Does More Power for Shareholders Undermine Board Stewardship?
The level of shareholders' expertise and experience needs to be questioned as they wield greater clout and become more deeply involved in strategic issues that should be the board's purview. This misdirected involvement distracts sharehol...
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| Format: | Brief |
| Language: | English |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2011/01/14499021/more-power-shareholders-undermine-board-stewardship http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11067 |
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okr-10986-110672021-04-23T14:02:53Z Does More Power for Shareholders Undermine Board Stewardship? World Bank ACQUISITION ACQUISITIONS AGENCY COST AGENCY COSTS ALLEGIANCE ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BANKS BENEFICIARIES BOARD MEETINGS BUSINESS COMMUNITY BUSINESS CORPORATION BUSINESS CORPORATION LAWS CAPITAL MARKETS CEO CHAIRMAN AND CEO COMMON LAW COMPANY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS CORPORATE BOARD CORPORATE DECISION CORPORATE DIRECTOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS CORPORATE PERFORMANCE CORPORATION CORPORATIONS COST OF CAPITAL COST REDUCTION DECISION MAKING DECISION-MAKING DECISION-MAKING PROCESS DERIVATIVE DERIVATIVE ACTION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES EMERGING MARKETS EMERGING-MARKET EXECUTION FINANCE CORPORATION FINANCIAL CRISIS FIRMS FUND MANAGER GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GLOBAL PRIVATE SECTOR GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES GOVERNANCE ISSUES GOVERNANCE PRACTICES GOVERNANCE SYSTEM GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS GOVERNMENT AGENCIES HOLDING HOLDINGS INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS INDIVIDUALS INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INTERNATIONAL FINANCE INTERNATIONAL PORTFOLIO INTERNATIONALIZATION INVESTEE COMPANIES INVESTIGATION INVESTING INVESTMENT BANKING INVESTOR INTEREST ISSUANCE LEGAL AUTHORITY LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGAL RIGHTS LIMITED LISTED COMPANIES LOCAL INSTITUTIONS MAJORITY VOTING MARKET CAPITALIZATION MARKET DEVELOPMENT MARKET PRICE MERGERS NATIONAL BANK OUTSOURCING PENSION PENSION REFORM PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT PORTFOLIOS PUBLIC POLICY REGULATOR REGULATORS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY STRUCTURES RISK MANAGEMENT SECURITIES SEES SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM SHAREHOLDER ADVOCATE SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL SHAREHOLDER MEETING SHAREHOLDER VALUE SHAREHOLDER VOTE SHAREHOLDERS SOCIETY STAKEHOLDERS STOCK EXCHANGE STOCK EXCHANGES STOCK MARKET STOCK MARKET CAPITALIZATION STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDIARY TRUST FUND The level of shareholders' expertise and experience needs to be questioned as they wield greater clout and become more deeply involved in strategic issues that should be the board's purview. This misdirected involvement distracts shareholders from their principal and most important role: electing and overseeing boards. To play that role, shareholders must have the basic tools from soliciting proxies of holders of voting securities to having the ability to seek court relief for a company's oppressive conduct. One of the important principles of good governance is the empowerment of shareholders. Unless they are able and willing to hold boards to account, then there is little hope, short of tough and intrusive regulation, of ensuring that company management acts in anything other than their own narrow self-interest. But the question is: how far should shareholders go? Peter Dey's paper brings an important perspective of someone who is both committed to good governance and experienced as a corporate director. This report heralded a new era of increased attention to the responsibilities of Canadian boards as stewards of shareholder value. Internationally, the author has been associated with the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) for the last ten years and has been an active participant in the Global Corporate Governance Forum, serving as a chairman. 2012-08-13T14:02:44Z 2012-08-13T14:02:44Z 2011-01 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2011/01/14499021/more-power-shareholders-undermine-board-stewardship http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11067 English Private Sector Opinion; No. 20 CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Brief Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ACQUISITION ACQUISITIONS AGENCY COST AGENCY COSTS ALLEGIANCE ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BANKS BENEFICIARIES BOARD MEETINGS BUSINESS COMMUNITY BUSINESS CORPORATION BUSINESS CORPORATION LAWS CAPITAL MARKETS CEO CHAIRMAN AND CEO COMMON LAW COMPANY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS CORPORATE BOARD CORPORATE DECISION CORPORATE DIRECTOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS CORPORATE PERFORMANCE CORPORATION CORPORATIONS COST OF CAPITAL COST REDUCTION DECISION MAKING DECISION-MAKING DECISION-MAKING PROCESS DERIVATIVE DERIVATIVE ACTION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES EMERGING MARKETS EMERGING-MARKET EXECUTION FINANCE CORPORATION FINANCIAL CRISIS FIRMS FUND MANAGER GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GLOBAL PRIVATE SECTOR GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES GOVERNANCE ISSUES GOVERNANCE PRACTICES GOVERNANCE SYSTEM GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS GOVERNMENT AGENCIES HOLDING HOLDINGS INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS INDIVIDUALS INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INTERNATIONAL FINANCE INTERNATIONAL PORTFOLIO INTERNATIONALIZATION INVESTEE COMPANIES INVESTIGATION INVESTING INVESTMENT BANKING INVESTOR INTEREST ISSUANCE LEGAL AUTHORITY LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGAL RIGHTS LIMITED LISTED COMPANIES LOCAL INSTITUTIONS MAJORITY VOTING MARKET CAPITALIZATION MARKET DEVELOPMENT MARKET PRICE MERGERS NATIONAL BANK OUTSOURCING PENSION PENSION REFORM PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT PORTFOLIOS PUBLIC POLICY REGULATOR REGULATORS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY STRUCTURES RISK MANAGEMENT SECURITIES SEES SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM SHAREHOLDER ADVOCATE SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL SHAREHOLDER MEETING SHAREHOLDER VALUE SHAREHOLDER VOTE SHAREHOLDERS SOCIETY STAKEHOLDERS STOCK EXCHANGE STOCK EXCHANGES STOCK MARKET STOCK MARKET CAPITALIZATION STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDIARY TRUST FUND |
| spellingShingle |
ACQUISITION ACQUISITIONS AGENCY COST AGENCY COSTS ALLEGIANCE ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BANKS BENEFICIARIES BOARD MEETINGS BUSINESS COMMUNITY BUSINESS CORPORATION BUSINESS CORPORATION LAWS CAPITAL MARKETS CEO CHAIRMAN AND CEO COMMON LAW COMPANY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS CORPORATE BOARD CORPORATE DECISION CORPORATE DIRECTOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS CORPORATE PERFORMANCE CORPORATION CORPORATIONS COST OF CAPITAL COST REDUCTION DECISION MAKING DECISION-MAKING DECISION-MAKING PROCESS DERIVATIVE DERIVATIVE ACTION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES EMERGING MARKETS EMERGING-MARKET EXECUTION FINANCE CORPORATION FINANCIAL CRISIS FIRMS FUND MANAGER GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GLOBAL PRIVATE SECTOR GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES GOVERNANCE ISSUES GOVERNANCE PRACTICES GOVERNANCE SYSTEM GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS GOVERNMENT AGENCIES HOLDING HOLDINGS INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS INDIVIDUALS INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INTERNATIONAL FINANCE INTERNATIONAL PORTFOLIO INTERNATIONALIZATION INVESTEE COMPANIES INVESTIGATION INVESTING INVESTMENT BANKING INVESTOR INTEREST ISSUANCE LEGAL AUTHORITY LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGAL RIGHTS LIMITED LISTED COMPANIES LOCAL INSTITUTIONS MAJORITY VOTING MARKET CAPITALIZATION MARKET DEVELOPMENT MARKET PRICE MERGERS NATIONAL BANK OUTSOURCING PENSION PENSION REFORM PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT PORTFOLIOS PUBLIC POLICY REGULATOR REGULATORS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY STRUCTURES RISK MANAGEMENT SECURITIES SEES SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM SHAREHOLDER ADVOCATE SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL SHAREHOLDER MEETING SHAREHOLDER VALUE SHAREHOLDER VOTE SHAREHOLDERS SOCIETY STAKEHOLDERS STOCK EXCHANGE STOCK EXCHANGES STOCK MARKET STOCK MARKET CAPITALIZATION STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDIARY TRUST FUND World Bank Does More Power for Shareholders Undermine Board Stewardship? |
| relation |
Private Sector Opinion; No. 20 |
| description |
The level of shareholders'
expertise and experience needs to be questioned as they
wield greater clout and become more deeply involved in
strategic issues that should be the board's purview.
This misdirected involvement distracts shareholders from
their principal and most important role: electing and
overseeing boards. To play that role, shareholders must have
the basic tools from soliciting proxies of holders of voting
securities to having the ability to seek court relief for a
company's oppressive conduct. One of the important
principles of good governance is the empowerment of
shareholders. Unless they are able and willing to hold
boards to account, then there is little hope, short of tough
and intrusive regulation, of ensuring that company
management acts in anything other than their own narrow
self-interest. But the question is: how far should
shareholders go? Peter Dey's paper brings an important
perspective of someone who is both committed to good
governance and experienced as a corporate director. This
report heralded a new era of increased attention to the
responsibilities of Canadian boards as stewards of
shareholder value. Internationally, the author has been
associated with the International Corporate Governance
Network (ICGN) for the last ten years and has been an active
participant in the Global Corporate Governance Forum,
serving as a chairman. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Brief |
| author |
World Bank |
| author_facet |
World Bank |
| author_sort |
World Bank |
| title |
Does More Power for Shareholders Undermine Board Stewardship? |
| title_short |
Does More Power for Shareholders Undermine Board Stewardship? |
| title_full |
Does More Power for Shareholders Undermine Board Stewardship? |
| title_fullStr |
Does More Power for Shareholders Undermine Board Stewardship? |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Does More Power for Shareholders Undermine Board Stewardship? |
| title_sort |
does more power for shareholders undermine board stewardship? |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2011/01/14499021/more-power-shareholders-undermine-board-stewardship http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11067 |
| _version_ |
1764415400883257344 |