Strengthening Legislatures : Implications from Industrial Countries

With more developing and post-communist states embracing democracy, improving the performance of their congresses, parliaments, and other legislative assemblies has become a must. These bodies make laws, hold the executive branch accountable, and r...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Messick, Richard E.
Format: Brief
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/03/2011708/strengthening-legislatures-implications-industrial-countries
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11354
id okr-10986-11354
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-113542021-06-14T10:58:53Z Strengthening Legislatures : Implications from Industrial Countries Messick, Richard E. ACCOUNTABILITY CABINET CITIZEN COMMITTEE MEETINGS COMMUNIST CONSTITUTIONALISM CORRUPTION DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIZATION ELECTION ELECTORATE EXECUTIVE AGENCIES EXECUTIVE BRANCH GOOD GOVERNANCE HOUSE OF REVIEW LAWS LEARNING LEGAL INSTITUTIONS LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES LEGISLATIVE REFORM LEGISLATORS LEGISLATURE LEGISLATURES MEDIA MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT MINISTERS OPPOSITION PARTIES PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS PARLIAMENTS POLITICAL PARTIES PRESIDENCY PROGRAMS PUBLIC INTEREST PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC SECTOR SENATE SEPARATION OF POWERS STANDING ORDERS TRAINING PROGRAMS TRANSITION ECONOMIES VOTING LAW REFORM LEGISLATIVE BODIES GOVERNANCE OPPOSITION LEADERS STAFF TRAINING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INCENTIVES AUTONOMY SEPARATION OF POWERS CANDIDATES CAMPAIGN FUNDS PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM COMMITTEES LEGISLATIVE PROCESS LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT POLITICAL PARTIES PARTY FACTIONS PARTY POSITIONS PARTY AFFILIATION With more developing and post-communist states embracing democracy, improving the performance of their congresses, parliaments, and other legislative assemblies has become a must. These bodies make laws, hold the executive branch accountable, and represent citizen interests. Good governance demands that each of these tasks be done well. Thus aid agencies have begun supporting programs that train legislators and their staff, provide computers and buildings, and otherwise strengthen the legislative branch of government. But while some programs have succeeded, the overall results have been disappointing. One reason is that many programs have ignored a key principle of public sector reform: success requires changing the incentives facing public officials (World Bank 2000). More effective legislative aid programs will require donors to understand what motivates legislators and how those incentives can be altered. This note surveys the main factors shaping incentives for legislators in industrial countries and suggests how these factors can inform legislative reform in developing and transition economies. 2012-08-13T14:50:28Z 2012-08-13T14:50:28Z 2002-03 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/03/2011708/strengthening-legislatures-implications-industrial-countries http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11354 English PREM Notes; No. 63 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Brief Publications & Research
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
topic ACCOUNTABILITY
CABINET
CITIZEN
COMMITTEE MEETINGS
COMMUNIST
CONSTITUTIONALISM
CORRUPTION
DEMOCRACY
DEMOCRATIZATION
ELECTION
ELECTORATE
EXECUTIVE AGENCIES
EXECUTIVE BRANCH
GOOD GOVERNANCE
HOUSE OF REVIEW
LAWS
LEARNING
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
LEGISLATION
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES
LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES
LEGISLATIVE REFORM
LEGISLATORS
LEGISLATURE
LEGISLATURES
MEDIA
MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT
MINISTERS
OPPOSITION PARTIES
PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES
PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT
PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS
PARLIAMENTS
POLITICAL PARTIES
PRESIDENCY
PROGRAMS
PUBLIC INTEREST
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC SECTOR
SENATE
SEPARATION OF POWERS
STANDING ORDERS
TRAINING PROGRAMS
TRANSITION ECONOMIES
VOTING LAW REFORM
LEGISLATIVE BODIES
GOVERNANCE
OPPOSITION LEADERS
STAFF TRAINING
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
INCENTIVES
AUTONOMY
SEPARATION OF POWERS
CANDIDATES
CAMPAIGN FUNDS
PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM
COMMITTEES
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT
POLITICAL PARTIES
PARTY FACTIONS
PARTY POSITIONS
PARTY AFFILIATION
spellingShingle ACCOUNTABILITY
CABINET
CITIZEN
COMMITTEE MEETINGS
COMMUNIST
CONSTITUTIONALISM
CORRUPTION
DEMOCRACY
DEMOCRATIZATION
ELECTION
ELECTORATE
EXECUTIVE AGENCIES
EXECUTIVE BRANCH
GOOD GOVERNANCE
HOUSE OF REVIEW
LAWS
LEARNING
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
LEGISLATION
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES
LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES
LEGISLATIVE REFORM
LEGISLATORS
LEGISLATURE
LEGISLATURES
MEDIA
MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT
MINISTERS
OPPOSITION PARTIES
PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES
PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT
PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS
PARLIAMENTS
POLITICAL PARTIES
PRESIDENCY
PROGRAMS
PUBLIC INTEREST
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC SECTOR
SENATE
SEPARATION OF POWERS
STANDING ORDERS
TRAINING PROGRAMS
TRANSITION ECONOMIES
VOTING LAW REFORM
LEGISLATIVE BODIES
GOVERNANCE
OPPOSITION LEADERS
STAFF TRAINING
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
INCENTIVES
AUTONOMY
SEPARATION OF POWERS
CANDIDATES
CAMPAIGN FUNDS
PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM
COMMITTEES
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT
POLITICAL PARTIES
PARTY FACTIONS
PARTY POSITIONS
PARTY AFFILIATION
Messick, Richard E.
Strengthening Legislatures : Implications from Industrial Countries
relation PREM Notes; No. 63
description With more developing and post-communist states embracing democracy, improving the performance of their congresses, parliaments, and other legislative assemblies has become a must. These bodies make laws, hold the executive branch accountable, and represent citizen interests. Good governance demands that each of these tasks be done well. Thus aid agencies have begun supporting programs that train legislators and their staff, provide computers and buildings, and otherwise strengthen the legislative branch of government. But while some programs have succeeded, the overall results have been disappointing. One reason is that many programs have ignored a key principle of public sector reform: success requires changing the incentives facing public officials (World Bank 2000). More effective legislative aid programs will require donors to understand what motivates legislators and how those incentives can be altered. This note surveys the main factors shaping incentives for legislators in industrial countries and suggests how these factors can inform legislative reform in developing and transition economies.
format Publications & Research :: Brief
author Messick, Richard E.
author_facet Messick, Richard E.
author_sort Messick, Richard E.
title Strengthening Legislatures : Implications from Industrial Countries
title_short Strengthening Legislatures : Implications from Industrial Countries
title_full Strengthening Legislatures : Implications from Industrial Countries
title_fullStr Strengthening Legislatures : Implications from Industrial Countries
title_full_unstemmed Strengthening Legislatures : Implications from Industrial Countries
title_sort strengthening legislatures : implications from industrial countries
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2012
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/03/2011708/strengthening-legislatures-implications-industrial-countries
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11354
_version_ 1764416435907461120