Why Performance Contracts for State-Owned Enterprises Haven't Worked
When privatization is not feasible or palatable, developing country governments seeking to improve the performance of state enterprises are often negotiating performance contracts with their managers. Many of these contracts have been put in place...
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| Format: | Viewpoint |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/08/441600/performance-contracts-state-owned-enterprises-havent-worked http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11537 |
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okr-10986-115372021-06-14T11:03:57Z Why Performance Contracts for State-Owned Enterprises Haven't Worked Shirley, Mary PUBLIC ENTERPRISES PERFORMANCE CONTRACTS POLITICS CONTRACTS EFFICIENCY LABOR PRODUCTIVITY STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES STATE RESPONSIBILITY PROFITABILITY ECONOMIC INFORMATION CONTRACT NEGOTIATION INCENTIVES PENALTIES CONTRACTING GOVERNANCE BANKS BOARDS OF DIRECTORS BUREAUCRATS EMPLOYMENT IMPORT TARIFFS LEVEL PLAYING FIELD MANAGERS MONOPOLIES OPERATING EFFICIENCY PENALTIES PERFORMANCE CONTRACTS PRIVATE ENTERPRISES PRIVATIZATION PRODUCTIVITY PROFITABILITY REFORMS RETURN ON ASSETS STATE ENTERPRISES When privatization is not feasible or palatable, developing country governments seeking to improve the performance of state enterprises are often negotiating performance contracts with their managers. Many of these contracts have been put in place with World Bank assistance. Research shows that they rarely work. The author summarizes the rationale for performance contracts and the evidence against them and explores the reasons why they haven't worked. She concludes that since a well-designed and carefully enforced performance contract can be as politically costly as a well-designed privatization, performance contracts are not likely to be successful in countries that lack the political will to privatize. 2012-08-13T15:20:07Z 2012-08-13T15:20:07Z 1998-08 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/08/441600/performance-contracts-state-owned-enterprises-havent-worked Viewpoint. -- Note no. 150 (August 1998) http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11537 English Viewpoint CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Viewpoint Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
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World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES PERFORMANCE CONTRACTS POLITICS CONTRACTS EFFICIENCY LABOR PRODUCTIVITY STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES STATE RESPONSIBILITY PROFITABILITY ECONOMIC INFORMATION CONTRACT NEGOTIATION INCENTIVES PENALTIES CONTRACTING GOVERNANCE BANKS BOARDS OF DIRECTORS BUREAUCRATS EMPLOYMENT IMPORT TARIFFS LEVEL PLAYING FIELD MANAGERS MONOPOLIES OPERATING EFFICIENCY PENALTIES PERFORMANCE CONTRACTS PRIVATE ENTERPRISES PRIVATIZATION PRODUCTIVITY PROFITABILITY REFORMS RETURN ON ASSETS STATE ENTERPRISES |
| spellingShingle |
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES PERFORMANCE CONTRACTS POLITICS CONTRACTS EFFICIENCY LABOR PRODUCTIVITY STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES STATE RESPONSIBILITY PROFITABILITY ECONOMIC INFORMATION CONTRACT NEGOTIATION INCENTIVES PENALTIES CONTRACTING GOVERNANCE BANKS BOARDS OF DIRECTORS BUREAUCRATS EMPLOYMENT IMPORT TARIFFS LEVEL PLAYING FIELD MANAGERS MONOPOLIES OPERATING EFFICIENCY PENALTIES PERFORMANCE CONTRACTS PRIVATE ENTERPRISES PRIVATIZATION PRODUCTIVITY PROFITABILITY REFORMS RETURN ON ASSETS STATE ENTERPRISES Shirley, Mary Why Performance Contracts for State-Owned Enterprises Haven't Worked |
| relation |
Viewpoint |
| description |
When privatization is not feasible or
palatable, developing country governments seeking to improve
the performance of state enterprises are often negotiating
performance contracts with their managers. Many of these
contracts have been put in place with World Bank assistance.
Research shows that they rarely work. The author summarizes
the rationale for performance contracts and the evidence
against them and explores the reasons why they haven't
worked. She concludes that since a well-designed and
carefully enforced performance contract can be as
politically costly as a well-designed privatization,
performance contracts are not likely to be successful in
countries that lack the political will to privatize. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Viewpoint |
| author |
Shirley, Mary |
| author_facet |
Shirley, Mary |
| author_sort |
Shirley, Mary |
| title |
Why Performance Contracts for State-Owned Enterprises Haven't Worked |
| title_short |
Why Performance Contracts for State-Owned Enterprises Haven't Worked |
| title_full |
Why Performance Contracts for State-Owned Enterprises Haven't Worked |
| title_fullStr |
Why Performance Contracts for State-Owned Enterprises Haven't Worked |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Why Performance Contracts for State-Owned Enterprises Haven't Worked |
| title_sort |
why performance contracts for state-owned enterprises haven't worked |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/08/441600/performance-contracts-state-owned-enterprises-havent-worked http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11537 |
| _version_ |
1764417092658921472 |