New Corporate Governance in the Post-Crisis World
The new corporate governance concept is articulating goes back to the roots of good corporate governance, which is the ability to act as a visionary and effective decision body, exerting both strategic leadership and control. It's also an invi...
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| Format: | Brief |
| Language: | English |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2010/01/11900709/new-corporate-governance-post-crisis-world http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11096 |
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okr-10986-110962021-04-23T14:02:53Z New Corporate Governance in the Post-Crisis World Hilb, Martin BOARD MEETING BOARD MEMBER BOARD MEMBERS BOARDS OF DIRECTORS CEO COLLECTIVE COMPANY COMPENSATION PACKAGE COMPETITORS CONSENSUS CORPORATE CONTROL CORPORATE FAILURES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK CORPORATE IMAGE CORPORATE PERFORMANCE CORPORATE SCANDALS CORPORATE STRATEGY CORPORATION CORPORATIONS COST OF CAPITAL DECISION-MAKING DEMOGRAPHIC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC REFORM FAMILY BUSINESS FINANCE CORPORATION FINANCIAL CRISES FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE FIRMS GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GLOBAL STANDARD GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES GOVERNANCE PRACTICE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES HUMAN RESOURCE HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT INCENTIVE STRUCTURE INCOME INDEPENDENCE REQUIREMENT INDIVIDUALS INTERESTS OF SHAREHOLDERS INTERNAL AUDIT INTERNAL CONTROL INTERNATIONAL FINANCE LARGE COMPANIES LISTED COMPANIES LISTED COMPANY LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES MANAGERS MOTIVATIONS PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PUBLIC COMPANIES RATE [BOARD REFORM PROGRAMS REPUTATION RISK MANAGEMENT RISK MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDER VALUE SHAREHOLDERS SMALL COMPANIES SMALL FIRMS SOCIETY SPONSORS STAKEHOLDER STAKEHOLDERS SUBSIDIARY TRANSITION ECONOMIES The new corporate governance concept is articulating goes back to the roots of good corporate governance, which is the ability to act as a visionary and effective decision body, exerting both strategic leadership and control. It's also an invitation to think twice about the applicability of "best practices" in different legal contexts and business models. Arguably, despite some common features, the appropriate corporate governance of a family business company will differ from that of a large listed company. In addition, both the financial crisis and previous cases of large corporate failures have raised critical questions about the role of board directors in risk management. Are boards sufficiently equipped with the necessary knowledge, skills and expertise to provide the appropriate strategic vision and control function? The answer is certainly more complex and nuanced than it seems. Overly generalist boards may not grasp certain technicalities (with dreadful consequences), yet overly technical boards may completely miss the big picture. 2012-08-13T14:07:51Z 2012-08-13T14:07:51Z 2010-01 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2010/01/11900709/new-corporate-governance-post-crisis-world http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11096 English Private Sector Opinion; No. 16 CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Brief Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
BOARD MEETING BOARD MEMBER BOARD MEMBERS BOARDS OF DIRECTORS CEO COLLECTIVE COMPANY COMPENSATION PACKAGE COMPETITORS CONSENSUS CORPORATE CONTROL CORPORATE FAILURES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK CORPORATE IMAGE CORPORATE PERFORMANCE CORPORATE SCANDALS CORPORATE STRATEGY CORPORATION CORPORATIONS COST OF CAPITAL DECISION-MAKING DEMOGRAPHIC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC REFORM FAMILY BUSINESS FINANCE CORPORATION FINANCIAL CRISES FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE FIRMS GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GLOBAL STANDARD GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES GOVERNANCE PRACTICE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES HUMAN RESOURCE HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT INCENTIVE STRUCTURE INCOME INDEPENDENCE REQUIREMENT INDIVIDUALS INTERESTS OF SHAREHOLDERS INTERNAL AUDIT INTERNAL CONTROL INTERNATIONAL FINANCE LARGE COMPANIES LISTED COMPANIES LISTED COMPANY LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES MANAGERS MOTIVATIONS PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PUBLIC COMPANIES RATE [BOARD REFORM PROGRAMS REPUTATION RISK MANAGEMENT RISK MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDER VALUE SHAREHOLDERS SMALL COMPANIES SMALL FIRMS SOCIETY SPONSORS STAKEHOLDER STAKEHOLDERS SUBSIDIARY TRANSITION ECONOMIES |
| spellingShingle |
BOARD MEETING BOARD MEMBER BOARD MEMBERS BOARDS OF DIRECTORS CEO COLLECTIVE COMPANY COMPENSATION PACKAGE COMPETITORS CONSENSUS CORPORATE CONTROL CORPORATE FAILURES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK CORPORATE IMAGE CORPORATE PERFORMANCE CORPORATE SCANDALS CORPORATE STRATEGY CORPORATION CORPORATIONS COST OF CAPITAL DECISION-MAKING DEMOGRAPHIC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC REFORM FAMILY BUSINESS FINANCE CORPORATION FINANCIAL CRISES FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE FIRMS GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GLOBAL STANDARD GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES GOVERNANCE PRACTICE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES HUMAN RESOURCE HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT INCENTIVE STRUCTURE INCOME INDEPENDENCE REQUIREMENT INDIVIDUALS INTERESTS OF SHAREHOLDERS INTERNAL AUDIT INTERNAL CONTROL INTERNATIONAL FINANCE LARGE COMPANIES LISTED COMPANIES LISTED COMPANY LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES MANAGERS MOTIVATIONS PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PUBLIC COMPANIES RATE [BOARD REFORM PROGRAMS REPUTATION RISK MANAGEMENT RISK MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDER VALUE SHAREHOLDERS SMALL COMPANIES SMALL FIRMS SOCIETY SPONSORS STAKEHOLDER STAKEHOLDERS SUBSIDIARY TRANSITION ECONOMIES Hilb, Martin New Corporate Governance in the Post-Crisis World |
| relation |
Private Sector Opinion; No. 16 |
| description |
The new corporate governance concept is
articulating goes back to the roots of good corporate
governance, which is the ability to act as a visionary and
effective decision body, exerting both strategic leadership
and control. It's also an invitation to think twice
about the applicability of "best practices" in
different legal contexts and business models. Arguably,
despite some common features, the appropriate corporate
governance of a family business company will differ from
that of a large listed company. In addition, both the
financial crisis and previous cases of large corporate
failures have raised critical questions about the role of
board directors in risk management. Are boards sufficiently
equipped with the necessary knowledge, skills and expertise
to provide the appropriate strategic vision and control
function? The answer is certainly more complex and nuanced
than it seems. Overly generalist boards may not grasp
certain technicalities (with dreadful consequences), yet
overly technical boards may completely miss the big picture. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Brief |
| author |
Hilb, Martin |
| author_facet |
Hilb, Martin |
| author_sort |
Hilb, Martin |
| title |
New Corporate Governance in the Post-Crisis World |
| title_short |
New Corporate Governance in the Post-Crisis World |
| title_full |
New Corporate Governance in the Post-Crisis World |
| title_fullStr |
New Corporate Governance in the Post-Crisis World |
| title_full_unstemmed |
New Corporate Governance in the Post-Crisis World |
| title_sort |
new corporate governance in the post-crisis world |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2010/01/11900709/new-corporate-governance-post-crisis-world http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11096 |
| _version_ |
1764415512882708480 |