Designing Mandatory Pension Schemes : Some Lessons from Argentina, Chile, Malaysia, and Singapore
In most countries, participation in a public pension system involving some kind of redistribution is compulsory, while participation in private pension schemes is voluntary. There are growing fears in many countries that the value of public pensio...
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| Format: | Viewpoint |
| Language: | English |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1996/02/696755/designing-mandatory-pension-schemes-some-lessons-argentina-chile-malaysia-singapore http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11631 |
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okr-10986-116312021-04-23T14:02:56Z Designing Mandatory Pension Schemes : Some Lessons from Argentina, Chile, Malaysia, and Singapore Vittas, Dimitri AGENTS ANNUITIES ANNUITY CAPITAL MARKETS CAPITALIZATION COMMISSIONS CONTRIBUTION RATE COVERAGE DEFINED BENEFIT SCHEMES DEFINED CONTRIBUTION SYSTEMS DISCRIMINATION EMPLOYMENT FIDUCIARY FRAUD HOUSING INCOME INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS INFLATION INSURANCE INSURANCE COMPANIES INTEGRITY INVESTMENT GUIDELINES INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE INVESTMENT RETURN INVESTMENT RETURNS LIFE EXPECTANCY LOW INFLATION MANAGERS MANDATORY RETIREMENT MARKETING MINIMUM PERIOD MORAL HAZARD NORMAL RETIREMENT AGE OPERATING COSTS PENALTIES PENSION FUND PENSION FUNDS PENSION SCHEMES PENSION SYSTEM PENSIONS PREMIUMS PRIVATE PENSION PRIVATE PILLAR PRIVATE SECTOR PROFITABILITY PUBLIC PILLAR RATES REPLACEMENT RATE RESERVES RETIREMENT RISK TAKING SAFETY SOCIAL ASSISTANCE SOLVENCY STATE GUARANTEES TAX RATE WAGE GROWTH WORKERS PENSIONS TAX INCENTIVES PENSION FUNDS INVESTMENT POLICY TAX EXEMPTION SOCIAL SECURITY COMPANY PENSIONS STATE GUARANTEES COMPULSORY SAVING PUBLIC PENSION SYSTEMS In most countries, participation in a public pension system involving some kind of redistribution is compulsory, while participation in private pension schemes is voluntary. There are growing fears in many countries that the value of public pensions will not be sustained. There are similar fears about company pensions. The credibility of company pensions depends on the integrity and solvency of large employers, which can no longer be taken for granted. These problems point to a need to refine compulsory saving. Drawing on the experiences of countries in Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere, this Note provides some guidance on answering the following questions: 1) Whom to compel? 2) Defined contribution or benefit? 3) How large should compulsory contributions be? 4) Who should manage the funds? 5) What types of regulation are appropriate? 6) What state guarantees for what system? 7) How to offer tax incentives? 2012-08-13T15:35:01Z 2012-08-13T15:35:01Z 1996-02 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1996/02/696755/designing-mandatory-pension-schemes-some-lessons-argentina-chile-malaysia-singapore Viewpoint. -- Note no. 72 (February 1996) http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11631 English Viewpoint CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Viewpoint Publications & Research Latin America & Caribbean East Asia and Pacific Singapore Malaysia Chile Argentina |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
AGENTS ANNUITIES ANNUITY CAPITAL MARKETS CAPITALIZATION COMMISSIONS CONTRIBUTION RATE COVERAGE DEFINED BENEFIT SCHEMES DEFINED CONTRIBUTION SYSTEMS DISCRIMINATION EMPLOYMENT FIDUCIARY FRAUD HOUSING INCOME INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS INFLATION INSURANCE INSURANCE COMPANIES INTEGRITY INVESTMENT GUIDELINES INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE INVESTMENT RETURN INVESTMENT RETURNS LIFE EXPECTANCY LOW INFLATION MANAGERS MANDATORY RETIREMENT MARKETING MINIMUM PERIOD MORAL HAZARD NORMAL RETIREMENT AGE OPERATING COSTS PENALTIES PENSION FUND PENSION FUNDS PENSION SCHEMES PENSION SYSTEM PENSIONS PREMIUMS PRIVATE PENSION PRIVATE PILLAR PRIVATE SECTOR PROFITABILITY PUBLIC PILLAR RATES REPLACEMENT RATE RESERVES RETIREMENT RISK TAKING SAFETY SOCIAL ASSISTANCE SOLVENCY STATE GUARANTEES TAX RATE WAGE GROWTH WORKERS PENSIONS TAX INCENTIVES PENSION FUNDS INVESTMENT POLICY TAX EXEMPTION SOCIAL SECURITY COMPANY PENSIONS STATE GUARANTEES COMPULSORY SAVING PUBLIC PENSION SYSTEMS |
| spellingShingle |
AGENTS ANNUITIES ANNUITY CAPITAL MARKETS CAPITALIZATION COMMISSIONS CONTRIBUTION RATE COVERAGE DEFINED BENEFIT SCHEMES DEFINED CONTRIBUTION SYSTEMS DISCRIMINATION EMPLOYMENT FIDUCIARY FRAUD HOUSING INCOME INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS INFLATION INSURANCE INSURANCE COMPANIES INTEGRITY INVESTMENT GUIDELINES INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE INVESTMENT RETURN INVESTMENT RETURNS LIFE EXPECTANCY LOW INFLATION MANAGERS MANDATORY RETIREMENT MARKETING MINIMUM PERIOD MORAL HAZARD NORMAL RETIREMENT AGE OPERATING COSTS PENALTIES PENSION FUND PENSION FUNDS PENSION SCHEMES PENSION SYSTEM PENSIONS PREMIUMS PRIVATE PENSION PRIVATE PILLAR PRIVATE SECTOR PROFITABILITY PUBLIC PILLAR RATES REPLACEMENT RATE RESERVES RETIREMENT RISK TAKING SAFETY SOCIAL ASSISTANCE SOLVENCY STATE GUARANTEES TAX RATE WAGE GROWTH WORKERS PENSIONS TAX INCENTIVES PENSION FUNDS INVESTMENT POLICY TAX EXEMPTION SOCIAL SECURITY COMPANY PENSIONS STATE GUARANTEES COMPULSORY SAVING PUBLIC PENSION SYSTEMS Vittas, Dimitri Designing Mandatory Pension Schemes : Some Lessons from Argentina, Chile, Malaysia, and Singapore |
| geographic_facet |
Latin America & Caribbean East Asia and Pacific Singapore Malaysia Chile Argentina |
| relation |
Viewpoint |
| description |
In most countries, participation in a
public pension system involving some kind of redistribution
is compulsory, while participation in private pension
schemes is voluntary. There are growing fears in many
countries that the value of public pensions will not be
sustained. There are similar fears about company pensions.
The credibility of company pensions depends on the integrity
and solvency of large employers, which can no longer be
taken for granted. These problems point to a need to refine
compulsory saving. Drawing on the experiences of countries
in Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere, this Note provides
some guidance on answering the following questions: 1) Whom
to compel? 2) Defined contribution or benefit? 3) How
large should compulsory contributions be? 4) Who should
manage the funds? 5) What types of regulation are
appropriate? 6) What state guarantees for what system? 7)
How to offer tax incentives? |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Viewpoint |
| author |
Vittas, Dimitri |
| author_facet |
Vittas, Dimitri |
| author_sort |
Vittas, Dimitri |
| title |
Designing Mandatory Pension Schemes : Some Lessons from Argentina, Chile, Malaysia, and Singapore |
| title_short |
Designing Mandatory Pension Schemes : Some Lessons from Argentina, Chile, Malaysia, and Singapore |
| title_full |
Designing Mandatory Pension Schemes : Some Lessons from Argentina, Chile, Malaysia, and Singapore |
| title_fullStr |
Designing Mandatory Pension Schemes : Some Lessons from Argentina, Chile, Malaysia, and Singapore |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Designing Mandatory Pension Schemes : Some Lessons from Argentina, Chile, Malaysia, and Singapore |
| title_sort |
designing mandatory pension schemes : some lessons from argentina, chile, malaysia, and singapore |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1996/02/696755/designing-mandatory-pension-schemes-some-lessons-argentina-chile-malaysia-singapore http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11631 |
| _version_ |
1764417437169614848 |