Controlling Market Power : Balancing Antitrust and Sector Regulation in Telecoms
Among the countries fully liberalizing their telecommunicationssector, some have chosen to rely mainly on sector-specific rules,often applied by sector-specific institutions, while others havedepended on economywide antitrust rules and...
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/06/6040141/controlling-market-power-balancing-antitrust-sector-regulation-telecoms http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11216 |
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okr-10986-112162021-04-23T14:02:54Z Controlling Market Power : Balancing Antitrust and Sector Regulation in Telecoms Kerf, Michel Neto, Isabel Geradim, Damien ANTITRUST ANTITRUST AUTHORITIES ANTITRUST AUTHORITY ANTITRUST LAW ANTITRUST LEGISLATION ANTITRUST REGULATION AUTHORIZATION COMPETITION LAW ECONOMIC REGULATION INNOVATIONS JUDGES LEGISLATURE LICENSES MARKET CONDITIONS MARKET POWER MARKET SEGMENTS MONOPOLIES PHONES PRESIDENCY PRICE REGULATION PRIVATE SECTOR PROVISIONS PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC RESOURCES PUBLIC SUBSIDIES REGULATOR REGULATORS REGULATORY AGENCY REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS REGULATORY INTERVENTION REGULATORY REGIMES RETAIL RETAIL PRICES SPREAD TELECOMMUNICATIONS TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES TELECOMS UNBUNDLING UNIVERSAL SERVICE UNIVERSAL SERVICE OBJECTIVES Among the countries fully liberalizing their telecommunicationssector, some have chosen to rely mainly on sector-specific rules,often applied by sector-specific institutions, while others havedepended on economywide antitrust rules and institutions to controlmarket power. This Note describes the choices made by five notablereformers: Australia, Chile, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and theUnited States. Drawing on their experiences, it then assesses whetherantitrust or sector-specific processes have dealt more quickly andeffectively with key regulatory issues. 2012-08-13T14:28:26Z 2012-08-13T14:28:26Z 2005-06 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/06/6040141/controlling-market-power-balancing-antitrust-sector-regulation-telecoms Viewpoint.--Note no. 294 (June 2005) http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11216 English Viewpoint CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Viewpoint Publications & Research Latin America & Caribbean East Asia and Pacific Europe and Central Asia Chile New Zealand Australia United States United Kingdom |
repository_type |
Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
English |
topic |
ANTITRUST ANTITRUST AUTHORITIES ANTITRUST AUTHORITY ANTITRUST LAW ANTITRUST LEGISLATION ANTITRUST REGULATION AUTHORIZATION COMPETITION LAW ECONOMIC REGULATION INNOVATIONS JUDGES LEGISLATURE LICENSES MARKET CONDITIONS MARKET POWER MARKET SEGMENTS MONOPOLIES PHONES PRESIDENCY PRICE REGULATION PRIVATE SECTOR PROVISIONS PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC RESOURCES PUBLIC SUBSIDIES REGULATOR REGULATORS REGULATORY AGENCY REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS REGULATORY INTERVENTION REGULATORY REGIMES RETAIL RETAIL PRICES SPREAD TELECOMMUNICATIONS TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES TELECOMS UNBUNDLING UNIVERSAL SERVICE UNIVERSAL SERVICE OBJECTIVES |
spellingShingle |
ANTITRUST ANTITRUST AUTHORITIES ANTITRUST AUTHORITY ANTITRUST LAW ANTITRUST LEGISLATION ANTITRUST REGULATION AUTHORIZATION COMPETITION LAW ECONOMIC REGULATION INNOVATIONS JUDGES LEGISLATURE LICENSES MARKET CONDITIONS MARKET POWER MARKET SEGMENTS MONOPOLIES PHONES PRESIDENCY PRICE REGULATION PRIVATE SECTOR PROVISIONS PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC RESOURCES PUBLIC SUBSIDIES REGULATOR REGULATORS REGULATORY AGENCY REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS REGULATORY INTERVENTION REGULATORY REGIMES RETAIL RETAIL PRICES SPREAD TELECOMMUNICATIONS TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES TELECOMS UNBUNDLING UNIVERSAL SERVICE UNIVERSAL SERVICE OBJECTIVES Kerf, Michel Neto, Isabel Geradim, Damien Controlling Market Power : Balancing Antitrust and Sector Regulation in Telecoms |
geographic_facet |
Latin America & Caribbean East Asia and Pacific Europe and Central Asia Chile New Zealand Australia United States United Kingdom |
relation |
Viewpoint |
description |
Among the countries fully liberalizing
their telecommunicationssector, some have chosen
to rely mainly on sector-specific rules,often
applied by sector-specific institutions, while others
havedepended on economywide antitrust rules and
institutions to controlmarket power. This Note
describes the choices made by five
notablereformers: Australia, Chile, New Zealand,
the United Kingdom, and theUnited States. Drawing
on their experiences, it then assesses
whetherantitrust or sector-specific processes have
dealt more quickly andeffectively with key
regulatory issues. |
format |
Publications & Research :: Viewpoint |
author |
Kerf, Michel Neto, Isabel Geradim, Damien |
author_facet |
Kerf, Michel Neto, Isabel Geradim, Damien |
author_sort |
Kerf, Michel |
title |
Controlling Market Power : Balancing Antitrust and Sector Regulation in Telecoms |
title_short |
Controlling Market Power : Balancing Antitrust and Sector Regulation in Telecoms |
title_full |
Controlling Market Power : Balancing Antitrust and Sector Regulation in Telecoms |
title_fullStr |
Controlling Market Power : Balancing Antitrust and Sector Regulation in Telecoms |
title_full_unstemmed |
Controlling Market Power : Balancing Antitrust and Sector Regulation in Telecoms |
title_sort |
controlling market power : balancing antitrust and sector regulation in telecoms |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2012 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/06/6040141/controlling-market-power-balancing-antitrust-sector-regulation-telecoms http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11216 |
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