Rebidding for Concessions

The longer a concession lasts, the less effect the initial rounds of bidding will have on the terms of the concession over its full life. Much more influential will be periodic renegotiations or price reviews, which under standard concessions are h...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Klein, Michael
Format:	Viewpoint
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:	ABSOLUTE ADVANTAGE ASSET VALUATION ASSETS AUCTION BID BIDDERS BIDDING COMPETITIVE MARKETS CONSUMERS DEBT FREE ENTRY HOSTILE TAKEOVER MARKET ENTRY MARKET POWER MEDIAN VOTERS NATURAL MONOPOLY NET WORTH PRICE SETTING PRICE STRUCTURES PRICING POLICY PROPERTY RIGHTS RETAIL RISK PREMIUM SHAREHOLDINGS SUSTAINABILITY TAKEOVER VOTERS WEALTH BIDDING CONCESSIONS AUCTIONS ECONOMIC COMPETITION
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/441574/rebidding-concessions http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11524

id	okr-10986-11524
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-115242021-06-14T11:03:17Z Rebidding for Concessions Klein, Michael ABSOLUTE ADVANTAGE ASSET VALUATION ASSETS AUCTION BID BIDDERS BIDDING COMPETITIVE MARKETS CONSUMERS DEBT FREE ENTRY HOSTILE TAKEOVER MARKET ENTRY MARKET POWER MEDIAN VOTERS NATURAL MONOPOLY NET WORTH PRICE SETTING PRICE STRUCTURES PRICING POLICY PROPERTY RIGHTS RETAIL RISK PREMIUM SHAREHOLDINGS SUSTAINABILITY TAKEOVER VOTERS WEALTH BIDDING CONCESSIONS AUCTIONS ECONOMIC COMPETITION The longer a concession lasts, the less effect the initial rounds of bidding will have on the terms of the concession over its full life. Much more influential will be periodic renegotiations or price reviews, which under standard concessions are hard to settle by competition. It has been suggested that competition could be brought to bear by periodically reauctioning a concession, which would limit the potential for exercise of market power by concessionaires. If contracts can be well written and rebidding is practical, periodic reauctioning offers an effective solution to the natural monoply problem. Price regulation may no longer be necessary, and rebidding may help with contract adjustment. This Note examines the case for rebidding. 2012-08-13T15:18:02Z 2012-08-13T15:18:02Z 1998-11 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/441574/rebidding-concessions Viewpoint. -- Note no. 161 (November 1998) http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11524 English Viewpoint CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Viewpoint Publications & Research
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English
topic	ABSOLUTE ADVANTAGE ASSET VALUATION ASSETS AUCTION BID BIDDERS BIDDING COMPETITIVE MARKETS CONSUMERS DEBT FREE ENTRY HOSTILE TAKEOVER MARKET ENTRY MARKET POWER MEDIAN VOTERS NATURAL MONOPOLY NET WORTH PRICE SETTING PRICE STRUCTURES PRICING POLICY PROPERTY RIGHTS RETAIL RISK PREMIUM SHAREHOLDINGS SUSTAINABILITY TAKEOVER VOTERS WEALTH BIDDING CONCESSIONS AUCTIONS ECONOMIC COMPETITION
spellingShingle	ABSOLUTE ADVANTAGE ASSET VALUATION ASSETS AUCTION BID BIDDERS BIDDING COMPETITIVE MARKETS CONSUMERS DEBT FREE ENTRY HOSTILE TAKEOVER MARKET ENTRY MARKET POWER MEDIAN VOTERS NATURAL MONOPOLY NET WORTH PRICE SETTING PRICE STRUCTURES PRICING POLICY PROPERTY RIGHTS RETAIL RISK PREMIUM SHAREHOLDINGS SUSTAINABILITY TAKEOVER VOTERS WEALTH BIDDING CONCESSIONS AUCTIONS ECONOMIC COMPETITION Klein, Michael Rebidding for Concessions
relation	Viewpoint
description	The longer a concession lasts, the less effect the initial rounds of bidding will have on the terms of the concession over its full life. Much more influential will be periodic renegotiations or price reviews, which under standard concessions are hard to settle by competition. It has been suggested that competition could be brought to bear by periodically reauctioning a concession, which would limit the potential for exercise of market power by concessionaires. If contracts can be well written and rebidding is practical, periodic reauctioning offers an effective solution to the natural monoply problem. Price regulation may no longer be necessary, and rebidding may help with contract adjustment. This Note examines the case for rebidding.
format	Publications & Research :: Viewpoint
author	Klein, Michael
author_facet	Klein, Michael
author_sort	Klein, Michael
title	Rebidding for Concessions
title_short	Rebidding for Concessions
title_full	Rebidding for Concessions
title_fullStr	Rebidding for Concessions
title_full_unstemmed	Rebidding for Concessions
title_sort	rebidding for concessions
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2012
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/441574/rebidding-concessions http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11524
_version_	1764417045700542464

Rebidding for Concessions

Similar Items