Rebidding for Concessions

The longer a concession lasts, the less effect the initial rounds of bidding will have on the terms of the concession over its full life. Much more influential will be periodic renegotiations or price reviews, which under standard concessions are h...

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Main Author: Klein, Michael
Format: Viewpoint
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/441574/rebidding-concessions
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11524
id okr-10986-11524
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-115242021-06-14T11:03:17Z Rebidding for Concessions Klein, Michael ABSOLUTE ADVANTAGE ASSET VALUATION ASSETS AUCTION BID BIDDERS BIDDING COMPETITIVE MARKETS CONSUMERS DEBT FREE ENTRY HOSTILE TAKEOVER MARKET ENTRY MARKET POWER MEDIAN VOTERS NATURAL MONOPOLY NET WORTH PRICE SETTING PRICE STRUCTURES PRICING POLICY PROPERTY RIGHTS RETAIL RISK PREMIUM SHAREHOLDINGS SUSTAINABILITY TAKEOVER VOTERS WEALTH BIDDING CONCESSIONS AUCTIONS ECONOMIC COMPETITION The longer a concession lasts, the less effect the initial rounds of bidding will have on the terms of the concession over its full life. Much more influential will be periodic renegotiations or price reviews, which under standard concessions are hard to settle by competition. It has been suggested that competition could be brought to bear by periodically reauctioning a concession, which would limit the potential for exercise of market power by concessionaires. If contracts can be well written and rebidding is practical, periodic reauctioning offers an effective solution to the natural monoply problem. Price regulation may no longer be necessary, and rebidding may help with contract adjustment. This Note examines the case for rebidding. 2012-08-13T15:18:02Z 2012-08-13T15:18:02Z 1998-11 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/441574/rebidding-concessions Viewpoint. -- Note no. 161 (November 1998) http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11524 English Viewpoint CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Viewpoint Publications & Research
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
topic ABSOLUTE ADVANTAGE
ASSET VALUATION
ASSETS
AUCTION
BID
BIDDERS
BIDDING
COMPETITIVE MARKETS
CONSUMERS
DEBT
FREE ENTRY
HOSTILE TAKEOVER
MARKET ENTRY
MARKET POWER
MEDIAN VOTERS
NATURAL MONOPOLY
NET WORTH
PRICE SETTING
PRICE STRUCTURES
PRICING POLICY
PROPERTY RIGHTS
RETAIL
RISK PREMIUM
SHAREHOLDINGS
SUSTAINABILITY
TAKEOVER
VOTERS
WEALTH BIDDING
CONCESSIONS
AUCTIONS
ECONOMIC COMPETITION
spellingShingle ABSOLUTE ADVANTAGE
ASSET VALUATION
ASSETS
AUCTION
BID
BIDDERS
BIDDING
COMPETITIVE MARKETS
CONSUMERS
DEBT
FREE ENTRY
HOSTILE TAKEOVER
MARKET ENTRY
MARKET POWER
MEDIAN VOTERS
NATURAL MONOPOLY
NET WORTH
PRICE SETTING
PRICE STRUCTURES
PRICING POLICY
PROPERTY RIGHTS
RETAIL
RISK PREMIUM
SHAREHOLDINGS
SUSTAINABILITY
TAKEOVER
VOTERS
WEALTH BIDDING
CONCESSIONS
AUCTIONS
ECONOMIC COMPETITION
Klein, Michael
Rebidding for Concessions
relation Viewpoint
description The longer a concession lasts, the less effect the initial rounds of bidding will have on the terms of the concession over its full life. Much more influential will be periodic renegotiations or price reviews, which under standard concessions are hard to settle by competition. It has been suggested that competition could be brought to bear by periodically reauctioning a concession, which would limit the potential for exercise of market power by concessionaires. If contracts can be well written and rebidding is practical, periodic reauctioning offers an effective solution to the natural monoply problem. Price regulation may no longer be necessary, and rebidding may help with contract adjustment. This Note examines the case for rebidding.
format Publications & Research :: Viewpoint
author Klein, Michael
author_facet Klein, Michael
author_sort Klein, Michael
title Rebidding for Concessions
title_short Rebidding for Concessions
title_full Rebidding for Concessions
title_fullStr Rebidding for Concessions
title_full_unstemmed Rebidding for Concessions
title_sort rebidding for concessions
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2012
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/441574/rebidding-concessions
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11524
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