Infrastructure Concessions, Information Flows, and Regulatory Risk

Regulators of concessions in newly privatized infrastructure sectors typically start the price control process with limited sectoral and corporate data. To move toward more realistic regulatory targets, they must ensure that this information base g...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Burns, Phil, Estache, Antonio
Format:	Viewpoint
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:	REGULATORY FRAMEWORK PRICE STRUCTURES MONOPOLIES INFRASTRUCTURE REGULATION INFORMATION DISSEMINATION CONTRACT NEGOTIATION PRIVATIZATION OPERATING COSTS DEPRECIATION COST OF CAPITAL YARDSTICK COMPETITION VALUATION INVESTMENT PROGRAMS CAPITAL INVESTMENTS CONCESSIONS ACCOUNTING AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS ASSET PRICING ASSET VALUATION ASSET VALUE ASSETS BENCHMARK BENCHMARKING BID BIDDERS BIDDING BIDDING DOCUMENTS CAPITAL USE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX CONSUMERS COST OF DEBT CAPITAL COVERAGE CPI DEBT DIVIDEND POLICY ECONOMISTS EQUITY CAPITAL EXCESS PROFITS EXPENDITURES FINANCIAL INFORMATION FORECASTS INCENTIVE EFFECTS INEFFICIENCY LIQUIDITY MERGERS PERVERSE INCENTIVES PRESENT VALUE PRODUCTIVITY PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH REGULATORY CAPTURE SAVINGS STOCK MARKETS SUSTAINABILITY TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRADEOFFS TRANSPARENCY WEALTH
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1999/12/729341/infrastructure-concessions-information-flows-regulatory-risk http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11446

id	okr-10986-11446
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-114462021-06-14T11:02:43Z Infrastructure Concessions, Information Flows, and Regulatory Risk Burns, Phil Estache, Antonio REGULATORY FRAMEWORK PRICE STRUCTURES MONOPOLIES INFRASTRUCTURE REGULATION INFORMATION DISSEMINATION CONTRACT NEGOTIATION PRIVATIZATION OPERATING COSTS DEPRECIATION COST OF CAPITAL YARDSTICK COMPETITION VALUATION INVESTMENT PROGRAMS CAPITAL INVESTMENTS CONCESSIONS ACCOUNTING AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS ASSET PRICING ASSET VALUATION ASSET VALUE ASSETS BENCHMARK BENCHMARKING BID BIDDERS BIDDING BIDDING DOCUMENTS CAPITAL USE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX CONSUMERS COST OF CAPITAL COST OF DEBT CAPITAL COVERAGE CPI DEBT DIVIDEND POLICY ECONOMISTS EQUITY CAPITAL EXCESS PROFITS EXPENDITURES FINANCIAL INFORMATION FORECASTS INCENTIVE EFFECTS INEFFICIENCY LIQUIDITY MERGERS MONOPOLIES PERVERSE INCENTIVES PRESENT VALUE PRODUCTIVITY PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH REGULATORY CAPTURE SAVINGS STOCK MARKETS SUSTAINABILITY TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRADEOFFS TRANSPARENCY WEALTH Regulators of concessions in newly privatized infrastructure sectors typically start the price control process with limited sectoral and corporate data. To move toward more realistic regulatory targets, they must ensure that this information base grows and that their ability to process it improves-a costly undertaking but worth the expense. Getting it right-with well-conceived rules, data, and methodologies-helps to avoid time-consuming regulatory disputes and contract renegotiations, reduce regulatory capture by the new private operator, and assess who gains and who loses from utility privatization. Getting it wrong can cause the concessionaire to operate and invest inefficiently, raise its cost of capital, and ultimately jeopardize privatization. This Note outlines the accounting requirements that a regulator should impose on new concessionaires to navigate these waters as smoothly as possible. 2012-08-13T15:05:40Z 2012-08-13T15:05:40Z 1999-12 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1999/12/729341/infrastructure-concessions-information-flows-regulatory-risk Viewpoint. -- Note no. 203 (December 1999) http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11446 English Viewpoint CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Viewpoint Publications & Research Latin America & Caribbean Europe and Central Asia Argentina United Kingdom
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English
topic	REGULATORY FRAMEWORK PRICE STRUCTURES MONOPOLIES INFRASTRUCTURE REGULATION INFORMATION DISSEMINATION CONTRACT NEGOTIATION PRIVATIZATION OPERATING COSTS DEPRECIATION COST OF CAPITAL YARDSTICK COMPETITION VALUATION INVESTMENT PROGRAMS CAPITAL INVESTMENTS CONCESSIONS ACCOUNTING AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS ASSET PRICING ASSET VALUATION ASSET VALUE ASSETS BENCHMARK BENCHMARKING BID BIDDERS BIDDING BIDDING DOCUMENTS CAPITAL USE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX CONSUMERS COST OF CAPITAL COST OF DEBT CAPITAL COVERAGE CPI DEBT DIVIDEND POLICY ECONOMISTS EQUITY CAPITAL EXCESS PROFITS EXPENDITURES FINANCIAL INFORMATION FORECASTS INCENTIVE EFFECTS INEFFICIENCY LIQUIDITY MERGERS MONOPOLIES PERVERSE INCENTIVES PRESENT VALUE PRODUCTIVITY PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH REGULATORY CAPTURE SAVINGS STOCK MARKETS SUSTAINABILITY TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRADEOFFS TRANSPARENCY WEALTH
spellingShingle	REGULATORY FRAMEWORK PRICE STRUCTURES MONOPOLIES INFRASTRUCTURE REGULATION INFORMATION DISSEMINATION CONTRACT NEGOTIATION PRIVATIZATION OPERATING COSTS DEPRECIATION COST OF CAPITAL YARDSTICK COMPETITION VALUATION INVESTMENT PROGRAMS CAPITAL INVESTMENTS CONCESSIONS ACCOUNTING AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS ASSET PRICING ASSET VALUATION ASSET VALUE ASSETS BENCHMARK BENCHMARKING BID BIDDERS BIDDING BIDDING DOCUMENTS CAPITAL USE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX CONSUMERS COST OF CAPITAL COST OF DEBT CAPITAL COVERAGE CPI DEBT DIVIDEND POLICY ECONOMISTS EQUITY CAPITAL EXCESS PROFITS EXPENDITURES FINANCIAL INFORMATION FORECASTS INCENTIVE EFFECTS INEFFICIENCY LIQUIDITY MERGERS MONOPOLIES PERVERSE INCENTIVES PRESENT VALUE PRODUCTIVITY PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH REGULATORY CAPTURE SAVINGS STOCK MARKETS SUSTAINABILITY TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRADEOFFS TRANSPARENCY WEALTH Burns, Phil Estache, Antonio Infrastructure Concessions, Information Flows, and Regulatory Risk
geographic_facet	Latin America & Caribbean Europe and Central Asia Argentina United Kingdom
relation	Viewpoint
description	Regulators of concessions in newly privatized infrastructure sectors typically start the price control process with limited sectoral and corporate data. To move toward more realistic regulatory targets, they must ensure that this information base grows and that their ability to process it improves-a costly undertaking but worth the expense. Getting it right-with well-conceived rules, data, and methodologies-helps to avoid time-consuming regulatory disputes and contract renegotiations, reduce regulatory capture by the new private operator, and assess who gains and who loses from utility privatization. Getting it wrong can cause the concessionaire to operate and invest inefficiently, raise its cost of capital, and ultimately jeopardize privatization. This Note outlines the accounting requirements that a regulator should impose on new concessionaires to navigate these waters as smoothly as possible.
format	Publications & Research :: Viewpoint
author	Burns, Phil Estache, Antonio
author_facet	Burns, Phil Estache, Antonio
author_sort	Burns, Phil
title	Infrastructure Concessions, Information Flows, and Regulatory Risk
title_short	Infrastructure Concessions, Information Flows, and Regulatory Risk
title_full	Infrastructure Concessions, Information Flows, and Regulatory Risk
title_fullStr	Infrastructure Concessions, Information Flows, and Regulatory Risk
title_full_unstemmed	Infrastructure Concessions, Information Flows, and Regulatory Risk
title_sort	infrastructure concessions, information flows, and regulatory risk
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2012
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1999/12/729341/infrastructure-concessions-information-flows-regulatory-risk http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11446
_version_	1764416761236553728

Infrastructure Concessions, Information Flows, and Regulatory Risk

Similar Items