What it Takes to Lower Regulatory Risk in Infrastructure Industries : An Assessment and Benchmarking of Brazilian Regulators
This article points out that regulatory governance-how regulators manage concession contracts, or other public-private contractual arrangements and sector laws-can affect the private sector's perception of regulatory risk and thus the availabi...
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| Format: | Brief |
| Language: | English |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/09/8830441/takes-lower-regulatory-risk-infrastructure-industries-assessment-benchmarking-brazilian-regulators http://hdl.handle.net/10986/10645 |
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okr-10986-106452021-04-23T14:02:51Z What it Takes to Lower Regulatory Risk in Infrastructure Industries : An Assessment and Benchmarking of Brazilian Regulators Correa, Paulo ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS ATTORNEY GENERAL BENCHMARKING BOARD MEMBERS BUDGETARY RESOURCES CONSENSUS DECISION MAKERS DECISION MAKING DECISION-MAKING DECISION-MAKING PROCESS DISCRETIONARY POWER ECONOMIC REGULATION ELECTRICITY MARKET ELECTRICITY MARKET REFORM FEDERAL AGENCIES FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES FINANCIAL AUTONOMY FIRM PERFORMANCE GOVERNANCE INDEXES GOVERNMENT POLICY HUMAN RESOURCES INFORMAL MEETINGS INFRASTRUCTURE INDUSTRIES INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS INFRASTRUCTURE REGULATION JURISDICTION LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL PROVISIONS LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT LEGISLATURES LEGITIMACY MARKET STRUCTURES MISMANAGEMENT POLITICAL INTERFERENCE PRIVATE CAPITAL PRIVATE INFRASTRUCTURE PRIVATE INVESTMENT PRIVATE INVESTORS PRIVATE SECTOR PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC HEARINGS PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS REGULATED INDUSTRY REGULATOR REGULATORS REGULATORY AGENCIES REGULATORY AGENCY REGULATORY AUTHORITY REGULATORY DECISIONS REGULATORY DESIGN REGULATORY DISCRETION REGULATORY GOVERNANCE REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS REGULATORY MECHANISMS REGULATORY POWERS REGULATORY PROCESS REGULATORY PROCESSES REGULATORY SYSTEMS REGULATORY TOOLS RISK OF EXPROPRIATION RULES SHAREHOLDER STATE AGENCIES STATE ENTERPRISE STATE FINANCE STATE REGULATORY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSPARENCY TURNOVER UTILITIES UTILITIES POLICY UTILITY REGULATION UTILITY REGULATORS VETO VOTING This article points out that regulatory governance-how regulators manage concession contracts, or other public-private contractual arrangements and sector laws-can affect the private sector's perception of regulatory risk and thus the availability of private capital for infrastructure projects. Four key elements of the regulatory governance structure can reduce the risk of regulatory failure: political and financial autonomy, decision-making structures that reduce regulatory discretion, access to effective enforcement and other regulatory tools, and efficient rules of accountability. This note presents an analytical framework based on those four elements and applies it in assessing regulatory governance in Brazil. 2012-08-13T12:33:15Z 2012-08-13T12:33:15Z 2007-09 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/09/8830441/takes-lower-regulatory-risk-infrastructure-industries-assessment-benchmarking-brazilian-regulators http://hdl.handle.net/10986/10645 English Gridlines; No. 29 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Brief Publications & Research Latin America & Caribbean Brazil |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS ATTORNEY GENERAL BENCHMARKING BOARD MEMBERS BUDGETARY RESOURCES CONSENSUS DECISION MAKERS DECISION MAKING DECISION-MAKING DECISION-MAKING PROCESS DISCRETIONARY POWER ECONOMIC REGULATION ELECTRICITY MARKET ELECTRICITY MARKET REFORM FEDERAL AGENCIES FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES FINANCIAL AUTONOMY FIRM PERFORMANCE GOVERNANCE INDEXES GOVERNMENT POLICY HUMAN RESOURCES INFORMAL MEETINGS INFRASTRUCTURE INDUSTRIES INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS INFRASTRUCTURE REGULATION JURISDICTION LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL PROVISIONS LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT LEGISLATURES LEGITIMACY MARKET STRUCTURES MISMANAGEMENT POLITICAL INTERFERENCE PRIVATE CAPITAL PRIVATE INFRASTRUCTURE PRIVATE INVESTMENT PRIVATE INVESTORS PRIVATE SECTOR PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC HEARINGS PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS REGULATED INDUSTRY REGULATOR REGULATORS REGULATORY AGENCIES REGULATORY AGENCY REGULATORY AUTHORITY REGULATORY DECISIONS REGULATORY DESIGN REGULATORY DISCRETION REGULATORY GOVERNANCE REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS REGULATORY MECHANISMS REGULATORY POWERS REGULATORY PROCESS REGULATORY PROCESSES REGULATORY SYSTEMS REGULATORY TOOLS RISK OF EXPROPRIATION RULES SHAREHOLDER STATE AGENCIES STATE ENTERPRISE STATE FINANCE STATE REGULATORY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSPARENCY TURNOVER UTILITIES UTILITIES POLICY UTILITY REGULATION UTILITY REGULATORS VETO VOTING |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS ATTORNEY GENERAL BENCHMARKING BOARD MEMBERS BUDGETARY RESOURCES CONSENSUS DECISION MAKERS DECISION MAKING DECISION-MAKING DECISION-MAKING PROCESS DISCRETIONARY POWER ECONOMIC REGULATION ELECTRICITY MARKET ELECTRICITY MARKET REFORM FEDERAL AGENCIES FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES FINANCIAL AUTONOMY FIRM PERFORMANCE GOVERNANCE INDEXES GOVERNMENT POLICY HUMAN RESOURCES INFORMAL MEETINGS INFRASTRUCTURE INDUSTRIES INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS INFRASTRUCTURE REGULATION JURISDICTION LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL PROVISIONS LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT LEGISLATURES LEGITIMACY MARKET STRUCTURES MISMANAGEMENT POLITICAL INTERFERENCE PRIVATE CAPITAL PRIVATE INFRASTRUCTURE PRIVATE INVESTMENT PRIVATE INVESTORS PRIVATE SECTOR PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC HEARINGS PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS REGULATED INDUSTRY REGULATOR REGULATORS REGULATORY AGENCIES REGULATORY AGENCY REGULATORY AUTHORITY REGULATORY DECISIONS REGULATORY DESIGN REGULATORY DISCRETION REGULATORY GOVERNANCE REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS REGULATORY MECHANISMS REGULATORY POWERS REGULATORY PROCESS REGULATORY PROCESSES REGULATORY SYSTEMS REGULATORY TOOLS RISK OF EXPROPRIATION RULES SHAREHOLDER STATE AGENCIES STATE ENTERPRISE STATE FINANCE STATE REGULATORY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSPARENCY TURNOVER UTILITIES UTILITIES POLICY UTILITY REGULATION UTILITY REGULATORS VETO VOTING Correa, Paulo What it Takes to Lower Regulatory Risk in Infrastructure Industries : An Assessment and Benchmarking of Brazilian Regulators |
| geographic_facet |
Latin America & Caribbean Brazil |
| relation |
Gridlines; No. 29 |
| description |
This article points out that regulatory
governance-how regulators manage concession contracts, or
other public-private contractual arrangements and sector
laws-can affect the private sector's perception of
regulatory risk and thus the availability of private capital
for infrastructure projects. Four key elements of the
regulatory governance structure can reduce the risk of
regulatory failure: political and financial autonomy,
decision-making structures that reduce regulatory
discretion, access to effective enforcement and other
regulatory tools, and efficient rules of accountability.
This note presents an analytical framework based on those
four elements and applies it in assessing regulatory
governance in Brazil. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Brief |
| author |
Correa, Paulo |
| author_facet |
Correa, Paulo |
| author_sort |
Correa, Paulo |
| title |
What it Takes to Lower Regulatory Risk in Infrastructure Industries : An Assessment and Benchmarking of Brazilian Regulators |
| title_short |
What it Takes to Lower Regulatory Risk in Infrastructure Industries : An Assessment and Benchmarking of Brazilian Regulators |
| title_full |
What it Takes to Lower Regulatory Risk in Infrastructure Industries : An Assessment and Benchmarking of Brazilian Regulators |
| title_fullStr |
What it Takes to Lower Regulatory Risk in Infrastructure Industries : An Assessment and Benchmarking of Brazilian Regulators |
| title_full_unstemmed |
What it Takes to Lower Regulatory Risk in Infrastructure Industries : An Assessment and Benchmarking of Brazilian Regulators |
| title_sort |
what it takes to lower regulatory risk in infrastructure industries : an assessment and benchmarking of brazilian regulators |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/09/8830441/takes-lower-regulatory-risk-infrastructure-industries-assessment-benchmarking-brazilian-regulators http://hdl.handle.net/10986/10645 |
| _version_ |
1764413856112705536 |