Mitigating Regulatory Risk in Telecommunications
In the transition from state-owned monopolies to privately led and increasingly competitive market structures in telecommunications, poor performance of regulatory agencies limits the benefits of reform. This Note proposes measures for establishing...
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| Format: | Viewpoint |
| Language: | English |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1999/07/1346401/mitigating-regulatory-risk-telecommunications http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11470 |
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okr-10986-114702021-06-14T11:02:32Z Mitigating Regulatory Risk in Telecommunications Smith, Peter L. Wellenius, Bjorn ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACCOUNTING AUCTIONS BARRIERS TO ENTRY BIDDING CENTRAL BANK COMMUNAL FACILITIES CONSUMERS DECISION- MAKING DUOPOLY ELECTRICITY EVALUATION CRITERIA FINANCIAL RESOURCES INCOME INFLATION INNOVATIONS LEARNING LICENSES MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COST PRICING MARKET POWER MARKET PRICES MEDIA MONOPOLIES OUTSOURCING PHONES POLITICAL POWER PRICE COMPETITION PRICE CONTROL PRICE INDEX PRICE REGULATION PRIVATE SECTOR PRODUCTIVITY PROVISIONS PUBLIC CONSULTATION PUBLIC SECTOR RADIO REGULATORY AGENCIES REGULATORY AGENCY REGULATORY EXPERTS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY POLICY REGULATORY PRINCIPLES SALES TELECENTERS TELECOMMUNICATIONS TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANIES TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES TELEPHONE LINES TELEPHONE SERVICE TELEPHONE SERVICES TELEVISION TRANSPARENCY TRANSPARENT PROCESSES UNIVERSAL SERVICE UTILITIES WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATORY STRUCTURE REGULATORY AGENCY REGULATORY FRAMEWORK MARKET COMPETITION PRICE CONTROLS MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION LICENCING INSTITUTION BUILDING CONTRACTING In the transition from state-owned monopolies to privately led and increasingly competitive market structures in telecommunications, poor performance of regulatory agencies limits the benefits of reform. This Note proposes measures for establishing a regulatory framework that enables better sector performance even when a full-fledged regulatory agency is lacking. These measures reduce the need for agency decisions -- for example, by prepackaging rules and accelerating competition. They enhance the credibility of regulation -- for example, by locking in principles through international agreements. And they generate maximum impact from scarce professional and financial resources by using them effectively -- such as by contracting out functions and creating multisectoral or regional agencies. 2012-08-13T15:09:33Z 2012-08-13T15:09:33Z 1999-07 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1999/07/1346401/mitigating-regulatory-risk-telecommunications Viewpoint. -- Note no. 189 (July 1999) http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11470 English Viewpoint CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Viewpoint Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACCOUNTING AUCTIONS BARRIERS TO ENTRY BIDDING CENTRAL BANK COMMUNAL FACILITIES CONSUMERS DECISION- MAKING DUOPOLY ELECTRICITY EVALUATION CRITERIA FINANCIAL RESOURCES INCOME INFLATION INNOVATIONS LEARNING LICENSES MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COST PRICING MARKET POWER MARKET PRICES MEDIA MONOPOLIES OUTSOURCING PHONES POLITICAL POWER PRICE COMPETITION PRICE CONTROL PRICE INDEX PRICE REGULATION PRIVATE SECTOR PRODUCTIVITY PROVISIONS PUBLIC CONSULTATION PUBLIC SECTOR RADIO REGULATORY AGENCIES REGULATORY AGENCY REGULATORY EXPERTS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY POLICY REGULATORY PRINCIPLES SALES TELECENTERS TELECOMMUNICATIONS TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANIES TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES TELEPHONE LINES TELEPHONE SERVICE TELEPHONE SERVICES TELEVISION TRANSPARENCY TRANSPARENT PROCESSES UNIVERSAL SERVICE UTILITIES WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATORY STRUCTURE REGULATORY AGENCY REGULATORY FRAMEWORK MARKET COMPETITION PRICE CONTROLS MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION LICENCING INSTITUTION BUILDING CONTRACTING |
| spellingShingle |
ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACCOUNTING AUCTIONS BARRIERS TO ENTRY BIDDING CENTRAL BANK COMMUNAL FACILITIES CONSUMERS DECISION- MAKING DUOPOLY ELECTRICITY EVALUATION CRITERIA FINANCIAL RESOURCES INCOME INFLATION INNOVATIONS LEARNING LICENSES MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COST PRICING MARKET POWER MARKET PRICES MEDIA MONOPOLIES OUTSOURCING PHONES POLITICAL POWER PRICE COMPETITION PRICE CONTROL PRICE INDEX PRICE REGULATION PRIVATE SECTOR PRODUCTIVITY PROVISIONS PUBLIC CONSULTATION PUBLIC SECTOR RADIO REGULATORY AGENCIES REGULATORY AGENCY REGULATORY EXPERTS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY POLICY REGULATORY PRINCIPLES SALES TELECENTERS TELECOMMUNICATIONS TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANIES TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES TELEPHONE LINES TELEPHONE SERVICE TELEPHONE SERVICES TELEVISION TRANSPARENCY TRANSPARENT PROCESSES UNIVERSAL SERVICE UTILITIES WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATORY STRUCTURE REGULATORY AGENCY REGULATORY FRAMEWORK MARKET COMPETITION PRICE CONTROLS MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION LICENCING INSTITUTION BUILDING CONTRACTING Smith, Peter L. Wellenius, Bjorn Mitigating Regulatory Risk in Telecommunications |
| relation |
Viewpoint |
| description |
In the transition from state-owned
monopolies to privately led and increasingly competitive
market structures in telecommunications, poor performance of
regulatory agencies limits the benefits of reform. This Note
proposes measures for establishing a regulatory framework
that enables better sector performance even when a
full-fledged regulatory agency is lacking. These measures
reduce the need for agency decisions -- for example, by
prepackaging rules and accelerating competition. They
enhance the credibility of regulation -- for example, by
locking in principles through international agreements. And
they generate maximum impact from scarce professional and
financial resources by using them effectively -- such as by
contracting out functions and creating multisectoral or
regional agencies. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Viewpoint |
| author |
Smith, Peter L. Wellenius, Bjorn |
| author_facet |
Smith, Peter L. Wellenius, Bjorn |
| author_sort |
Smith, Peter L. |
| title |
Mitigating Regulatory Risk in Telecommunications |
| title_short |
Mitigating Regulatory Risk in Telecommunications |
| title_full |
Mitigating Regulatory Risk in Telecommunications |
| title_fullStr |
Mitigating Regulatory Risk in Telecommunications |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Mitigating Regulatory Risk in Telecommunications |
| title_sort |
mitigating regulatory risk in telecommunications |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1999/07/1346401/mitigating-regulatory-risk-telecommunications http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11470 |
| _version_ |
1764416851516850176 |