Rebidding for Concessions
The longer a concession lasts, the less effect the initial rounds of bidding will have on the terms of the concession over its full life. Much more influential will be periodic renegotiations or price reviews, which under standard concessions are h...
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| Format: | Viewpoint |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/441574/rebidding-concessions http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11524 |
| Summary: | The longer a concession lasts, the less
effect the initial rounds of bidding will have on the terms
of the concession over its full life. Much more influential
will be periodic renegotiations or price reviews, which
under standard concessions are hard to settle by
competition. It has been suggested that competition could be
brought to bear by periodically reauctioning a concession,
which would limit the potential for exercise of market power
by concessionaires. If contracts can be well written and
rebidding is practical, periodic reauctioning offers an
effective solution to the natural monoply problem. Price
regulation may no longer be necessary, and rebidding may
help with contract adjustment. This Note examines the case
for rebidding. |
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