Utility Regulators : Decisionmaking Structures, Resources, and Start-Up Strategy

Utility Regulators : Decisionmaking Structures, Resources, and Start-Up Strategy

The design of a regulatory agency's decisionmaking structure encompasses issues relating to the number of decisionmakers, the basis for selecting them, the role played by stakeholders, and the regulatory and appeals processes. The selection of...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Smith, Warrick
Format: Viewpoint
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:
ACCOUNTABILITY
ANTITRUST
ASSURANCE
AUTHORITY
BENEFICIARIES
CAP
CONSUMERS
COUNCILS
DECISIONMAKING
HUMAN RESOURCES
INTEGRITY
LEGISLATURE
LEGITIMACY
MINISTERS
PRIVATE FIRMS
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
REGULATOR
REGULATORS
REGULATORY AGENCIES
REGULATORY AGENCY
REGULATORY PROCESS
REPRESENTATIVES
TAX REVENUES
TRANSPARENCY
UTILITY REGULATION
VOTING INSTITUTION BUILDING
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
STOCKHOLDERS
DECISION MAKING
FINANCIAL RESOURCES
TRAINING
RECRUITMENT
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1997/10/441283/utility-regulators-decisionmaking-structures-resources-start-up-strategy
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11568
Description
Summary:The design of a regulatory agency's decisionmaking structure encompasses issues relating to the number of decisionmakers, the basis for selecting them, the role played by stakeholders, and the regulatory and appeals processes. The selection of the regulator is critical--especially in countries that have yet to establish a reputation for competence and reliability. When agencies are to be independent, the goal should be to select regulators with the personal qualities needed to exercise independent judgement and resist improper pressures. An appeals process is also important to ensure that the regulator does not stray from its mandate and that it remains accountable. The author outlines good practice.

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