Dealing with Non-Controlling Shareholders : Issues and Best Practice
There is ample evidence today that demanding best practice standards of good corporate governance and convincing enforcement processes lead to higher market valuations of enterprises in free capital markets. This paper contains the following headin...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Brief |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/01/6988048/dealing-non-controlling-shareholders-issues-best-practice http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11198 |
| id |
okr-10986-11198 |
|---|---|
| recordtype |
oai_dc |
| spelling |
okr-10986-111982021-04-23T14:02:54Z Dealing with Non-Controlling Shareholders : Issues and Best Practice World Bank ACCOUNTABILITY ACQUISITIONS ASSET MANAGEMENT AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE AUTHORITY BOARD MEMBERS CAPITAL MARKETS CEO CO-OPERATIVES COMPANY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS CORPORATE FINANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS CORPORATE OWNERSHIP CORPORATE SCANDALS CORPORATION CORRUPTION DECISION MAKING DISCLOSURE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE EQUITY CAPITAL FAMILY OWNED BUSINESSES FIDUCIARY DUTY FINANCIAL CRISES FINANCIAL INFORMATION FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FIRMS GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE FAILURES GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES GOVERNANCE ISSUES GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES GOVERNANCE QUALITY IMPROVING GOVERNANCE INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS INDIVIDUAL COMPANIES INEQUALITY INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS INVESTOR PROTECTION LIMITED LISTED COMPANIES MANAGERS MERGER MERGER TRANSACTIONS MINISTRY OF FINANCE MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS MOTIONS POISON PILLS POVERTY ALLEVIATION PRIVATISATION PROXY PUBLIC COMPANY PUBLIC SECTOR REGULATORY FRAMEWORK RISK MANAGEMENT RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS SHARE CAPITAL SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS SHAREHOLDERS SINGLE SHAREHOLDER STOCK EXCHANGE STOCK EXCHANGES STOCK OPTIONS SUBSIDIARY TAKEOVER TRAINING PROGRAMMES TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY VOTING There is ample evidence today that demanding best practice standards of good corporate governance and convincing enforcement processes lead to higher market valuations of enterprises in free capital markets. This paper contains the following headings: key prerequisites for success with non-controlling shareholders; institutional investors have a fiduciary duty to act convincingly in the interest of their clients; and a good governance framework is essential but only sufficient quality convinces institutions to be long-term shareholders. 2012-08-13T14:25:25Z 2012-08-13T14:25:25Z 2006-01 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/01/6988048/dealing-non-controlling-shareholders-issues-best-practice http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11198 English Private Sector Opinion; No. 1 CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Brief Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY ACQUISITIONS ASSET MANAGEMENT AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE AUTHORITY BOARD MEMBERS CAPITAL MARKETS CEO CO-OPERATIVES COMPANY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS CORPORATE FINANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS CORPORATE OWNERSHIP CORPORATE SCANDALS CORPORATION CORRUPTION DECISION MAKING DISCLOSURE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE EQUITY CAPITAL FAMILY OWNED BUSINESSES FIDUCIARY DUTY FINANCIAL CRISES FINANCIAL INFORMATION FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FIRMS GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE FAILURES GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES GOVERNANCE ISSUES GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES GOVERNANCE QUALITY IMPROVING GOVERNANCE INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS INDIVIDUAL COMPANIES INEQUALITY INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS INVESTOR PROTECTION LIMITED LISTED COMPANIES MANAGERS MERGER MERGER TRANSACTIONS MINISTRY OF FINANCE MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS MOTIONS POISON PILLS POVERTY ALLEVIATION PRIVATISATION PROXY PUBLIC COMPANY PUBLIC SECTOR REGULATORY FRAMEWORK RISK MANAGEMENT RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS SHARE CAPITAL SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS SHAREHOLDERS SINGLE SHAREHOLDER STOCK EXCHANGE STOCK EXCHANGES STOCK OPTIONS SUBSIDIARY TAKEOVER TRAINING PROGRAMMES TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY VOTING |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY ACQUISITIONS ASSET MANAGEMENT AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE AUTHORITY BOARD MEMBERS CAPITAL MARKETS CEO CO-OPERATIVES COMPANY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS CORPORATE FINANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS CORPORATE OWNERSHIP CORPORATE SCANDALS CORPORATION CORRUPTION DECISION MAKING DISCLOSURE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE EQUITY CAPITAL FAMILY OWNED BUSINESSES FIDUCIARY DUTY FINANCIAL CRISES FINANCIAL INFORMATION FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FIRMS GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE FAILURES GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES GOVERNANCE ISSUES GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES GOVERNANCE QUALITY IMPROVING GOVERNANCE INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS INDIVIDUAL COMPANIES INEQUALITY INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS INVESTOR PROTECTION LIMITED LISTED COMPANIES MANAGERS MERGER MERGER TRANSACTIONS MINISTRY OF FINANCE MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS MOTIONS POISON PILLS POVERTY ALLEVIATION PRIVATISATION PROXY PUBLIC COMPANY PUBLIC SECTOR REGULATORY FRAMEWORK RISK MANAGEMENT RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS SHARE CAPITAL SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS SHAREHOLDERS SINGLE SHAREHOLDER STOCK EXCHANGE STOCK EXCHANGES STOCK OPTIONS SUBSIDIARY TAKEOVER TRAINING PROGRAMMES TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY VOTING World Bank Dealing with Non-Controlling Shareholders : Issues and Best Practice |
| relation |
Private Sector Opinion; No. 1 |
| description |
There is ample evidence today that
demanding best practice standards of good corporate
governance and convincing enforcement processes lead to
higher market valuations of enterprises in free capital
markets. This paper contains the following headings: key
prerequisites for success with non-controlling shareholders;
institutional investors have a fiduciary duty to act
convincingly in the interest of their clients; and a good
governance framework is essential but only sufficient
quality convinces institutions to be long-term shareholders. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Brief |
| author |
World Bank |
| author_facet |
World Bank |
| author_sort |
World Bank |
| title |
Dealing with Non-Controlling Shareholders : Issues and Best Practice |
| title_short |
Dealing with Non-Controlling Shareholders : Issues and Best Practice |
| title_full |
Dealing with Non-Controlling Shareholders : Issues and Best Practice |
| title_fullStr |
Dealing with Non-Controlling Shareholders : Issues and Best Practice |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Dealing with Non-Controlling Shareholders : Issues and Best Practice |
| title_sort |
dealing with non-controlling shareholders : issues and best practice |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/01/6988048/dealing-non-controlling-shareholders-issues-best-practice http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11198 |
| _version_ |
1764415876299227136 |