Incentives and the Role of Institutions in the Provision of Social Safety Nets

The institutional environment can determine the effectiveness and efficiency of social safety net programs. An otherwise perfectly designed program may fail if it does not take into account the role of the different institutional actors, and the in...

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Main Author:	Weigand, Christine
Format:	Brief
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:	ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY AUDITING BENEFICIARIES BUREAUCRACY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT CONSTITUENCIES CORRUPTION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ELIGIBILITY FISCAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT HUMAN DEVELOPMENT NETWORK INCENTIVE STRUCTURES INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT LOCAL AUTHORITIES LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL LEVEL LOCAL LEVELS OPPORTUNITY COSTS PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION SAFETY NET PROGRAMS SALARIES SERVICE DELIVERY SERVICE PROVIDERS SOCIAL POLICY SOCIAL PROGRAMS SOCIAL PROTECTION SOCIAL SAFETY SOCIAL SAFETY NET SOCIAL SAFETY NETS TARGETING WORKERS
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/01/6240288/incentives-role-institutions-provision-social-safety-nets http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11818

id	okr-10986-11818
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-118182021-04-23T14:02:57Z Incentives and the Role of Institutions in the Provision of Social Safety Nets Weigand, Christine ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY AUDITING BENEFICIARIES BUREAUCRACY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT CONSTITUENCIES CORRUPTION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ELIGIBILITY FISCAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT HUMAN DEVELOPMENT NETWORK INCENTIVE STRUCTURES INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT LOCAL AUTHORITIES LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL LEVEL LOCAL LEVELS OPPORTUNITY COSTS PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION SAFETY NET PROGRAMS SALARIES SERVICE DELIVERY SERVICE PROVIDERS SOCIAL POLICY SOCIAL PROGRAMS SOCIAL PROTECTION SOCIAL SAFETY SOCIAL SAFETY NET SOCIAL SAFETY NETS TARGETING WORKERS The institutional environment can determine the effectiveness and efficiency of social safety net programs. An otherwise perfectly designed program may fail if it does not take into account the role of the different institutional actors, and the incentives they face in the implementation and delivery of the program. Thus, incentive structures-between sponsors (i.e., governments) and providers, and between providers and their clients-play an important role in determining the success of a social safety net program. The biggest challenges in countries with fully developed institutions tend to be: 1. Optimizing program mix: With many and very sophisticated programs, it is crucial to determine the 'right' program mix and reduce overlap and conflicts between social programs. Regular monitoring and evaluation play a central role in achieving this. 2. Deciding on the degree of devolution: Local authorities can be better informed and more accountable to their local constituencies. Nevertheless, the devolution of certain policy decisions not only requires a certain level of capacity at the local level, but must also be based on an explicit, clearly defined contract between the central and local governments. 2012-08-13T16:06:33Z 2012-08-13T16:06:33Z 2003-01 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/01/6240288/incentives-role-institutions-provision-social-safety-nets http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11818 English Social Safety Nets Primer Notes; No. 7 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Brief Publications & Research Africa
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English
topic	ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY AUDITING BENEFICIARIES BUREAUCRACY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT CONSTITUENCIES CORRUPTION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ELIGIBILITY FISCAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT HUMAN DEVELOPMENT NETWORK INCENTIVE STRUCTURES INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT LOCAL AUTHORITIES LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL LEVEL LOCAL LEVELS OPPORTUNITY COSTS PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION SAFETY NET PROGRAMS SALARIES SERVICE DELIVERY SERVICE PROVIDERS SOCIAL POLICY SOCIAL PROGRAMS SOCIAL PROTECTION SOCIAL SAFETY SOCIAL SAFETY NET SOCIAL SAFETY NETS TARGETING WORKERS
spellingShingle	ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY AUDITING BENEFICIARIES BUREAUCRACY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT CONSTITUENCIES CORRUPTION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ELIGIBILITY FISCAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT HUMAN DEVELOPMENT NETWORK INCENTIVE STRUCTURES INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT LOCAL AUTHORITIES LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL LEVEL LOCAL LEVELS OPPORTUNITY COSTS PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION SAFETY NET PROGRAMS SALARIES SERVICE DELIVERY SERVICE PROVIDERS SOCIAL POLICY SOCIAL PROGRAMS SOCIAL PROTECTION SOCIAL SAFETY SOCIAL SAFETY NET SOCIAL SAFETY NETS TARGETING WORKERS Weigand, Christine Incentives and the Role of Institutions in the Provision of Social Safety Nets
geographic_facet	Africa
relation	Social Safety Nets Primer Notes; No. 7
description	The institutional environment can determine the effectiveness and efficiency of social safety net programs. An otherwise perfectly designed program may fail if it does not take into account the role of the different institutional actors, and the incentives they face in the implementation and delivery of the program. Thus, incentive structures-between sponsors (i.e., governments) and providers, and between providers and their clients-play an important role in determining the success of a social safety net program. The biggest challenges in countries with fully developed institutions tend to be: 1. Optimizing program mix: With many and very sophisticated programs, it is crucial to determine the 'right' program mix and reduce overlap and conflicts between social programs. Regular monitoring and evaluation play a central role in achieving this. 2. Deciding on the degree of devolution: Local authorities can be better informed and more accountable to their local constituencies. Nevertheless, the devolution of certain policy decisions not only requires a certain level of capacity at the local level, but must also be based on an explicit, clearly defined contract between the central and local governments.
format	Publications & Research :: Brief
author	Weigand, Christine
author_facet	Weigand, Christine
author_sort	Weigand, Christine
title	Incentives and the Role of Institutions in the Provision of Social Safety Nets
title_short	Incentives and the Role of Institutions in the Provision of Social Safety Nets
title_full	Incentives and the Role of Institutions in the Provision of Social Safety Nets
title_fullStr	Incentives and the Role of Institutions in the Provision of Social Safety Nets
title_full_unstemmed	Incentives and the Role of Institutions in the Provision of Social Safety Nets
title_sort	incentives and the role of institutions in the provision of social safety nets
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2012
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/01/6240288/incentives-role-institutions-provision-social-safety-nets http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11818
_version_	1764418103563780096

Incentives and the Role of Institutions in the Provision of Social Safety Nets

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