
description |
Direct democracy is designed to better
align public resource allocation decisions with citizen
preferences. Using a randomized field experiment in 250
villages across Afghanistan, this paper compares outcomes of
secret-ballot referenda with those of consultation meetings,
which adhere to customary decision-making practices. Elites
are found to exert influence over meeting outcomes, but not
over referenda outcomes, which are driven primarily by
citizen preferences. Referenda are also found to improve
public satisfaction, whereas elite domination of allocation
processes has a negative effect. The results indicate that
the use of direct democracy in public resource allocation
results in more legitimate outcomes than those produced by
customary processes. |
format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
author |
Beath, Andrew Christia, Fotini Enikolopov, Ruben |
author_facet |
Beath, Andrew Christia, Fotini Enikolopov, Ruben |
author_sort |
Beath, Andrew |
title |
Direct Democracy and Resource Allocation : Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan |
title_short |
Direct Democracy and Resource Allocation : Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan |
title_full |
Direct Democracy and Resource Allocation : Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan |
title_fullStr |
Direct Democracy and Resource Allocation : Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan |
title_full_unstemmed |
Direct Democracy and Resource Allocation : Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan |
title_sort |
direct democracy and resource allocation : experimental evidence from afghanistan |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2012 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/07/16506743/direct-democracy-resource-allocation-experimental-evidence-afghanistan http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11946 |
_version_ |
1764418566192365568 |