Regulating Water Concessions : Lessons from the Buenos Aires concession
The Argentine government privatized the water and sewerage services in greater Buenos Aires by concession. The utility was sold as a single monopoly business, but bidders had to compete for the right to provide service at the lowest price. Contract...
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2012
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1996/09/693098/regulating-water-concessions-lessons-buenos-aires-concession http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11610 |
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okr-10986-116102021-04-23T14:02:56Z Regulating Water Concessions : Lessons from the Buenos Aires concession Crampes, Claude Estache, Antonio BILLING CONCESSION CONTRACT CROSS-SUBSIDIES CUBIC METERS ELECTRICITY INVESTMENT DECISIONS LABOR COSTS LABOR PRODUCTIVITY MARGINAL COST MONOPOLIES PIPES PRIVATE OPERATOR PROFIT MARGIN PUBLIC OWNERSHIP PUBLIC UTILITY PUBLIC WATER REGULATORY AGENCY REGULATORY REGIME SERVICE PROVIDER SEWAGE SEWAGE COLLECTION SEWAGE TREATMENT SEWERAGE SEWERAGE SERVICES SEWERAGE SYSTEM SEWERS TARIFF ADJUSTMENTS UTILITIES WATER DISTRIBUTION WATER PIPES WATER QUALITY WATER QUALITY PROBLEMS WATER REGULATION WATER SECTOR WATER SECTOR REFORM WATER SYSTEM WATER UTILITY WATER PUMPING STATIONS PIPES WATER MANAGEMENT SEWAGE The Argentine government privatized the water and sewerage services in greater Buenos Aires by concession. The utility was sold as a single monopoly business, but bidders had to compete for the right to provide service at the lowest price. Contractual targets for service coverage implied significant investment over the life of the contract. As things have turned out, the assets were in worse shape than expected, and a renegotiation rule has allowed a tariff hike to pay for accelerated investment. The authors argue, however, that the pricing system is still flawed, producing incentive problems for investment. 2012-08-13T15:31:48Z 2012-08-13T15:31:48Z 1996-09 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1996/09/693098/regulating-water-concessions-lessons-buenos-aires-concession http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11610 English Viewpoint: Public Policy for the Private Sector; Note No. 91 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Viewpoint Publications & Research |
repository_type |
Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
English |
topic |
BILLING CONCESSION CONTRACT CROSS-SUBSIDIES CUBIC METERS ELECTRICITY INVESTMENT DECISIONS LABOR COSTS LABOR PRODUCTIVITY MARGINAL COST MONOPOLIES PIPES PRIVATE OPERATOR PROFIT MARGIN PUBLIC OWNERSHIP PUBLIC UTILITY PUBLIC WATER REGULATORY AGENCY REGULATORY REGIME SERVICE PROVIDER SEWAGE SEWAGE COLLECTION SEWAGE TREATMENT SEWERAGE SEWERAGE SERVICES SEWERAGE SYSTEM SEWERS TARIFF ADJUSTMENTS UTILITIES WATER DISTRIBUTION WATER PIPES WATER QUALITY WATER QUALITY PROBLEMS WATER REGULATION WATER SECTOR WATER SECTOR REFORM WATER SYSTEM WATER UTILITY WATER PUMPING STATIONS PIPES WATER MANAGEMENT SEWAGE |
spellingShingle |
BILLING CONCESSION CONTRACT CROSS-SUBSIDIES CUBIC METERS ELECTRICITY INVESTMENT DECISIONS LABOR COSTS LABOR PRODUCTIVITY MARGINAL COST MONOPOLIES PIPES PRIVATE OPERATOR PROFIT MARGIN PUBLIC OWNERSHIP PUBLIC UTILITY PUBLIC WATER REGULATORY AGENCY REGULATORY REGIME SERVICE PROVIDER SEWAGE SEWAGE COLLECTION SEWAGE TREATMENT SEWERAGE SEWERAGE SERVICES SEWERAGE SYSTEM SEWERS TARIFF ADJUSTMENTS UTILITIES WATER DISTRIBUTION WATER PIPES WATER QUALITY WATER QUALITY PROBLEMS WATER REGULATION WATER SECTOR WATER SECTOR REFORM WATER SYSTEM WATER UTILITY WATER PUMPING STATIONS PIPES WATER MANAGEMENT SEWAGE Crampes, Claude Estache, Antonio Regulating Water Concessions : Lessons from the Buenos Aires concession |
relation |
Viewpoint: Public Policy for the Private Sector; Note No. 91 |
description |
The Argentine government privatized the
water and sewerage services in greater Buenos Aires by
concession. The utility was sold as a single monopoly
business, but bidders had to compete for the right to
provide service at the lowest price. Contractual targets for
service coverage implied significant investment over the
life of the contract. As things have turned out, the assets
were in worse shape than expected, and a renegotiation rule
has allowed a tariff hike to pay for accelerated investment.
The authors argue, however, that the pricing system is still
flawed, producing incentive problems for investment. |
format |
Publications & Research :: Viewpoint |
author |
Crampes, Claude Estache, Antonio |
author_facet |
Crampes, Claude Estache, Antonio |
author_sort |
Crampes, Claude |
title |
Regulating Water Concessions : Lessons from the Buenos Aires concession |
title_short |
Regulating Water Concessions : Lessons from the Buenos Aires concession |
title_full |
Regulating Water Concessions : Lessons from the Buenos Aires concession |
title_fullStr |
Regulating Water Concessions : Lessons from the Buenos Aires concession |
title_full_unstemmed |
Regulating Water Concessions : Lessons from the Buenos Aires concession |
title_sort |
regulating water concessions : lessons from the buenos aires concession |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2012 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1996/09/693098/regulating-water-concessions-lessons-buenos-aires-concession http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11610 |
_version_ |
1764417354982227968 |