Bidding for Concessions : The Impact of Contract Design

Bidding for Concessions : The Impact of Contract Design

Infrastructure concession contracts set out the performance obligations and rights of concessionaires and the incentives and risks under which they operate, including pricing arrangements. The clarity with which these terms can be defined determine...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Klein, Michael
Format: Viewpoint
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:
CONCESSIONS
INFRASTRUCTURE
CONTRACT NEGOTIATION
RISKS
COST SHARING
BIDDING
RESTRICTIONS ARBITRATION
BOT
BREACH OF CONTRACT
COAL
CONCESSION
CONCESSION CONTRACTS
EMISSIONS
FUELS
INCENTIVE SYSTEMS
INFLATION
INSURANCE
LAWS
LEASE
LICENSES
MARKET POWER
MONOPOLY
MONOPOLY POWER
OIL
PENALTIES
POWER PLANTS
PRIVATE SECTOR
SERVICE DELIVERY
SPECIFICATIONS
TRANSACTION COSTS
UTILITY REGULATION
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/441577/bidding-concessions-impact-contract-design
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11527
id okr-10986-11527
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-115272021-06-14T11:03:48Z Bidding for Concessions : The Impact of Contract Design Klein, Michael CONCESSIONS INFRASTRUCTURE CONTRACT NEGOTIATION RISKS COST SHARING BIDDING RESTRICTIONS ARBITRATION BOT BREACH OF CONTRACT COAL CONCESSION CONCESSION CONTRACTS EMISSIONS FUELS INCENTIVE SYSTEMS INFLATION INSURANCE LAWS LEASE LICENSES MARKET POWER MONOPOLY MONOPOLY POWER OIL PENALTIES POWER PLANTS PRIVATE SECTOR SERVICE DELIVERY SPECIFICATIONS TRANSACTION COSTS UTILITY REGULATION Infrastructure concession contracts set out the performance obligations and rights of concessionaires and the incentives and risks under which they operate, including pricing arrangements. The clarity with which these terms can be defined determines whether there is likely to be renegotiations after contract award, which may undermine the significance of the initial auction. The design of incentives and risk allocation will affect first the intensity of competition and then the sustainability of the original contract. This Note examines these issues. 2012-08-13T15:18:32Z 2012-08-13T15:18:32Z 1998-11 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/441577/bidding-concessions-impact-contract-design Viewpoint. -- Note no. 158 (November 1998) http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11527 English Viewpoint CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Viewpoint Publications & Research
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
topic CONCESSIONS
INFRASTRUCTURE
CONTRACT NEGOTIATION
RISKS
COST SHARING
BIDDING
RESTRICTIONS ARBITRATION
BOT
BREACH OF CONTRACT
COAL
CONCESSION
CONCESSION CONTRACTS
EMISSIONS
FUELS
INCENTIVE SYSTEMS
INFLATION
INSURANCE
LAWS
LEASE
LICENSES
MARKET POWER
MONOPOLY
MONOPOLY POWER
OIL
PENALTIES
POWER PLANTS
PRIVATE SECTOR
SERVICE DELIVERY
SPECIFICATIONS
TRANSACTION COSTS
UTILITY REGULATION
spellingShingle CONCESSIONS
INFRASTRUCTURE
CONTRACT NEGOTIATION
RISKS
COST SHARING
BIDDING
RESTRICTIONS ARBITRATION
BOT
BREACH OF CONTRACT
COAL
CONCESSION
CONCESSION CONTRACTS
EMISSIONS
FUELS
INCENTIVE SYSTEMS
INFLATION
INSURANCE
LAWS
LEASE
LICENSES
MARKET POWER
MONOPOLY
MONOPOLY POWER
OIL
PENALTIES
POWER PLANTS
PRIVATE SECTOR
SERVICE DELIVERY
SPECIFICATIONS
TRANSACTION COSTS
UTILITY REGULATION
Klein, Michael
Bidding for Concessions : The Impact of Contract Design
relation Viewpoint
description Infrastructure concession contracts set out the performance obligations and rights of concessionaires and the incentives and risks under which they operate, including pricing arrangements. The clarity with which these terms can be defined determines whether there is likely to be renegotiations after contract award, which may undermine the significance of the initial auction. The design of incentives and risk allocation will affect first the intensity of competition and then the sustainability of the original contract. This Note examines these issues.
format Publications & Research :: Viewpoint
author Klein, Michael
author_facet Klein, Michael
author_sort Klein, Michael
title Bidding for Concessions : The Impact of Contract Design
title_short Bidding for Concessions : The Impact of Contract Design
title_full Bidding for Concessions : The Impact of Contract Design
title_fullStr Bidding for Concessions : The Impact of Contract Design
title_full_unstemmed Bidding for Concessions : The Impact of Contract Design
title_sort bidding for concessions : the impact of contract design
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2012
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/441577/bidding-concessions-impact-contract-design
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11527
_version_ 1764417056242925568

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