Uses and Limits of Conventional Corporate Governance Instruments : Analysis and Guidance for Reform - Part Two
This private sector opinion is organized in two parts. Part one, published in June 2009, examined the uses and limits of five conventional corporate governance instruments: transparency, independent monitoring, economic alignment, shareholder right...
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Washington, DC
2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2009/06/11504352/uses-limits-conventional-corporate-governance-instruments-analysis-guidance-reform-part-two http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11118 |
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okr-10986-111182021-04-23T14:02:54Z Uses and Limits of Conventional Corporate Governance Instruments : Analysis and Guidance for Reform - Part Two World Bank ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ACCOUNTING RULES ASSET MANAGER ASSET MANAGERS AUDITS BANKING CRISIS BANKS BEST INTEREST OF SHAREHOLDERS CAPITAL EXPENDITURES CAPITAL MARKETS CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS CASH FLOW CEO CEOS CHECKS COLLECTIVE COMMODITY COMPANY COMPANY LAW CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CONSENSUS CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS CORPORATIONS COST OF CAPITAL CREDIT RATING CREDIT RATING AGENCIES CREDIT RATINGS DEBT DEBT ISSUES DEBT SECURITIES DERIVATIVE DISCLOSURE ECONOMIC REFORM EMERGING MARKETS EXPENDITURES FAIR VALUE FIDUCIARY DUTIES FINANCE CORPORATION FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATE FINANCIAL CRISES FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FINANCIAL INSTITUTION FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL MARKET FINANCIAL REPORTS FINANCIAL RESULTS FINANCIAL RETURN FINANCIAL SECTOR FOREIGN INVESTORS FUND MANAGERS GLOBAL BANKING GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GLOBAL INVESTORS GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES GOVERNANCE ISSUE GOVERNANCE ISSUES GOVERNANCE PRACTICES GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS GOVERNANCE STANDARDS HOLDINGS INCOME INCORPORATED INCORPORATED COMPANIES INDEPENDENT BOARDS INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS INDIVIDUALS INFORMATION ASYMMETRY INSIDER TRADING INSOLVENCY INSOLVENCY REFORM INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS INSTRUMENT INSURERS INTERNAL CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL FINANCE INVESTMENT BANKING INVESTMENT DECISIONS INVESTOR PROTECTION ISSUANCE LARGE COMPANIES LAWYER LIABILITY LIMITED LOAN LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES MARKET MECHANISMS MARKET RISK MINORITY INVESTORS MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS MUTUAL FUNDS OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE PENSION PENSION FUNDS PORTFOLIO PORTFOLIOS PROXY PROXY CONTEST RAPID GROWTH RECESSIONARY TIMES REFORM PROGRAMS REGULATORS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY STANDARDS REPUTATION RETURN RISK OF EXPROPRIATION SECONDARY MARKET SECURITIES SHARE PRICE SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDER INTEREST SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS SPONSORS STOCK MARKET STOCK OPTIONS SUBSIDIARY TAX TAX LAWS TAX REGIMES TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY TRUST FUND UNION VOTING This private sector opinion is organized in two parts. Part one, published in June 2009, examined the uses and limits of five conventional corporate governance instruments: transparency, independent monitoring, economic alignment, shareholder rights, and financial liability and suggested ways to improve their application. Part two, the essay that follows, recommends how policymakers should approach corporate governance reform generally, with a view toward strengthening the effectiveness of conventional corporate governance instruments. Drawing upon the lessons learned from analyzing the application of conventional corporate governance tools to different situations and contexts, policymakers can take a number of steps to improve corporate governance reform efforts, including: 1) calibrate reforms to fit the surrounding context; 2) assess how an instrument will influence the behavior and focus of the affected parties; 3) be prepared to take difficult decisions to resolve challenging corporate governance issues; 4) ensure coherence of tools employed with the legal, regulatory, and tax regimes; 5) employ 'carrots' as well as 'sticks' to improve corporate governance standards; and 6) focus on social incentives and values to complement existing governance instruments. 2012-08-13T14:11:57Z 2012-08-13T14:11:57Z 2009-06 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2009/06/11504352/uses-limits-conventional-corporate-governance-instruments-analysis-guidance-reform-part-two http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11118 English Private Sector Opinion; No. 15 CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/ World Bank Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Brief Publications & Research |
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Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
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World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ACCOUNTING RULES ASSET MANAGER ASSET MANAGERS AUDITS BANKING CRISIS BANKS BEST INTEREST OF SHAREHOLDERS CAPITAL EXPENDITURES CAPITAL MARKETS CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS CASH FLOW CEO CEOS CHECKS COLLECTIVE COMMODITY COMPANY COMPANY LAW CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CONSENSUS CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS CORPORATIONS COST OF CAPITAL CREDIT RATING CREDIT RATING AGENCIES CREDIT RATINGS DEBT DEBT ISSUES DEBT SECURITIES DERIVATIVE DISCLOSURE ECONOMIC REFORM EMERGING MARKETS EXPENDITURES FAIR VALUE FIDUCIARY DUTIES FINANCE CORPORATION FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATE FINANCIAL CRISES FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FINANCIAL INSTITUTION FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL MARKET FINANCIAL REPORTS FINANCIAL RESULTS FINANCIAL RETURN FINANCIAL SECTOR FOREIGN INVESTORS FUND MANAGERS GLOBAL BANKING GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GLOBAL INVESTORS GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES GOVERNANCE ISSUE GOVERNANCE ISSUES GOVERNANCE PRACTICES GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS GOVERNANCE STANDARDS HOLDINGS INCOME INCORPORATED INCORPORATED COMPANIES INDEPENDENT BOARDS INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS INDIVIDUALS INFORMATION ASYMMETRY INSIDER TRADING INSOLVENCY INSOLVENCY REFORM INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS INSTRUMENT INSURERS INTERNAL CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL FINANCE INVESTMENT BANKING INVESTMENT DECISIONS INVESTOR PROTECTION ISSUANCE LARGE COMPANIES LAWYER LIABILITY LIMITED LOAN LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES MARKET MECHANISMS MARKET RISK MINORITY INVESTORS MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS MUTUAL FUNDS OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE PENSION PENSION FUNDS PORTFOLIO PORTFOLIOS PROXY PROXY CONTEST RAPID GROWTH RECESSIONARY TIMES REFORM PROGRAMS REGULATORS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY STANDARDS REPUTATION RETURN RISK OF EXPROPRIATION SECONDARY MARKET SECURITIES SHARE PRICE SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDER INTEREST SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS SPONSORS STOCK MARKET STOCK OPTIONS SUBSIDIARY TAX TAX LAWS TAX REGIMES TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY TRUST FUND UNION VOTING |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ACCOUNTING RULES ASSET MANAGER ASSET MANAGERS AUDITS BANKING CRISIS BANKS BEST INTEREST OF SHAREHOLDERS CAPITAL EXPENDITURES CAPITAL MARKETS CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS CASH FLOW CEO CEOS CHECKS COLLECTIVE COMMODITY COMPANY COMPANY LAW CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CONSENSUS CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS CORPORATIONS COST OF CAPITAL CREDIT RATING CREDIT RATING AGENCIES CREDIT RATINGS DEBT DEBT ISSUES DEBT SECURITIES DERIVATIVE DISCLOSURE ECONOMIC REFORM EMERGING MARKETS EXPENDITURES FAIR VALUE FIDUCIARY DUTIES FINANCE CORPORATION FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATE FINANCIAL CRISES FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FINANCIAL INSTITUTION FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL MARKET FINANCIAL REPORTS FINANCIAL RESULTS FINANCIAL RETURN FINANCIAL SECTOR FOREIGN INVESTORS FUND MANAGERS GLOBAL BANKING GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GLOBAL INVESTORS GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES GOVERNANCE ISSUE GOVERNANCE ISSUES GOVERNANCE PRACTICES GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS GOVERNANCE STANDARDS HOLDINGS INCOME INCORPORATED INCORPORATED COMPANIES INDEPENDENT BOARDS INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS INDIVIDUALS INFORMATION ASYMMETRY INSIDER TRADING INSOLVENCY INSOLVENCY REFORM INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS INSTRUMENT INSURERS INTERNAL CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL FINANCE INVESTMENT BANKING INVESTMENT DECISIONS INVESTOR PROTECTION ISSUANCE LARGE COMPANIES LAWYER LIABILITY LIMITED LOAN LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES MARKET MECHANISMS MARKET RISK MINORITY INVESTORS MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS MUTUAL FUNDS OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE PENSION PENSION FUNDS PORTFOLIO PORTFOLIOS PROXY PROXY CONTEST RAPID GROWTH RECESSIONARY TIMES REFORM PROGRAMS REGULATORS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY STANDARDS REPUTATION RETURN RISK OF EXPROPRIATION SECONDARY MARKET SECURITIES SHARE PRICE SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDER INTEREST SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS SPONSORS STOCK MARKET STOCK OPTIONS SUBSIDIARY TAX TAX LAWS TAX REGIMES TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY TRUST FUND UNION VOTING World Bank Uses and Limits of Conventional Corporate Governance Instruments : Analysis and Guidance for Reform - Part Two |
| relation |
Private Sector Opinion; No. 15 |
| description |
This private sector opinion is organized
in two parts. Part one, published in June 2009, examined the
uses and limits of five conventional corporate governance
instruments: transparency, independent monitoring, economic
alignment, shareholder rights, and financial liability and
suggested ways to improve their application. Part two, the
essay that follows, recommends how policymakers should
approach corporate governance reform generally, with a view
toward strengthening the effectiveness of conventional
corporate governance instruments. Drawing upon the lessons
learned from analyzing the application of conventional
corporate governance tools to different situations and
contexts, policymakers can take a number of steps to improve
corporate governance reform efforts, including: 1) calibrate
reforms to fit the surrounding context; 2) assess how an
instrument will influence the behavior and focus of the
affected parties; 3) be prepared to take difficult decisions
to resolve challenging corporate governance issues; 4)
ensure coherence of tools employed with the legal,
regulatory, and tax regimes; 5) employ 'carrots'
as well as 'sticks' to improve corporate
governance standards; and 6) focus on social incentives and
values to complement existing governance instruments. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Brief |
| author |
World Bank |
| author_facet |
World Bank |
| author_sort |
World Bank |
| title |
Uses and Limits of Conventional Corporate Governance Instruments : Analysis and Guidance for Reform - Part Two |
| title_short |
Uses and Limits of Conventional Corporate Governance Instruments : Analysis and Guidance for Reform - Part Two |
| title_full |
Uses and Limits of Conventional Corporate Governance Instruments : Analysis and Guidance for Reform - Part Two |
| title_fullStr |
Uses and Limits of Conventional Corporate Governance Instruments : Analysis and Guidance for Reform - Part Two |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Uses and Limits of Conventional Corporate Governance Instruments : Analysis and Guidance for Reform - Part Two |
| title_sort |
uses and limits of conventional corporate governance instruments : analysis and guidance for reform - part two |
| publisher |
Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2009/06/11504352/uses-limits-conventional-corporate-governance-instruments-analysis-guidance-reform-part-two http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11118 |
| _version_ |
1764415591166246912 |